The orthos logos in Aristotle’s ethics by Tian, Jie
  
Dissertation 
 
 
The Orthos Logos in Aristotle’s Ethics 
 
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades 
Doctor philosophiae 
(Dr. phil.) 
 
eingereicht  
an der Philosophischen Fakultät I  
der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 
 
Jie Tian, M.A. 
 
Dekan der Philosophischen Fakultät I: Prof. Michael Seadle, PhD  
Präsident der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin: Prof. Dr. Jan-Hendrik Olbertz 
 
Gutachter: 1. Prof. Dr. Thomas Schmidt 
         2. Prof. Dr. Klaus Corcilius 
 
Datum der Einreichung: 26.11.2013 
Datum der Verteidigung: 24.03.2014
Acknowledgments 
 I 
Acknowledgments 
First and foremost I would like to thank my first advisor Thomas Schmidt. It was 
unexpected good fortune to be able to study with him. He always made time for 
reading and discussing my work, and I benefited from his acute criticism of my 
writing. From him I learned much regarding philosophical thinking and writing. I also 
express respectful thanks to my second advisor Klaus Corcilius. It has been an honor 
to be his student. He taught me how to deal with the ancient writings, how to 
rigorously do philosophy, and how to respect the readers you face. I appreciate his 
contribution of time, ideas, and encouragement to get me through to the end. I am also 
grateful to Jacob Rosen. As our academic coordinator, he has gone beyond the 
ordinary for my sake. His insightful questions and comments, as well as his nice 
behaviour, have been an inestimable influence on me. 
 
I would also like to thank Carlo Natalie, Gabriel R. Lear, Richard Kraut, Ursula Wolf, 
for their very helpful comments and discussion on various versions of chapters. Also 
thanks to my colleagues in Graduate School, especially Wei Cheng, for giving helpful 
comments on the later version. Thanks to Joshua Crone, Christopher Noble, and 
Elizabeth Barfield for correcting the English in early versions. 
 
Thanks also to the Graduate School of Ancient Philosophy in HU and the former 
director Christopher Helmig. They made it possible for me to take part in conferences 
and to visit other universities in North America which was really helpful for my work. 
Thanks to the Chinese Scholarship Council for supporting me with a four year 
scholarship, and to the Humboldt University for providing the Abschlussstipendium 
to finish my last phase of study. 
 
Acknowledgments 
 II 
Lastly, I would like to thank my family for all their love and encouragement. To my 
parents who gave me all kinds of support, thank you more than words can say. Finally, 
I want to give special thanks to my wife, Minhua Jing, who provided me with 
invaluable advice, encouragement and happiness during the studies. She takes care of 
me patiently and carefully when I suffer from back pain and eye infection for several 
months each year. She also brought our first son into the world in the later stage of my 
PhD. In addition to all of these, she has been working hard on her own project PhD 
project in Heidelberg. For me, she is the moral sage whom I searched for in this work. 
So, I dedicate this to her. 
 
Contents 
 III 
Contents 
Acknowledgments ..................................................................................... I 
 
Introduction ............................................................................................... 1 
1. Why the Orthos Logos? ...................................................................................... 1 
2. The State of Research: A Brief Overview .......................................................... 2 
3. Outline by Chapters ............................................................................................ 4 
 
Chapter 1: Textual Analysis .................................................................... 9 
1. The Division of Moral Stages ............................................................................. 9 
2. Moral Features of the Orthos Logos ................................................................. 14 
2.1. Πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς ........................................................................... 15 
2.2. From κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον to μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου ........................... 16 
2.3. Ὡρισμένῃ λόγῳ ....................................................................................... 18 
2.4. The σαφές Problem ................................................................................. 23 
2.5. The OL in Akrates and Enkrates ............................................................. 27 
2.6. Related Texts in EE ................................................................................ 29 
2.7. Related Text in MM ................................................................................ 31 
 
Chapter 2: Primary Interpretations ..................................................... 38 
1. Cook Wilson’s View ......................................................................................... 38 
2. Rule View ......................................................................................................... 41 
Contents 
 IV 
3. Particularist View.............................................................................................. 45 
4. Revised Faculty View ....................................................................................... 54 
5. Author’s Revision of the Philological Attack ................................................... 56 
6. A Brief Summary .............................................................................................. 60 
 
Chapter 3: The Orthos Logos in the Virtue-Acquiring Stage ............. 63 
1. The Disadvantages of the Revised Faculty View: A Review ........................... 64 
2. Nature, Habit, and Virtue .................................................................................. 67 
2.1. Nature and Habituation ........................................................................... 67 
2.2. By Nature, Against Nature, and According to Nature ............................ 69 
2.3. Nature and Reason .................................................................................. 73 
3. Reasoning and Virtue-Acquiring ...................................................................... 79 
3.1. Repeatedly Practicing and Making Decisions ........................................ 79 
3.2. Two Basic Positions ................................................................................ 83 
3.3. Imitation, Pleasure, and Reasoning ......................................................... 89 
3.4. Shame (αἰδώς) and Reasoning ................................................................ 95 
4. Deliberation and Prohairesis .......................................................................... 107 
4.1. The Means-End or the Constituents-End .............................................. 109 
4.2. Deliberation and the Orthos Logos ....................................................... 112 
5. Conclusive Suggestion .................................................................................... 117 
 
Chapter 4: The Orthos Logos in the Virtue-Acquired Stage ............ 119 
1. Phronesis: An Outline..................................................................................... 121 
1.1 Phronesis and Ethical Virtue ................................................................. 122 
1.2 Phronesis and True Logos ...................................................................... 126 
2. Phronesis, Good Deliberation, and Practical Syllogism ................................. 129 
2.1 Phronesis and Good Deliberation .......................................................... 129 
2.2 Good Deliberation and Practical Syllogism ........................................... 134 
Contents 
 V 
3. Good Deliberation qua the Orthos Logos ....................................................... 137 
3.1 The Universal and the Particular ............................................................ 138 
3.2 Objection to the Particularist View ........................................................ 141 
3.3 Moral Perception, Experience, and Deliberation ................................... 145 
3.4 Deliberation as Prescription and Explanation ........................................ 151 
4. Advantages of Deliberation qua the Orthos Logos ......................................... 155 
 
Conclusion ............................................................................................. 160 
 
Bibliograhy ............................................................................................ 166 
 
Erklärung über die selbstständige Abfassung meiner Dissertation 183 
 
 
Introduction 
 1 
Introduction 
1. Why the Orthos Logos?1 
The fundamental motivation behind my decision to focus on the orthos logos for my 
dissertation project is the importance, despite the remaining ambiguity, of this concept 
in Aristotle’s ethical context, particularly the teachings from Nicomachean Ethics.2 
Said importance is characterized by Aristotle’s belief, as he says in the second book 
of his Nicomachean Ethics, that the OL can determine the right action and that this 
right action builds the characteristic state of ethical virtue. In other words, the right 
action is in accordance with the OL; the virtuous state is formed by performing 
virtue-like action, which is, I argue, one kind of right action. By virtue-like action, I 
do not mean action that comes from a virtuous state, but rather action which comes 
from imitating truly virtuous action. To this effect, the OL determines both right 
action and also ethical virtue through determining the virtue-like action. 
 
According to Aristotle, this ethical quandary aims at generating “good” people who 
possess virtuous states and perform virtuous actions (EN II 2, 1103b26-34； II 6, 
1106b36-1107a2). This makes the OL vital and decisive for his ethical framework as a 
whole, but what the OL really is remains elusive—not only because the concept of 
logos is ambiguous, but also because Aristotle seems to abandon the subject entirely 
partway through the inquiry. In Book II 2, he raises the question of what the OL is and 
                                                        
1 I use OL as an abbreviation for orthos logos in this paper, but the abbreviation of OL does not imply that OL is 
an entity nor a thing. It seems also possible that orthos is simply a modification of logos. If the latter is the case, 
it would be possible for Aristotle to qualify the same logos differently in other passages: e.g., as alethê in 
1139a22-6. The wording of line 1138b20, ho logos ho orthos, indicates that this latter interpretation is likely 
correct. 
2 In this project, I mainly focused on the Nichomachean Ethics, while other related passages in Eudeimian Ethics 
and Magna Moralia are relatively briefly discussed. Throughout this paper, unless otherwise noted, “ethics” 
refers to Nicomachean Ethics. 
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mentions the moral function of the OL several times afterwards, paying considerable 
attention to the concept. At the beginning of Book 6, there is a brief reiteration of the 
function of the OL and again a question regarding its definition: he tells us that he will 
discuss the OL, including its definition or limit (ὅρος) (EN VI 1, 1138b34), but goes 
on to focus on intellectual virtue rather than the OL throughout the sixth Book, thus 
failing to provide the complete definition of the OL as promised, (or at least failing to 
provide it straight-forwardly.) 
 
What is the OL? Why and how can the OL determine right action and ethical virtue? 
To this day, the answers to these questions remain obscure. Indeed, if Aristotle 
himself has not answered them, the soundness of his ethical framework is threatened 
as it remains unclear how one can perform right action and build ethical virtue. If 
Aristotle does have an answer but does not give it to us directly, (as is my argument,) 
then it is our task not only to fully define the OL, but to determine why Aristotle did 
not explicitly do so. 
2. The State of Research: A Brief Overview 
For centuries, commentators have disputed the nature and the content of the OL 
without reaching a satisfactory solution. There are two basic standpoints from which 
scholars typically address this problem: Some believe that Aristotle failed to present 
us with the definition of the OL as he had originally planned, and so given the 
importance of the OL, that he also failed to build a consistent ethical framework;3 the 
other standpoint, more optimistically, asserts that Aristotle does define the OL but 
only insofar as it can be extracted and reconstructed from his ethics. 
 
One of the most influential interpretations of the latter approach was presented by 
Cook Wilson (1912). He classifies the OL under the faculty of reason, i.e., the 
principle of the soul. In this sense, the OL can guide other faculties of the human soul 
such as desire or feeling. Furthermore, through moral training, the OL shapes the 
veracity of the faculty, i.e., “right” reasoning, through which moral learners are 
                                                        
3 Ackrill (1974), pp. 339-59, also in Rorty (1980), pp. 15-34; Tugendhat (1993), pp. 239-49. Thanks to Klaus 
Corcilius for pointing this out. 
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instructed in rationality. Lastly, the expression of the OL becomes the law that good 
people obey. As Cook Wilson says, “[the law] is not here thought of as a mere rule, 
but as a rule in which reason expresses itself, with the implied opposition of reason to 
desire and appetite.”(1912, p. 116) Cook Wilson’s view is that reason, as a faculty of 
the human soul, is the root of these other two meanings: namely, reasoning or the 
activity of the faculty, and the law, or the expression or production of the faculty. His 
view can as such be called the “faculty view” in general, (although his interpretation 
of the OL contains a broader sense than the pure rational faculty by encompassing the 
activity and product of the faculty, as well.) 
 
Later commentators have developed multiple interpretations based on their critiques 
of Cook Wilson’s view. There seems to be a general consensus among them that the 
OL should be an activity or product of the rational faculty of the human soul, rather 
than of the rational faculty itself.4 
Nevertheless, this consensus contains intricate and complex differences within 
varying interpretations of the OL. There are two opposing groups (which criticize 
each other rather severely, in fact.) The first insists that OL is a correct exercise of the 
rational faculty, i.e., right deliberation or reasoning which is the activity of the 
rational faculty, which I refer to here as the “revised faculty view”. The other group 
favors the OL as a universal formulation, i.e., a defining rule, moral principle, or law 
that is the result or product of reasoning or deliberation, which I call the “rule view”. 
In short, the revised faculty view takes the OL as the right reasoning or deliberation, 
while the rule view takes the OL as a rule that results from the reasoning. Each group 
contains many prominent thinkers: in the former group, there are Dirlmeier (richtige 
Planung), Urmson (right reason), Ursula Wolf (richtige Überlegung), Carlo Natali 
(retta ragione), and Roger Crisp (right reason), while the latter group includes Grant 
                                                        
4 Actually, it is hard to find anyone who classifies the OL purely as a rational faculty. The first scholar to be 
criticized as a faculty-view supporter was Cook Wilson, who considers the OL a combination of faculty, 
exercise of faculty, and virtue of this faculty rather than a pure faculty. I discuss this point in detail later in this 
thesis.  
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(right law), Burnet (right rule), Ross (right rule or principle), Gauthier/Jolif (droite 
regle), and Dorothea Frede (richtiges Prinzip), among others.5 
 
Yet another interpretation has emerged within the past twenty years based on critique 
of the two interpretations above: some scholars are not content with the OL being 
conceptualized as a universal rule, and insist that the OL consists of the right 
propositions about morally particular situations, e.g., “doing this thing today with 
these friends is ‘generous’.” Gómez-Lobo (particular practical proposition or 
particular proposition) and Sarah Broadie (right prescription) are particularly 
representative of this view.6 I call this the “particularist view,” and in later chapters 
when referring to such a proposition about particular situation, I follow 
Gómez-Lobo’s definition of “particular proposition.” (I also use “proposition view” 
as a general term which integrates the rule view and particularist view.) Klaus 
Corcilius has also supported this way of thinking in terms of the OL, by arguing that it 
is simply a placeholder for a particular description of one’s action in given situation, 
and delivers no normative information for the moral agent; he further states that his 
interpretation does not preclude the function of the rule from the OL.7 A detailed 
analysis of these interpretations can be found in Chapter 2.  
3. Outline by Chapters 
My interpretation would express sympathy for the viewpoint that the OL is the right 
reasoning or deliberation. Unfortunately, those who hold this view have given us 
neither an adequate argument to support their interpretations, nor a strong response to 
those who insist that the OL is propositional. I must point out that the proposition 
view also plays a positive role in my interpretation, namely, I insist that we cannot 
make good deliberation and decision for a concrete action without good 
understanding and application of rule or proposition. 
                                                        
5 Irwin uses “right reason” in his translation, but later explains that he leaves it open to the reasoning or rule view. 
See Irwin (1985), p. 423. This list is not comprehensive. Cf. Taylor (2006), pp. 65-6, Moss (2014), p. 182. 
6 A similar interpretation had already been suggested by I. M. Crombie (1962), pp. 539-40; Gómez-Lobo, 1995, p. 
15-21; Sarah Broadie and Christopher Rowe translate it as “correct prescription”. 
7 Special thanks to Corcilius for letting me read and draw inspiration from his unpublished paper on this topic. 
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In order to more carefully examine the influence of different views on my own 
interpretation, I will divide my research into an examination of different moral stages: 
the virtue-acquiring stage (moral learning stage) and virtue-acquired stage (moral 
learned stage or morally mature stage.) To defend this methodology, I argue that these 
two moral stages exist in EN, and further, that because they exist, the OL might (or 
might appear to) be different things for moral agents at different stages. This 
established, it is reasonable that I probe the definition of OL according to these two 
moral stages.  
 
This work is structured as follows. In Chapter 1, I will analyze several texts related to 
the OL taken from EN, Eudemian Ethics (EE), and Magna Moralia (MM)8 in order to 
present a general overview, (though as mentioned above, the discussion mainly 
focuses on the texts from EN.) The textual analysis accomplishes two main tasks in 
the first chapter: 1) Justifying my division of the two moral stages for inquiry into 
what the OL is, and 2) sketching the moral features of the OL and problems within 
possible interpretations of the OL. In respect to the first task, I will not only argue the 
existence of the two stages and that the OL plays different roles in each stage, but also 
argue that the OL appears to be different things for different moral agents in these two 
different stages, even though it is one thing per se. In respect to the second task, I go 
on to analyze the concept of the orthos logos as a whole as well as the logos related to 
the context of the OL; I argue that according to the texts examined, the concept of 
logos in the OL is philologically open to the interpretations of both the rule view and 
the reasoning view rather than being limited only to the proposition view, as is 
claimed by the scholars in the proposition group (both universal and particular). In 
short, Chapter 1 focuses primarily on philological work and textual analysis. 
 
                                                        
8 The authenticity of these three books, especially the MM, has been very controversial. Here, because I focus my 
discussion on EN alone, I will avoid this disputation. My basic standpoint is that I accept the currently popular 
views that EN and EE are genuinely Aristotle’s work, and leave the problem of the authenticity of MM open. 
My discussion on the texts from EE and MM supplies only supplementary and auxiliary functions to my study 
of the OL in EN. For a more detailed discussion, the reader may refer to Schleiermacher (1835), Sprengel (1841; 
1843), Susemihl (1884), Jaeger (1923), von Arnim (1925), Dirlmeier (1983; 1984), Rowe (1971; 1983), Kenny 
(1978), and Cooper (1973).  
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In Chapter 2, I focus on presenting the main interpretations of the OL in detail. To 
better facilitate subsequent investigation, I present both the interpretations and the 
arguments for them simultaneously. This chapter, similar to Chapter 1, serves a 
preparatory and expository function in the dissertation. 
 
The next task is to examine my interpretation in comparison with the two most 
notable previous interpretations, right reasoning and proposition (again, both 
universal and particular,) to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of each. I discuss 
the two moral stages separately in Chapters 3 and 4, and ultimately argue that my 
interpretation not only philosophically lends stronger interpretative force and merits 
than the other two, but also contributes to a comprehensive and consistent reading of 
Aristotle’s ethical framework. 
 
In Chapter 3, I argue that the OL is, per se, one thing, i.e. rational deliberation or right 
practical syllogism, but that in the virtue-acquiring stage (especially early on) it 
appears as a series of propositions for the moral learner such as a set of rules, 
commands, or orders; it also can appear a particular proposition, namely only a piece 
of the syllogism (maybe the major premise or maybe the conclusion of syllogism of 
virtuous people.) These propositions can tell moral learners explicitly what they 
should do, as the learners are not capable initially of understanding the moral 
reasoning of “the practically wise man” (phronimos);9 they have not grasped the 
“why”. I will go on to argue that one’s ability for moral reasoning grows as moral 
reasoning matures. By “the mature form of moral reasoning,” I mean the moral 
reasoning of phronimos, or the man possessing practical wisdom. In the later phases 
of moral learning, moral reasoning develops into a relatively mature state but does not 
yet reach a fully virtuous state—moral reasoning becomes an important part of moral 
decision and judgment as the learner better understands the phronimos concept, or, in 
effect, the learner employs moral reasoning to make right decisions and judgments but 
only occasionally. To this effect, I also define this relatively mature form of moral 
reasoning in learners as the OL in a fairly loose sense. 
 
                                                        
9 I use masculine gender only because it is a literal translation of the masculine Greek word phronimos; the 
concept is fully gender-inclusive. 
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I identify the OL in the virtue-acquired stage as the right deliberation generated by 
phronesis in the last chapter (Chapter 4). Similarly to Jessica Moss (2014), I insist that 
Aristotle’s identification of phronesis and the OL is an overstatement (or, again, a 
loose expression). I argue that in the virtue-acquired stage, this identification refers in 
actuality to the activity of phronesis and the OL. 
 
First, Aristotle defines phronesis as an intellectual virtue which renders man capable 
of “good” deliberation (euboulia) and as a state existing with true logos. The meaning 
of true logos is obviously very close to the right logos, so I take this as a distinct sign 
of the relationship between the OL and good deliberation.  
 
Second, I argue that the function of deliberation, namely to find the means for the end, 
is the same as the function of the OL: to determine virtuous actions in concrete 
situations. Virtuous actions are the means to achieve the noble end of happiness, i.e., 
eudaimonia; these means are determined via deliberation under the guidance of the 
ultimate end and are prescribed by the OL as well. The OL works also under the 
guidance of this ultimate end in the form of a practical syllogism. The major premise 
is the formulation of the noble end, while the minor premise is the perceived 
particular elements (which share the middle term with the major premise.) The 
conclusion is the action which should be done in a given situation. This action, for the 
fully virtuous person, will actually and necessarily be done. The non-fully virtuous 
person may only be aware that the action is correct, but not complete it. This practical 
syllogism can be associated with good deliberation (at least in the virtue-acquired 
stage.) Aristotle himself makes this identification several times, in fact.  
 
The good deliberation or practical syllogism cannot only fit the function of the OL to 
determine virtuous action, but also provide an explanatory account for the action. This 
latter function is also the OL of the fully virtuous person. The rule view, I argue, 
overemphasizes the major premise of the practical syllogism and pays insufficient 
attention to the particular elements of concrete actions. The particularists fail to 
provide an adequate explanation for why the correct action should be done. The major 
premise of the syllogism provides us a final cause for the correct action, and the 
Introduction 
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practical syllogism in its entirety also includes the importance of the particular 
knowledge of correct actions. 
 
Moral leaners may be unable to understand the reasoning of fully virtuous people, 
because they do not yet understand the “why”. A command, a particular proposition, 
or the conclusion of the syllogism is better candidates for the OL than the reasoning 
form. Once reaching the point where they desire to know the “why”, then the 
reasoning form begins to play a substantial role in their continuing moral education 
process. 
 
There are notable challenges I must address when identifying and associating good 
deliberation with the practical syllogism. First, Aristotle also states several times that 
the conclusion of the practical syllogism is the action itself, not the decision to act. 
Second, deliberation, however, is likely not the (only) activity involved in particular 
situations. To know how to act in a particular situation, one needs perception to 
provide information. For this reason, the particularists would deny that deliberation 
can be the OL. Moreover, the example given in EN III 8, 1117a 17-22 speaks of 
courage when in sudden danger, which suggests that there is little time or space for 
deliberation in certain situations. In view of these problems, I first argue that the 
decision of fully virtuous people will actually and necessarily lead to an action. In the 
sense the conclusion of practical syllogism and decision of good deliberation could be 
identified. Then I argue that perception cannot simply be understood as sense 
perception; rather, it is perception trained by deliberation and moral principles. This 
perception, then, is influenced by reason. I call this kind of perception “moral 
perception,” while Aristotle sometimes calls it “practical nous” (EN VI 8, 1142a24). 
In short, I will prove that in the virtue-acquired stage, the OL is the right or good 
deliberation generated by phronesis. 
 
Chapter 1: Textual Analysis 
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Chapter 1: Textual Analysis 
In this chapter, I analyze texts related to the OL in order to fulfill two tasks: 1) 
justifying my division of two moral stages for the inquiry into the essential definition 
of the OL, and 2) determining the moral features of the OL and problems with 
possible interpretations of the OL. These two tasks cannot be undertaken completely 
separately, as they are somewhat interwoven. I discuss several passages from EN, EE, 
and MM in this chapter, but as discussed above, I mainly focus on EN. The 
interpretation of each passage will unveil several unique features and questions 
concerning the OL: The discussion of the first two passages justifies my division of 
the investigation into two distinct moral stages, (which, again, I call the 
“virtue-acquiring stage” and the “virtue-acquired” stage.) The discussion of the 
remaining passages reinforces my argument.  
1. The Division of Moral Stages 
I would like to begin with some questions from the opening passage of EN II 2, where 
Aristotle mentions for the first time in this work that we should perform our actions 
according to the OL. 
(Passage 1)10 
Τὸ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πράττειν κοινὸν καὶ ὑποκείσθω—ῥηθήσεται δ’ 
ὕστερον περὶ αὐτοῦ, καὶ τί ἐστιν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας 
ἀρετάς. 
                                                        
10 Passages in this dissertation are marked numerically for ease of reference. The Greek text, unless otherwise 
noted, is from Bywater’s Oxford Classical Text (OCT); Susemihl’s Text is also referenced. 
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Now, that we must act according to the orthos logos is a common [principle] and 
must be assumed—it will be discussed later, i.e., both what it is, and how it is 
related to the other virtues.11(1103b31-34) 
This passage consists of two parts: In the first part, Aristotle tells us that acting 
according to the OL is a common belief; the second part isthe promise Aristotle made 
that he would inquire into the nature of the OL and its relationship to the other virtues, 
(e.g., courage, justice, etc.). While the two parts are easily identified, the first contains 
several unclear elements—for example, in what sense was acting according to the OL 
a common belief accepted by the Greeks or the Academy at that time?12 Despite this 
common belief, do they know exactly what the OL is? Action according to the OL 
might simply be an action that follows a very general moral precept that was 
commonly accepted, or the OL could be the moral reasoning process of moral agents 
according to each particular moral situation, in which each agent’s purpose in acting 
according to the OL could differ. Some would believe this kind of action worthy of 
taking because it would profit them or bring them honor, while others would perform 
the action in order to build a virtuous state, (such as performing courageous actions to 
build bravery.) 
These considerations raise two main questions: 1) what kind of action is Aristotle 
talking about in the context of the quoted passage? 2) What is the OL? Aristotle 
answers the first question in terms of acquiring ethical virtue, (which will be 
discussed in detail later in this chapter,) but, as discussed above, he does not answer 
the second very clearly; it would be fair to say that he recognizes the importance of 
the investigation or need for clarification of the second question, however, as he does 
indeed include it. The primary goal of this dissertation is to uncover the answer to this 
second question. 
                                                        
11 All of the English translations in this thesis, unless otherwise noted, are from the Revised Oxford Text (ROT) 
with occasional small revisions; for example, in translating this passage, as there is no Greek word for the 
“principle“, I placed it in brackets. I also will make no attempt to translate the orthos logos into English. 
12 Some scholars (e.g., Burnet and Broadie,) think that acting according to the OL was commonly accepted in the 
Academy, but the use of the OL actually exists much earlier than the Academy (Herodotus II xvii 1; VI liii 2; 
VI lxviii 1; Thucydides II lxi 2). Here, I consider the OL a widely accepted concept beyond the scope of the 
Academy.  
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In addition to these two questions, there is another unclear point in the second part of 
the passage. Aristotle questions not only what the OL is, but also how it is related to 
the other virtues (πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς.) We might then question the Greek 
use of πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς, leading us to a third question: Does the Greek 
vocabulary, which Aristotle includes in his question, imply that the OL is also virtue, 
or is he simply using the Greek phrase (τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς) in a loose, colloquial sense, 
without suggesting that the OL is necessarily a virtue? 
I’ll begin by addressing the first question: What action is in accordance with the OL? 
In the larger context (and within the same page) of Passage 1, Aristotle discusses the 
manner in which virtue is acquired, arguing that it is done through habituation; in 
other words, that doing a good action frequently is the way to acquire the 
corresponding virtue. By frequently doing just actions, moral learners acquire the 
virtue of justice; by doing temperate actions, moral learners acquire the virtue of 
temperance (1105b4ff). Aristotle thus concludes that the state of character of moral 
learners arises from similar actions, and so that doing right actions is crucial for moral 
learners. Examining the right way to act, which can lead to the corresponding states of 
character, is necessary for moral growth. I call this kind of action “character-building 
action”. In effect, the building of good states of character is indirectly, through the 
right actions, determined by the OL (τὸ μὲν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον.)  
As mentioned above, the answer to the second question—what is the OL?—is the 
overarching aim of this thesis, but examining the third question may help to elucidate 
the second question. The focus of the argument regarding the third question is 
whether we can infer from the Greek phrase (πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς) that the OL is 
also a virtue. Those who favor interpreting the OL as a virtue (Cook Wilson, for 
example) connect any discussion on this third question with another passage, (which 
is marked here as “Passage 2”.) 
Analyzing Passage 2 at this point provides another important benefit: The analysis of 
Passages 1 and 2, in fact, allowed me to organize this inquiry into what the OL is into 
two sections according to each of the moral stages (again, the virtue-acquiring stage 
and virtue-acquired stage.) Through analyzing Passage 1, I concluded that the 
building of good states of character is done through right actions and determined by 
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the OL (κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον). If Passage 2 can inform us that the virtuous state is 
also determined by the OL and that this determination departs somewhat from the 
virtue-acquiring stage, then it would be reasonable to make two separate inquiries. 
Passage 2, which is from EN VI 13, where Aristotle identifies the OL with phronesis 
in the background to ethical virtue: 
 
(Passage 2) 
Ἔστι γὰρ οὐ μόνον ἡ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, ἀλλ’ ἡ μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου ἕξις 
ἀρετή ἐστιν· ὀρθὸς δὲ λόγος περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡ φρόνησίς ἐστιν.  
For it is not merely the state in accordance with the orthos logos, but the state 
that implies the presence of the orthos logos, that is virtue; and practical wisdom 
is orthos logos about such matters. (1144b26-28)13 
Aristotle emphasizes here that ethical virtue is a state that is not just in accordance 
with the OL (κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον), but also is present with the OL (μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ 
λόγου.) According to this perspective, Aristotle identifies the OL alongside the 
phronesis.  
Interpreting this passage comes with essentially two main challenges: First, 
determining how to understand the different and progressive relationship between 
κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον and μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου; and second, determining how to 
interpret the separate identification of OL and phronesis.  
The main task in approaching the first challenge seems to be undertaking philological 
work to explain the use of κατὰ and μετὰ in Aristotle’s context. First, though, it is 
important to note that in Passage 2, Aristotle describes virtue as a state—not only 
κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, but also μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου. In Passage 1, Aristotle 
emphasizes that character-building action, which occurs mainly in the 
virtue-acquiring stage, is simply κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον. It is clear that the OL is 
involved in two different moral stages, i.e., the virtue-acquiring stage and the 
                                                        
13 The ROT renders the sentence ἀλλ’ ἡ μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου ἕξις ἀρετή ἐστιν “the state that implies the 
presence of right reason.” In the Greek text there is no word for “imply”, rather simply the verb ἐστιν. 
Chapter 1: Textual Analysis 
 13 
virtue-acquired stage, and that the OL plays different roles in each moral stage (or has 
a different relationship with the moral states in each stage.) Virtue-building action is 
simply κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, while the virtuous state is not only κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν 
λόγον, but also μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου. This means that when moral learners have 
acquired virtue, the OL is not only followed as a learner follows an order, but rather 
the OL must be present, which suggests a closer relationship between the moral agent 
and the OL than that of order-taker and order-giver. By this “close relationship”, the 
OL likely does not function as an external imperative, but rather has been internalized 
into the character of the moral agent. This observation may also shed light on the 
second difficulty (i.e., the distinction between the OL and phronesis,) which I discuss 
in detail in Chapter 4. 
 
Here, however, I would like to focus on the philological clarification of the latter 
sentence of Passage 2: ὀρθὸς δὲ λόγος περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡ φρόνησίς ἐστιν. This 
clarification will further justify my use of the two moral stages throughout this thesis. 
 
The Revised Oxford Text (ROT) renders the sentence as, “practical wisdom is right 
reason about such matters.” In this translation, the phrase περὶ τῶν τοιούτων seems to 
modify the word logos. The translation seems to imply that there are logoi regarding 
many different topics: logoi on mathematics, logoi on insects, logoi on stones, etc. 
Not every correct logos constitutes practical wisdom, but only the correct logos about 
certain things—presumably, the correct logos about human action.14 When applying 
the OL to ethical matters, as I argued above, the prior sentence certainly implies two 
moral stages: the virtue-acquiring stage (which is simply κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον,) and 
virtue-acquired stage (which is also μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου.) If it is reasonable to think 
that there are many logoi about different topics, it would also be reasonable to think 
                                                        
14 Thanks for Jacob Rosen for pointing this out to me. This reading is a very natural reading, and is similar to 
those taken by other translators. I do not think this reading is incorrect, but it does create at least two 
disadvantages for me: First, Passage 1 only mentions the OL generally, but not the ethical OL, i.e., it seems that 
there is a “general” OL .If we apply the general OL to the mathematical domain, it becomes the OL on 
mathematics; if we put the general OL toward insects, it becomes the OL on insects. Aristotle does not 
explicitly give us this idea, however. Second, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων is the plural form, so if it refers to ethical 
matters, it does not occur in the former sentence, rather only the singular form of ἕξις or ἀρετή. We might as 
such say that it refers to virtuous human actions, which also is most likely correct, but not made explicitly clear 
by Aristotle himself. 
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that there are different right logoi about human actions or states in the different moral 
stages—namely, the OL on human actions and states in the virtue-acquiring stage and 
that on the virtue-acquired stage. It might be that in the virtue-acquired stage, the OL 
is identified with phronesis without qualification, while the same cannot be true of the 
virtue-acquiring stage. Therefore, it is reasonable to focus this discussion on these two 
moral stages. 
 
In addition, ἐστιν in this passage does not necessarily imply identification without 
qualification, even for the virtue-acquired stage; the OL and phronesis may be 
identified simply due to their shared function in terms of the moral state in the 
virtue-acquired stage, as both are the formal cause of virtue. If they were not 
identified without qualification, we would continue to probe the exact definition of 
the OL. Additionally, in the virtue-acquiring stage, it would be reasonable to ask 
whether this identification still exists: If it does, would this identification exist in the 
exact same sense as in the virtue-acquired stage, or would it be different? If there is 
no identification at all in the virtue-acquiring stage, then what is the OL in the 
virtue-acquiring stage? 
If I am right so far, the above questions allow me to reasonably conduct my research 
in the following manner: to provide an overview of the OL in the ethical context, to 
determine what the OL could be, and then to examine the OL from the separate 
contexts of the virtue-acquiring stage and the virtue-acquired stage. Aristotle’s 
question—what is the OL?—can be re-formulated here, then, as the following 
question: What is the OL in the virtue-acquiring stage and what is it in the 
virtue-acquired stage? 
2. Moral Features of the Orthos Logos 
In the sections above, I established the motivation behind my research focus and 
explained how I have organized this thesis according to analysis of Passages 1 and 2. 
Now, we can proceed to gather as much information as possible about the OL to 
identify what the OL exactly is and what kind of moral features the OL has. 
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2.1. Πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς 
The discussion on whether we can infer from the Greek phrase (πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας 
ἀρετάς) that the OL is also a virtue (Section 1, p. 14), is a good place to begin, as 
Passage 1, where said question arises, is the first in which Aristotle mentions the OL 
and seems to give us essential information or implications about identifying the OL.  
 
Cook Wilson and several eminent scholars15 are quite confident that the OL here is a 
virtue, primarily because they think that the last portion of Passage 1 (καὶ πῶς ἔχει 
πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς) implies that the OL is itself a virtue; the nouns on both sides 
of the “other” (ἄλλας) should be in the same category. Passage 2 then tells us that the 
OL is identical to phronesis, which is a virtue. Accordingly, Cook Wilson and other 
scholars identify the OL as a virtue, and that virtue is phronesis. 
 
This conclusion is premature, however, and critics have been quick to respond to it. 
Wilson’s arguments can be rather easily challenged in the context of the ancient world 
in general, and in Aristotle’s texts in particular. First, this implication from language 
cannot even be taken as a serious argument because it reflects linguistic habits. A. R. 
Lord provides a few notable examples: “Homer speaks of Nausicaa and her ‘other’ 
serving maids, of Athena apart from the ‘other’ suitors; Xenophon says there was no 
grass nor any ‘other’ tree; and Plato says that Socrates has been careless of business, 
family affairs, military offices, public speaking and ‘other’ magistracies.”16 We often 
place a noun from a different category than the previous nouns after the word “other” 
as simply a colloquialism found in everyday speech. However, Lord is also aware that 
in this case, ἄλλας is used without any article, while Aristotle uses τὰς ἄλλας with an 
article in Passage 1. Clearly, Lord does not find this an insuperable difficulty and 
claims that the OL is the “right rule”, but unfortunately, does not give us any further 
explanation.  
 
Nevertheless, I think that Lord is quite correct. Variations in the “ἄλλoς” article 
(accusative plural versus nominative singular,) with similar usage as that shown in 
                                                        
15 Cook Wilson (1914), p. 114; Dirlmeier (1956), p. 298. Burnet (1914) brackets the words after ὑποκείσθω in 
Passage 1, in order to avoid the implication that the orthos logos is a virtue, pp. 79-80. 
16 A. R. Lord (1914), p. 1. 
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Lord’s examples are found in works by Plato and other Greek writers. For example, 
Plato puts citizens and aliens together by phrasing it, “εὐδαιμονιζόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν 
πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων” (Gorgia, 473 C); Xenophon puts hoplites together 
with other cavalries by saying, “τοὺς ἐν τῷ κατα λόγῳ ὁ πλίτας καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους 
ἱππέας” (Hellenica, 2. 4. 9).17 It is also important to note that Aristotle himself does 
not explicitly define the term logos in his ethical works as “virtue”, nor does he do so 
with the OL. The only passage that could plausibly be argued to imply that the OL is a 
virtue is Passage 2, where Aristotle identifies the OL with phronesis. This 
identification is not without qualification, howeve, it may be made only because they 
have the same function with regard to ethical virtue, as they make full virtue possible. 
Therefore, it is still not fully possible to determine whether the OL is a kind of virtue 
like phronesis, and as such, the two arguments that Cook Wilson provides are not 
adequate to prove that the OL is a virtue. The possibility of the OL as virtue is still left 
open, though, if we can prove that the use of ὁ ἄλλoς in Aristotle’s vocabulary 
consistently connects to the same categories. 
 
I hope I have now provided the reader with a satisfying answer to the third question 
posed in Section 1 and a thorough discussion on Passage 1. Above, I also discussed 
very briefly the second difficulty inherent to Passage 2, i.e., how to separately identify 
the OL and phronesis. (Further discussion on this problem will be addressed in the 
detailed investigation of the two moral stages.) The first challenge in Passage 2, how 
to understand the difference and progressive relationship between κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν 
λόγον and μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου, is the focus of the following subsection. 
2.2. From κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον to μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου 
Κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον literally means “according to the OL,” and μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ 
λόγου means, “along with the OL.” From the literal meaning alone, it is difficult to 
determine if it is a progressive relationship from κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον to μετὰ τοῦ 
ὀρθοῦ λόγου, or, in other words, that μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου has a stronger meaning 
than κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον. However, according to the context of Passage 2 and the 
above analysis of Passages 1 and 2, it is clear that μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου has a 
                                                        
17  Many other examples are given by Raphael Kuhner & Friedrich Blass. Ausführliche Grammatik Der 
Griechischen Sprache, 3. Auflage.1966, Teil II, Erst Band, p. 275. 
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stronger meaning than κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, since Aristotle connects them 
specifically with “οὐ μόνον (not only)” and “ἀλλα (but also)”. This is evident because 
Aristotle seems to demand more from the μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου than from κατὰ τὸν 
ὀρθὸν λόγον, because the κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον represents the building of virtuous 
character, but the state of ethical virtue requires not only κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, but 
also μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου. The progressive relationship between these two phrases is 
acceptable here;18 however, what does the progressive relationship of these two 
phrases refer to exactly?  
 
Most scholars basically agree on the interpretation of this progressive relationship, 
with some slight differences; I agree with them. In terms of my specific argument, 
κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον refers to the virtue-acquiring stage in Passage 1. Moral learners 
at this stage may merely have a basic idea of what is right and wrong (Burnyeat calls 
this basic knowing “the that”,) without an understanding of what makes right and 
wrong (Burnyeat calls this “the why”. I will discuss this distinction in detail in 
Chapter 3.) If the learner does not know “the why”, he or she might perform 
character-building actions purely through a set of traditional precepts, moral rules, or 
any form of external instructions; the basic idea of right or wrong is not internalized. 
These external, prescriptive instructions could be the OL, but we cannot yet confirm 
that definition; this point will also be discussed further in Chapter 3.  
 
It is essential to keep in mind, here, that moral learners perform their 
character-building actions without their own judgment of moral situations if they do 
not know “the that” or “the why” and only follow external instructions. Alternatively, 
then, moral learners who have acquired the “that” and “why” can indeed make correct 
decisions independently; but they may still perform wrong actions if their desires or 
emotions obscure the OL. Individuals at later stages of moral learning, namely those 
in the state μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου, however, do not have this conflict between the OL 
and desire because the OL has integrated into the moral state. The result of the 
                                                        
18 It is actually awidely accepted reading that μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου has a stronger meaning than κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν 
λόγον (Dirlmeier (1956), pp. 472-3; Broadie/Rowe (2002), p. 383; Walter (1874), p. 145; Gottlieb (1994), pp. 
275-90), so I consider this the traditional reading. J.A. Smith (1920) provides a non-traditional, and in effect, 
totally opposite reading of this point which was also accepted by Hardie (1968), pp. 236-9 and Irwin (1985), p. 
349.  
Chapter 1: Textual Analysis 
 18 
integration is harmony between the OL and desire.19 In this harmonious state, a moral 
agent not only knows what the right action is, but also does what they know to be 
right without any inner conflict; by this I mean that the desireis to follow the OL, 
which is the state of ethical virtue. As Aristotle says in EN VI 2, “Moral excellence is 
a state concerned with choice, and choice is deliberate desire, therefore both the 
reasoning must be true (τε τόν λόγον ἀληθῆ) and the desire right (καὶ τὴν ὄρεξιν 
ὀρθήν), if the choice is to be good, and the latter must pursue just what the former 
asserts.” (1139a22-6) 
 
I will refrain from analyzing this complicated passage (or the concept of prohairesis) 
here, but do intend to show that for Aristotle, the virtuous state requires both parts: the 
logos and the desire to act in a right and consistent way. Aristotle thus admits that 
“continent” and “incontinent” people (enkrates and akrates) share the OL (1102b15). 
They know what is good and right, but their desire innately leads them toward doing 
wrong; ultimately, akrates gives in and acts unethically because his desire overcomes 
his reason, while enkrates acts ethically because his reason overcomes his desire. 
Neither akrates nor enkrates can be called virtuous, however, due to this inner 
conflict between right reason and unright desire. 
 
I have now discussed the first difficulty of Passage 2, but the discussions above on 
Passages both 1 and 2 have still not brought us closer to a precise definition of the 
OL—it remains unclear whether the OL is a virtue, (i.e., phronesis,) or a set of moral 
rules, or whether the OL is the same or different in the virtue-acquiring stage 
compared to the virtue-acquired stage. It could be a set of moral rules in the 
virtue-acquiring stage which are then internalized as one entity, virtue, in the 
virtue-acquired stage. This possibility does not conflict with Aristotle’s distinction of 
κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον and μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου; and if this is right for Aristotle, the 
OL is simply a placeholder for different things in different situations. 
2.3. Ὡρισμένῃ λόγῳ 
Aristotle uses not only κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον and μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου, but also 
ὡρισμένῃ λόγῳ, ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθὸς λέγει to express the fact that the OL determines the 
                                                        
19 I provide a more comprehensive discussion on Aristotelian moral psychology in a Chapter 3, Section 2.  
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state of moral character. We may be able to glean more information from the precise 
usage of these phrases. In the definition of ethical virtue, for example, Aristotle more 
specifically states the relationship between ethical virtue and the OL. 
 
(Passage 3) 
Ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὡρισμένῃ 
λόγῳ καὶ ᾧ ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν. 
 
Virtue, then, is a state concerned with choice, lying in a mean relative to us, this 
being determined by reason and in the way in which the man of practical wisdom 
would determine it. (1106b36-1107a2) 
 
In Passage 3, Aristotle does not expressly refer to the orthos logos, but instead simply 
to the logos; that said, it is widely accepted that logos here means orthos logos. 
(Passage 4, which can be found below, further confirms the identification between the 
logos in Passage 3 and the OL.) I will discuss this point later in this chapter in greater 
detail, but this statement of the identification justifies my focus on Passage 3 though it 
does not contain “the orthos logos” explicitly.  
 
Returning to Passage 3: Aristotle tells us that to find the “mean” and “intermediate” is 
vital for ensuring virtuous states and virtuous actions; the logos determines the mean, 
which phronimos determines via the logos. It is important to note, here, that this 
interpretation is the result of two emendations of the manuscript from later 
commentators: First, where ὡρισμένη was emended as ὡρισμένῃ, and second, ὡς as 
ᾧ.20 In the first emendation, if ὡρισμένη is utilized, the sentence means that state 
(ἕξις) is determined by the logos; if we use ὡρισμένῃ, the sentence indicates that the 
mean is (μεσότης). I would assert that either option may be correct, but that the 
middle state (μεσότης) to which ὡρισμένῃ refers gives us more specific information 
about virtue than the state in general (ἕξις), so ὡρισμένῃ seems to me better than 
ὡρισμένη. There is not much dispute about this emendation. The second emendation, 
                                                        
20 Both of these emendations were made by both Alexander and Aspasius, and adopted by Bywater. 
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ὡς as ᾧ, however, seems less persuasive than the first.21 Taking ᾧ here creates 
emphasis on the instrumental usage of the logos for phronimos, precisely, that 
phronimos determines the mean through or by the logos. If we take ὡς, conversely, 
the instrumental sense is much looser: phronimos determines the mean obliquely, or 
that phronimos determines the mean in the way of the logos determining the mean. 
According to this interpretation of ὡς, the logos is not necessarily the instrument of 
phronimos, but rather independent of the phronimos. Both options are reasonable. 
However, that which is preferable seems dependent upon the as-established meaning 
of the logos and the reader’s understanding of phronimos. 
 
So, Passage 3 tells us that the ethical virtue is a mean state (μεσότης) concerning 
choice, and that the logos can determine the mean (μεσότης). This implies that the 
logos serves as an ethical function for virtuous people, namely, that the logos can help 
the moral agent aim for the intermediate (μέσον) and avoid weakness in both actions 
and feelings; the logos tells the moral agent what is right to do as well as what is the 
appropriate reaction to his feelings. 
 
In the remainder of this chapter, I address Aristotle’s words in Passage 3 which tell us 
that the mean (μεσότης) is a consequence of the habitual choice of the intermediate 
(μέσον). A few lines before the Passage 3 Aristotle says: “Virtue (excellence) is a 
kind of mean, since it aims at what is intermediate,” (1106b27-28). To be specific, it 
is the intermediate that is determined by the logos.22 This creates two levels: 1) the 
first where the OL initially determines the intermediate of particular actions and 
feelings, and the mean state is built from frequently performing the right actions and 
                                                        
21 Bywater and Burnet accept the ᾧ and Ross also brings this emendation into his translation, but many other 
scholars (e.g., Gomez-Lobo, Corcilius, Wilson in his early work,) prefer the ως. In the quoted translation of 
Passage 3, which is from Ross’s revised translation of the ROT, “…by that principle by which…” replaces 
“…in the way in which…”. 
22 Cf. Gomez-Lobo (1995), who asserts that both readings of ὡρισμένη and ὡρισμένῃ are unsatisfactory, claiming 
instead that the logos determines “the object of our choice or the intermediate relative to us” (pp. 16-7). I insist 
that it is more appropriate to say that the mean, rather than the intermediate, is determined by the logos. In the 
definition of “ethical virtue”, Aristotle emphasizes the state of said virtue rather than one specific action that 
aims at the intermediate. The virtuous state is built by the frequent performance of good actions. Gomez-Lobo 
is not wrong, though, because if only actions that aim at the intermediate are determined by the logos, then the 
state of the mean that is built by these actions can yet be determined by the logos. 
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appropriate reactions. (Therefore, the mean state is also somewhat determined by the 
logos) and 2) a second after the mean state has been established, where the logos is 
internalized and incorporated into this virtuous state. The logos “determining” the 
intermediate means that the logos accompanies (or even is itself a part of) the virtuous 
state which drives the agent’s particular actions and feelings in a given situation. 
Indeed, these two levels exactly correspond to the distinction between κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν 
λόγον and μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου. In addition, the ethical function of the logos exists 
throughout both the virtue-acquiring stage and the virtue-acquired stage. 
According to this normative force of the logos, many scholars have insisted that the 
logos should be translated und understood as a moral “rule”, “principle”, “norm”, or 
even “plan”. There are many very renowned names in this group, including Burnet 
(rule), Ross (rule or principle), Gauthier/Jolif (regle), Dirlmier (Planung), and others... 
I call this group the “rule-group” and their view the “rule-view”. (I provide fairly 
cursory definitions of these viewpoints here, but will come back to analyze the 
rule-view and other varying interpretations in detail in Chapter 2.) In reference to the 
moral rule, the intermediate action can be made and the mean can be built accordingly; 
the moral rule is reached by the phronimos through deliberation, and then applied to a 
particular situation. The ultimate goal of the human search for happinessis best 
attained by virtuous actions, which aim for the intermediate between extremes, and 
these virtuous actions should follow such a rule.23 
 
This does seem to be a promising interpretation. First, according to many in the 
rule-group and several other commentators,24 the rule-view avoids the unresolved 
philological difficulty that continued to perplex Cook Wilson and others. (I will 
address this point in Chapter 2, as well.) Second, proponents of this rule-view 
(especially Ross and Gauthier/Jolif) are strongly influenced by Kantian moral theory, 
(which indeed has sizable influence on the history of philosophy as a whole.) Within 
such a wide and universal background, it seems rather easy to understand and accept 
the rule-view. Third, the rule-view simply aligns with common sense—our growth in 
                                                        
23 Ross (1995), p. 229; plus a similar and even more subtle rule view espoused by Joachim (1951) in his 
influential commentary, p. 167. 
24 By “several other commentators,” I mean mainly Gomez-Lobo and Corcilius. 
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moral capacity certainly takes place under the influence of many rules that have 
existed throughout the whole of history and across the globe (e.g., do not steal, do not 
kill.) 
 
It is important to accept, before moving forward, that Aristotle’s view might not be 
fully aligned with Kant’s nor even be in accordance with common sense. The 
rule-view accordingly faces two major difficulties. First, Aristotle seems not to attach 
much importance to universal knowledge in ethical matters. A universal rule stated 
loosely is useless in a concrete moral situation (EN II 2, 1103b34-1104a11). Second, 
Aristotle does not explicitly or implicitly define the OL in terms of the rule or 
principle; rather, he defines it, (although with general lack of rigor,) as phronesis, an 
intellectual virtue.  
 
In addition to these two difficulties, another issue is posed if placing the rule-view 
into question according to my two-stage theory. According to my argument, moral 
rules take effect in two types of people, namely, the moral learner and the phronimos, 
who has both ethical virtue and practical wisdom. The way that the rule takes effect in 
a person differs depending on which of the two stages he has reached, however: moral 
learners simply follow the rule, because they have neither yet developed 
decision-making skills or a firm internal foundation for performing virtuous 
actions—they are aware of “the that”, but remain unable to possess “the why”, and 
thus cannot aim at the intermediate by themselves. They build the mean state only 
according to consistently following the moral rule. Phronimos, on the contrary, does 
indeed cognize moral rules and apply and adjust them according to particular 
situations. According to this model, my question is how the moral learner can grow 
into phronimos simply through following moral rules: I’ll call this the third difficulty.  
 
Unfortunately, the rule-group seems to have failed to respond very effectively to these 
three difficulties despite their serious importance. Even if they can explain away these 
difficulties merely according to this normative force of the logos, it is still hasty to 
conclude that the meaning of the logos is “rule”.  
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2.4. The σαφές Problem 
We have now examined three important passages that inform us about the OL, but the 
precise definition of the OL remains elusive, again, as Aristotle does not give us a 
clear-cut definition. Another important passage, quoted at length below, can be found 
at the beginning of the sixth Book of the Ethics, where Aristotle reconsiders the 
question of the OL for the first time after posing it in EN II 2 (Passage 1). 
 
(Passage 4) 
Ἐπεὶ δὲ τυγχάνομεν πρότερον εἰρηκότες ὅτι δεῖ τὸ μέσον αἱρεῖσθαι, μὴ τὴν 
ὑπερβολὴν μη δὲ τὴν ἔλλειψιν, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐστὶν ὡς ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθὸς λέγει, τοῦτο 
διέλωμεν. ἐνπάσαις γὰρ ταῖς εἰρημέναις ἕξεσι, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἔστι 
τις σκοπὸς πρὸς ὃν ἀποβλέπων ὁ τὸν λόγον ἔχων ἐπι τείνει καὶ ἀνίησιν, καί τις 
ἔστιν ὅρος τῶν μεσοτήτων, ἃς μεταξύ φαμεν εἶναι τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς 
ἐλλείψεως, οὔσας κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον. ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲνεἰ πεῖνο ὕτως ἀληθὲς μέν, 
οὐθὲν δὲ σαφές· καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιμελείαις, περὶ ὅσας ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, 
τοῦτ’ ἀληθὲς μὲν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι οὔτε πλείω οὔτε ἐλάττω δεῖ πονεῖν οὐδὲ ῥᾳθυμεῖν, 
ἀλλὰ τὰ μέσα καὶ ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος· τοῦτο δὲ μόνον ἔχων ἄν τις οὐδὲν ἂν εἰδείη 
πλέον, οἷον ποῖα δεῖ προσφέρεσθαι πρὸς τὸ σῶμα, εἴ τις εἴπειεν ὅτι ὅσα ἡ ἰατρικὴ 
κελεύει καὶ ὡς ὁ ταύτην ἔχων. διὸ δεῖ καὶ περὶ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἕξεις μὴ μόνον 
ἀληθῶς εἶναι τοῦτ’ εἰρημένον, ἀλλὰ καὶ διωρισμένον τίς ἐστιν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος καὶ 
τούτου τίς ὅρος.  
 
Since we have previously said that one ought to choose that which is intermediate, 
not the excess nor the defect, and that the intermediate is determined by the 
dictates of (right) reason,25 let us discuss this. In all the states we have mentioned, 
as in all other matters, there is a mark to which the man who possesses reason 
looks, and heightens or relaxes (his activity) accordingly,26 and there is a standard 
                                                        
25 The ROT omits the translation of the word orthos, so I supplement it here. 
26 There is no word exactly corresponding to “his activity” in the Greek text. Most commentators (e.g., Grant, 
Burnet,) take this “activity” to be the kithara-player tuning the instrument; I agree that this is the most 
appropriate. Gauthier/Jolif take it as an archer metaphor, and Corcilius thinks both options are possible. I would 
apply Gomez-Lobo’s critique on this point, in which he says: “In aiming at a target the bowman pulls back the 
string as far as possible whether the target lies close at hand or at a certain distance…. A weak shot is worthless” 
(1995), pp. 24-5. 
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which determines the mean states which we say are intermediate between excess 
and defect, being in accordance with right reason. But such a statement, though 
true, is by no means illuminating; for in all other pursuits which are objects of 
knowledge it is indeed true to say that we must not exert ourselves nor relax our 
efforts too much nor too little, but to an intermediate extent and as right reason 
dictates; but if a man had only this knowledge he would be none the wiser—e.g. 
we should not know what sort of medicines to apply to our body if some one were 
to say ‘all those which the medical art prescribes, and which agree with the 
practice of one who possesses the art’. Hence it is necessary with regard to the 
states of the soul also not only that this true statement should be made, but also 
that it should be determined what right reason is and what is the standard that 
fixes it. (EN VI 1, 1138b18-34) 
This passage again addresses the definition of “ethical virtue”, as Aristotle tells us 
explicitly that the intermediate is determined by the OL (ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθὸς λέγει.) At 
the same time, he emphasizes that just knowing to act according to the OL is a blank 
formula which must be filled in by real, significant content by phronimos. Aristotle’s 
most famous example of this tells us that a patient just following doctor’s orders does 
not master the art of medicine. At the end of Passage 4, Aristotle raises the question 
again, what is the OL and its horos?27 This leads the reader to believe that Aristotle 
will discuss the definition of the OL below Passage 4, but he does not do so (again, at 
least not in any straight-forward manner,) instead leaping into the discussion of 
intellectual virtue. Only at the end of Book 6 does he identify the OL (exactly once) 
with phronesis in a limited sense. (I discussed this identification in Passage 2 
as-quoted above.) 
 
It is possible, I believe, to extend this question and answer to the entirety of Book 6 as 
an arrangement carefully planned by Aristotle instead of as a gap in information; in 
other words, Aristotle may precisely be delivering the answer to his question—what 
the OL is?—by insisting we understand what the phronesis is, and then by telling us 
                                                        
27 Translators have different opinions on the meaning of this word. Some translate it as “definition”, some as 
“mark”. This will be discussed in Chapter 2, Section 3. 
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that the OL is phronesis. Basically, the word placement here suggests rather strongly 
that we should identify phronesis and OL. 
 
Before we go so far, though, there are details in Passage 4 we should examine more 
carefully. At first, through Passage 4, the reader can fairly readily justify the logos in 
Passage 3 as the OL; to be specific, in Passage 4, the OL appears three times where 
Aristotle tells us that the intermediate is determined by the OL and once in form of the 
question, “what is the OL?” In addition to these instances, Aristotle also at one point 
uses logos simply, without orthos, in the phrase “the man who has the logos” (ὁ τὸν 
λόγον ἔχων). It is reasonable to extrapolate the logos in the phrase ὁ τὸν λόγον ἔχων 
to mean the OL, as the man who has this logos is said to be able to hit the moral 
“target” (τις σκοπὸς) through “heightening” or “relaxing”. This target is the mark of 
the mean state (καί τις ἔστιν ὅρος τῶν μεσοτήτων), so this logos is related to the 
intermediate, or even determines the intermediate in the same manner as the OL. 
Indeed, the logos has the normative force that I called the “determining relationship” 
in Passage 3, so we can further confirm that the logos in Passage 3 is actually the OL. 
 
There are two other details strongly deserving of the reader’s attention in Passage 4 in 
terms of establishing the precise definition of the OL: The first concerns why the 
statement that knowing how to act according to the OL is a blank formula, i.e., that it 
is “not illuminating” (οὐθὲν δὲ σαφές)—I will call this the σαφές problem—and the 
second concerns the fact that Aristotle sometimes uses only logos to refer to the OL 
but occasionally explicitly uses the full phrase orthos logos. Does Aristotle mean that 
the logos itself contains the rightness, and that the OL is just a repetitive usage of the 
logos? Perhaps the logos is used by Aristotle shorthand for the OL, where only the OL 
has rightness while the logos itself is neutral (i.e., unable to determine right and 
wrong on its own), which I call the normative logos problem. The σαφές problem can 
be addressed solely through the text in Passage 4, but the normative logos problem 
can only be solved once we have determined the meaning of the logos in its ethical 
context. (Further discussion on this problem can be found in Chapters 3 and 4.) 
 
In respect to the σαφές problem, let’s first look at what follows the σαφές sentence. 
The γὰρ indicates that Aristotle himself explains the lack of σαφές. He says: 
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καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιμελείαις, περὶ ὅσας ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, τοῦτ’ ἀληθὲς μὲν 
εἰπεῖν, ὅτι οὔτε πλείω οὔτε ἐλάττω δεῖ πονεῖν οὐδὲ ῥᾳθυμεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέσα καὶ 
ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος· τοῦτο δὲ μόνον ἔχων ἄν τις οὐδὲν ἂν εἰδείη πλέον, οἷον ποῖα 
δεῖ προς φέρεσθαι πρὸς τὸ σῶμα, εἴ τις εἴπειεν ὅτι ὅσα ἡ ἰατρικὴ κελεύει καὶ ὡς 
ὁ ταύτην ἔχων. 
for in all other pursuits which are objects of knowledge it is indeed true to say 
that we must not exert ourselves nor relax our efforts too much nor too little, but 
to an intermediate extent and as right reason dictates; but if a man had only this 
knowledge he would be none the wiser—e.g. we should not know what sort of 
medicines to apply to our body if some one were to say ‘all those which the 
medical art prescribes, and which agree with the practice of one who possesses 
the art’.(1138a26-32) 
 
Aristotle tells us here that in all other pursuits, not only in ethics, to say one is acting 
according to the OL is an empty (i.e., blank) formula. Some scholars infer from this 
σαφές problem that the OL must be a very specific proposition applied to any 
particular situation.28 In the medicine example, as mentioned above, simply knowing 
that the doctor’s orders are correct does not make one a doctor, though taking the 
medicine prescribed will heal one’s illness; further, knowledge of medicine does not 
make the doctor a healer, but only successful application of said knowledge to heal 
patients. Other scholars believe that Aristotle does not tell us what the OL is, but 
rather tell us that there are many kinds of OLs (e.g., OL in the medical arts, OL in the 
theoretical domain, etc.,) that the ethical OL is but one of them,29 and that the task of 
Book 6 is merely to separate the ethical OL from the other kinds of OL. Aristotle does 
not tell us what the ethical OL is, or maybe does not have to tell us, since we can or 
must appeal to the phronimos to determine how to act; the advice that phronimos 
provides is, then, the ethical OL. Similarly, within the medical domain, if one wants to 
be healed correctly one must appeal to the doctor, and the prescription the doctor 
gives is the medical OL. 
                                                        
28 See Gomez-Lobo (1995), p. 26. 
29 E.g. Broadie/Rowe (2002), p. 359. 
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I believe the options mentioned above are all plausible, but not all are necessarily and 
directly supported by the passage. Consider the medical example again: for a patient, 
a concrete and particular prescription is the best OL for recovering health. If strictly 
interpreting the analogy between medical matters and ethical matters, then we can 
infer that the ethical OL given by phronimos is also very concrete and particular for a 
given moral situation. But we cannot ignore the fact that the prescription given by the 
doctor can be generated only if the doctor has been well trained. This means, 
presumably, that the doctor has possessed the systematic medical knowledge and 
enough healing experience. So the OL might be a complex of deliberative process 
which involves both universal and particular knowledge, when some patients would 
ask why they should take certain medicine (or certain actions,) and the doctor must 
give explanation why he gives such and such prescription. 
 
By extension, moral learners might just simply follow a specific order of moral people. 
But they are essentially different from most patients, since moral learners desire to 
become moral people, while most patients do not want to be doctor at all. When moral 
agents have the best possible and most mature reasoning capacity, they would ask 
why they should perform such and such actions. The only way to convince them to 
take a certain action is to tell them “the because”, not only “the that”. The OL for 
them, then, is no longer the particular proposition preferable for describing the whole 
reasoning process involving both universal and particular knowledge. 
 
There do naturally are subtle differences between ethical matters and medical matters 
that may influence the understanding of the ethical OL. We must, as such, keep asking 
what the differences are to maintain the analogy between medical matters and ethical 
matters and to distinguish the ethical OL from the medical OL appropriately. The text 
does not provide us with these answers, in other words, the σαφές problem still does 
not lead us to an accurate definition of the OL. 
2.5. The OL in Akrates and Enkrates 
In the seventh Book of the EN, the OL, sometimes only the logos, is set in opposition 
to appetite and feelings (pleasure) in the discussion of the akrasia. Aristotle 
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determines that in virtuous men, the OL and desire work harmoniously while in 
enkrates, appetite struggles with the OL but ultimately obeys it, and in the akrates, 
appetite disobeys the OL (παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον).30 
(Passage 5) 
ὅταν οὖν ἡ μὲν καθόλου ἐνῇ κωλύουσα γεύεσθαι, ἣ δέ, ὅτι πᾶν γλυκὺ ἡδύ, 
τουτὶ δὲ γλυκύ (αὕτη δὲ ἐνεργεῖ), τύχῃ δ’ ἐπιθυμία ἐνοῦσα, ἣ μὲν οὖν λέγει 
φεύγειν τοῦτο, ἡ δ’ ἐπιθυμία ἄγει· κινεῖν γὰρ ἕκαστον δύναται τῶν 
μορίων· ὥστε συμβαίνει ὑπὸ λόγου πως καὶ δόξης ἀκρατεύεσθαι, οὐκ ἐναντίας 
δὲ καθ’ αὑτήν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός—ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία ἐναντία, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἡ 
δόξα—τῷ ὀρθῷ λόγῳ 
 
The universal opinion is present in us restraining us from tasting, and there is 
also the opinion that everything sweet is pleasant, and that this is sweet (now 
this is the opinion that is active,) and when appetite happens to be present in us, 
the one opinion bids us avoid the object, but appetite leads us towards it (for it 
can move each of our bodily parts;) so that it turns out that a man behaves 
incontinently under the influence (in a sense) of reason and opinion, and of 
opinion not contrary in itself, but only incidentally—for the appetite is contrary 
not the opinion—to right reason. (1147a31-b3) 
 
It is very difficult to understand and interpret the content of this passage, but it is quite 
clear that it provides the following set of syllogistic forms. 
 
Form 1: We should restrain us from all sweet things, 
This is sweet, 
So I should not take this. 
 
Form 2: All sweet things make us pleasant, 
This is sweet, 
So I want to take it. 
                                                        
30 For other texts related to the OL see 1147b31, 1151a12, and many places only with logos that have likely the 
same meaning as OL (1145b14, 1151b10). 
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Facing this particular situation, the individual may reason in one of two different ways 
(potentially simultaneously,) namely “Form 1” and “Form 2”. Form 1 involves loaded 
rational and correct guidance for the moral agent, and Form 2 shows where desire can 
force the agent to make the wrong decision. If one struggles to make the choice 
between the correct guidance (Form 1) and the desire (Form 2), but ultimately acts 
rationally, he is a “continent” person (enkrates) according to Aristotle; if he struggles 
but ultimately gives in to desire, he is “incontinent” (akrates). If he has no struggle 
(even though desire exists with the OL,) and directly and firmly follows the OL, he is 
virtuous. If he has no such correct guidance, but rather thinks that all sweet things are 
good to take and follows purely his desire, he is vicious.31 
 
Different interpreters take different parts of Form 1 as the OL. The rule-view group 
assert that the universal rule is the OL; the particularists that the conclusion of Form 1 
is the OL. Each standpoint has merits but also serious disadvantages, which I discuss 
at length in Chapter 2. Further, I argue that the complete Form 1 is the OL (see 
Chapters 3 and 4.) 
2.6. Related Texts in EE 
The general philosophical function of the OL in EE is the same as that in EN, namely, 
that OL determines right actions and virtuous states. 1222a9 is the first occurrence of 
the phrase in EE, where Aristotle defines virtue as state of character which causes 
man to perform the best possible actions. The virtuous state is the best state, a middle 
point between excess and deficiency relative to the agent and concerned with pleasure 
and pain. This best state and the best action which is generated by this state are in 
accordance with the OL (κατὰ τὸν λόγον). We see this passage paralleled in the 
virtue-definition passage in EN (Passage 3). A few lines later, in 1222b7, Aristotle 
repeats this point: the virtuous state is the middle state concerned with emotions 
neither in excess nor deficiency; this state is in accordance with the OL. In addition to 
this, Aristotle also raises the questions of what the OL is exactly and what its limit 
(ὅρος) is, which are essentially identical to the questions posed in Passage 4 from 
                                                        
31 See also EN VII 8, 1151a7 “ὅτι μὲν οὖν κακία ἡ ἀκρασία οὐκ ἔστι, φανερόν (ἀλλὰ πῇ ἴσως) τὸ μὲν γὰρ παρὰ 
προαίρεσιν τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσίν ἐστιν”. 
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EN.32 The apparent difference here is that the OL is not as directly identified with 
phronesis as in the EN. 
 
Other passages in EE are also quite deserving of our attention, particularly those 
where Aristotle does not use the OL, but instead simply logos (though the meaning in 
these cases is most likely the same as the OL,) as indeed these passages seem able to 
shed light on the meaning of the OL. Below, I analyze two passages from EE in effort 
to further support my argument. 
(Passage 6) 
ἡ μὲν γὰρ κίνησις συνεχές, ἡ δὲ πρᾶξις κίνησις. ἐν πᾶσι δὲ τὸ μέσον τὸ πρὸς 
ἡμᾶς βέλτιστον· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ὡς ἡ ἐπιστήμη κελεύει καὶ ὁ λόγος. 
 
For motion is continuous, and action is motion. In all cases the mean in relation 
to us is the best; for this is as knowledge and reason direct us. (1220b27-29) 
 
This passage tells us also that the mean (to meson) relative to us is directed by logos. 
This information echoes the Passage 3 in EN discussed above, in that the logos here is 
presumably the same as the OL. But here Aristotle makes an interesting point by 
placing logos together with knowledge (ἡἐπιστήμη), suggesting that the logos and 
knowledge have the same function—to direct us toward the intermediate. The usage 
here implies that the logos is likely a product or deliverance of the reasoning process, 
in the same way that knowledge is the product of the epismetikon of our soul. If the 
function of reason is similar de facto to knowledge, we can expect that “reason” 
demands an “explanation”. The entire syllogistic form can be perfectly loaded into 
this explanatory function, but constitutes only speculation based on the juxtaposed 
position of the concepts knowledge and logos in Passage 6. In short, we need further 
evidence to prove that logos contains the explanation for reason in the form of 
syllogistic process. 
                                                        
32 Another similar usage of the OL in EN and EE is connected to the concept of akrasia, where the OL is opposed 
to the desire. In the virtuous man, the OL and the desire are in harmony, while in akrates and enkrates, desire 
does not cooperate or even works against the OL (παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον). See EN VII 1, 1145b14; 3, 1147b1; 4, 
1147b31; 8, 1151a12; 9, 1151b10; EE 1227b14-20. 
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The passage below also describes the OL’s function, this time only with the word 
“logos”, which seems therein to mean an explanatory statement or articulated 
formulation: 
(P assage 7) 
ὅτι μὲν γὰρ οὐ φρονήσει κατορθοῦσι, δῆλον. οὐ γὰρ ἄλογος [ἡ] φρόνησις, ἀλλ’ 
ἔχει λόγον διὰ τί οὕτως πράττει, οἳ δ’ οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιεν εἰπεῖν διὰ τί κατορθοῦσι. 
 
For that they do not succeed through wisdom is clear, for wisdom is not 
irrational but can give a reason why it acts as it does; but they could not say 
why they succeed. (1247a14-16) 
 
This passage determines the phronesis is not irrational in contrasting with fortune (or 
desire, or gain,) but rather it is λόγον ἔχειν; this logos is the reason the agent 
completes the correct action at the present moment. Here, the phrase λόγον ἔχειν is 
used to characterise phronesis, fairly similarly to Passage 2 in the EN, where 
phronesis is identified with the OL. Phronesis in this EE passage contains the logos as 
an explanatory statement in regard to the moral agent’s action.33 This explanation can 
also exist in the form of a reasoning process or a syllogism, however, including 
statements or propositions related to the action.34 
2.7. Related Text in MM 
The way Aristotle characterizes the OL in MM seems somewhat different from that in 
the EN and the EE. The OL in MM is also connected to virtue and virtuous action, 
similar to the EN and EE, but it is not explicitly said to determine the intermediate 
between excess and deficiency35and is also not any more directly identified as 
belonging to the phronesis in relation to ethical virtue in MM.36 
                                                        
33 Cf. Sandra Peterson (1988), pp. 240-1. 
34 The parallel passage in MM 1207a2-5 seems to confirm the reasoning process view, where Aristotle uses nous 
and the OL together to contrast against fortune. 
35 Theseparallel passages are in MM I 9 and EE 1222b7; in the latter the OL appears, while in the former the OL 
does not appear.  
36 Cf. Richard Walzer (1929); G.C. Amstrong (1947). 
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There are, nevertheless, also many passages (most in Book II 6) which provide us 
similar information as EE and EN. Before we proceed to the particularly striking 
passages from MM, I’d like to briefly review the conceptual similarities in OL 
between MM and the other two books of ethics. 
 
In many places in MM II 6, Aristotle discusses the OL in the context of pairs of 
concepts: namely enkrates and akrates, akrates and akolastos, sophron and enkrates, 
and phronimos and akrates. Both the enkrates and akrates have the OL, but only the 
enkrates obeys the OL while the akrates does not (ἀκρατὴς μὲν ὁ τῷ τοιούτῳ λόγω 
ἀπειθῶν, ἐγκρατὴς δὲ ὁ πειθόμενος καὶ μὴ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ἀγόμενος·1202a10-14). 
The akolastos (intemprate) does not possess the OL at all (ἔστι τοί νυν ὁ μὲν ἀκρατὴς 
ἀγαθὸν ἔχων τὸν λόγον ὀρθὸν ὄντα· ὁ δὲ ἀκόλαστος οὐκ ἔχει.1203a13-15). Both 
enkrates and the temperate have the OL, but the enkrates has a “bad appetite” (i.e., 
struggles with the OL,) while the intemperate does not (ἔστιν δὲ σώφρων ὁ μὴ ἔχων 
ἐπιθυμίας φαύλας τόν τε λόγον τὸν περὶ ταῦτα ὀρθόν, ὁ δ’ ἐγκρατὴς ὁ ἐπιθυμίας ἔχων 
φαύλας τόν τε λόγον τὸν περὶ ταῦτα ὀρθόν·1203b16-19). The akrates knows the OL, 
while the phronimos not only has knowledge of the OL but also uses it to understand 
his particular situation (ὁ ἀκρατὴς τοιοῦτος [τις] οἷος εἰδέναι καὶ μὴ διεψεῦσθαι τῷ 
λόγῳ, ἔστιν δὲ καὶ ὁ φρόνιμος τοιοῦτος ὁ τῷ λόγῳ τῷ ὀρθῷ ἕκαστα θεωρῶν. 
1204a5-8) and to take the best action indicated by the OL (ἔφαμεν γὰρ τὸν φρόνιμον 
εἶναι οὐχ ᾧ ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος μόνον ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ’ ᾧ καὶ τὸ πράττειν τὰ κατὰ τὸν λόγον 
φαινόμενα βέλτιστα. 1204a11-12). 
 
According to the discussion above, then, it is quite sensible to define the OL as “right 
deliberation”, “right reasoning”, or even “right planning”. There are three main 
reasons which justify this conclusion: 1) Aristotle also explicitly ascribes deliberation 
to the incontinent (akrates) and the continent (enkrate) in EN in a way that functions 
identically to the OL here (1151a7). 2) It is more reasonable to say that the OL is the 
inner rational activity of soul, in contrast with the appetitive activity (i.e., desire) 
existing in the akrates and enkrate (but not in the intemperate at all,) than as an 
external principle or rule in these individuals, as the intemperate can also work under 
any formulation of such external rules or principles. 3) The OL is an instrument 
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phronimos uses to read particulars and prescribe best possible actions: A universal 
rule or principle can also be applied to the particular, not directly as an instrument, but 
rather through the instrument presumably via reasoning or deliberation. Accordingly, 
the candidate definition for OL here is “right reasoning” or “deliberation”.37 This is 
only a strong possibility, however, which cannot absolutely exclude other possible 
interpretations (e.g., the proposition view). 
 
Next, let’s examine someparticularly remarkable passages of MM which seem to say 
something different. The first passage, in which the OL appears for the first time in 
MM, puts the OL in contrast with natural impulse and natural virtue: 
 
(Passage 8) 
αἱ δὲ δὴ μετὰ λόγου οὖσαι τελέως ἀρεταί εἰσιν ἐπαινεταὶ ἐπιγινόμεναι. ἔστιν 
οὖν ἡ φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ αὕτη ἡ ἄνευ λόγου χωριζομένη μὲν τοῦ λόγου μικρὰ καὶ 
ἀπολειπομένη τοῦ ἐπαιν εῖσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὸν λόγον καὶ τὴν προαίρεσιν 
προστιθεμένη τελείαν ποιεῖ τὴν ἀρετήν. διὸ καὶ συνεργεῖ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν 
ἄνευ τοῦ λόγου ἡ φυσικὴ ὁρμὴ πρὸς ἀρετήν. οὐδ’ αὖ ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις 
οὐ πάνυ τελειοῦται τῷ εἶναι ἀρετὴ ἄνευ τῆς φυσικῆς ὁρμῆς. διὸ οὐκ ὀρθῶς 
Σωκράτης ἔλεγεν, φάσκων εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν λόγον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ὄ φελος εἶναι 
πράττειν τὰ ἀνδρεῖα καὶ τὰ δίκαια, μὴ εἰ δότα καὶ προαιρούμενον τῷ λόγῳ. διὸ 
τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔφη λόγον εἶναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς, ἀλλ’ οἱ νῦν βέλτιον· τὸ γὰρ κατὰ τὸν 
ὀρθὸν λόγον πράττειν τὰ καλά, τοῦτό φασιν εἶναι ἀρετήν· ὀρθῶς μὲν οὐδ’ 
οὗτοι. Πράξαι μὲν γὰρ ἄντις τὰ δίκαια προαιρέσει μὲν οὐδ εμιᾷ, οὐδὲ γνώσει 
τῶν καλῶν, ἀλλ’ ὁρμῇ τινιἀ λόγῳ, ὀρθῶς δὲ ταῦτα καὶ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον 
(λέγω δέ, ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθὸς κελεύσειεν, οὕτως ἔπραξεν)· ἀλλ’ ὅμως ἡ 
τοιαύτη πρᾶξις οὐκ ἔχει τὸ ἐπαινετόν. ἀλλὰ βέλτιον, ὡς ἡμεῖς ἀφορίζομεν, τὸ 
μετὰ λόγου εἶναι τὴν ὁρμὴν πρὸς τὸ καλόν· τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ 
ἐπαινετόν. 
 
Now, this natural excellence which is unaccompanied by reason, so long as it 
                                                        
37 Another popular interpretation of the OL, namely the OL as the particular proposition of the practical syllogism, 
is also possible here, though grammatically awkward. (In addition, I systematically refute this position in a later 
chapter.) 
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remains apart from reason, is of little account, and falls short of being praised, 
but when added to reason and choice, it makes complete excellence. Hence also 
the natural impulse to excellence co-operates with reason and is not apart from 
reason. Nor, on the other hand, are reason and choice quite completed as 
excellence without the natural impulse. 
 
Hence Socrates was not speaking correctly when he said that excellence was 
reason, thinking that it was no use doing brave and just acts, unless one did 
them from knowledge and rational choice. This was why he said that excellence 
was reason. Herein he was not right, but the men of the present day say better; 
for they say that excellence is doing what is good in accordance with right 
reason. Even they, indeed, are not right. For one might do what is just without 
any choice at all or knowledge of the good, but from an irrational impulse, and 
yet do this rightly and in accordance with right reason (I mean he may have 
acted in the way that right reason would command); but all the same, this sort 
of conduct does not merit praise. But it is better to say, according to our 
definition, that it is the accompaniment by reason of the impulse to good. For 
that is excellence and that is praiseworthy. (1198a4-a21) 
 
Here, again, Aristotle connects the OL or logos to knowledge and rational choice, 
which function to direct the natural impulse and create complete virtue with the 
natural virtue. Indeed, logos, knowledge, and the rational choice are employed as 
quasi-synonyms by Aristotle. He criticises the Socratic identification between logos 
or knowledge and virtue, stating that logos and knowledge are necessary conditions 
for complete virtue, but alone are not sufficient; virtuous actions must take place in 
accordance with the OL (κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον). What is only κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, 
however, is likewise insufficient. Virtuous action must also be done willingly and 
with rational choice (prohairesis) rather than simply from irrational impulse or 
ignorance κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον. 
 
In summary, this passage insists that virtuous action can be done if and only if the 
agent has knowledge (i.e., OL) of the action, as well as the relevant particulars about 
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the situation, and choses to follow said knowledge/OL voluntarily or 
“prohairetically”. 
 
Within such context, the OL can be defined as the rational statement or explanation as 
to why the action is right and virtuous, which serves to persuade the agent against his 
irrational impulse. This statement or account very likely can exist in the form of a 
reasoning process into which the explanatory element is loaded. The emphasis on 
prohairesis tells us that moral agents understand the OL and deliberatively apply the 
OL into their particular situations, in other words, that the propositional deliberation 
on how and why to act itself is the OL. 
 
The most salient formulation of the OL is articulated at the beginning of II 10: 
 
(Passage 9) 
Ὑπὲρ δὲ τοῦ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς ὀρθῶς πράττειν εἴρηται μέν, οὐχ ἱκανῶς δέ. 
ἔφαμεν γὰρ τὸ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πράττειν· ἀλλ’ ἴσως ἄν τις αὐτὸ τοῦτο 
ἀγνοῶν ἐρωτήσειεν, τὸ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον τί ποτ’ ἐστί, καὶ ποῦ ἐστιν ὁ 
ὀρθὸς λόγος; ἔστιν οὖν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πράττειν, ὅταν τὸ ἄλογον μέρος 
τῆς ψυχῆς μὴ κωλύῃ τὸ λογιστικὸν ἐνεργεῖν τὴν αὑτοῦ ἐνέργειαν. τότε γὰρ ἡ 
πρᾶξις ἔσται κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον. 
 
But about acting rightly in accordance with the excellences something indeed 
has been said, but not enough. For we said that it was acting in accordance with 
right reason. But possibly one might be ignorant as to this very point, and might 
ask, ‘What is acting in accordance with right reason? And where is right 
reason’? To act, then, in accordance with right reason is when the irrational part 
of the soul does not prevent the rational from displaying its own activity. For 
then the action will be in accordance with right reason. (1208a5-a12) 
 
After the OL is utilized to establish his theory of virtue at length in previous chapters, 
questions regarding what acting in accordance with the OL is and where the OL is, 
somewhat strangely, are reintroduced here by Aristotle. He seems to give an implicit 
answer to this question with an adverbial, temporal (or conditional) clause: When the 
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activity of the non-rational part of the soul does not impede rational activity, then the 
action is in accordance with the OL. In Aristotle’s context, the action is issued by the 
non-rational part of the soul (e.g., desire, feeling) in tandem with the rational part, 
thought. When these two parts work in a right and harmonious condition, a virtuous 
action can be accomplished; this condition is described here as the antecedent of 
acting in accordance with the OL. 
 
There are two possible readings of the definition of the OL as-provided in this passage: 
First, that the harmonious condition itself is the OL, and second, that the OL is the 
wider genus of this harmonious condition. The first is the most natural reading in this 
context, as it reflects the answer directly given after the question of what it is to act in 
accordance with the OL and where the OL is, i.e., acting in accordance with a 
harmonious state in one’s soul. The second reading does not give an answer to this 
question, but rather only exhibits the harmonious state as the part of the OL, leaving 
no answer to the definition of the OL overall. 
 
If the first reading is correct, the meaning of the OL in II 10 actually differs from the 
meaning of the OL in II 6.38 In II 6, as discussed at length above, it is most likely that 
the OL means right reasoning or right deliberation standing in opposition to desire and 
feeling. (It is possible, though less likely, that it means a proposition, and not at all 
possible that it means any sort of state.) Yet in II 10, the OL is rather clearly defined 
as a harmonious state which includes not only rational activity but also desire, feeling, 
and obedience. If the entirety of this analysis is accurate, then we have created (at 
least) two different meanings for the OL. One possible rationalization for this is that 
these passages had different authors,39 which is outside the scope of this thesis. 
Another possibility is that the first reading is completely fallacious—that the OL is 
something else in Aristotle’s mind. Because the primary concern of this thesis is the 
OL problem in EN, and also due to the complexity of the authenticity and editorial 
problems of MM, my discussion of what the OL is in MM, (and especially in MM II 
                                                        
38 A very similar viewpoint is held by Karl Bärthlein (1963), who insists the meaning of the OL is different in 
these two sources and defines the OL as an “objektiv richtiges (und daher: maßgebendes) Verhältnis der 
Seelenteile zueinander”. He goes on to argue that the logos encompasses the meaning of the harmonious 
relationship between different parts of the soul, different classes of friends, polis, etc.. 
39 Bärthlein (1963), for example, believes that II6 was written by another author.  
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10,) must end here. 
 
In this chapter, I analyzed several pieces of text directly related to the OL. During said 
analysis, I also identified and justified my research method; namely, that I seek to 
define the OL at it exists at two different stages: the virtue-acquiring stage and the 
virtue-acquired stage. During the textual analysis, I also sketched the moral features 
of the OL, most importantly that the OL determines right action and ethical virtue. 
This definition reflects a two-fold demand in the moral agent: Finding, then reaching 
the intermediate of the action and feelings. The OL instructs moral agents what or 
how they ought to do in a given situation, while also regulating the agent’s desire and 
feeling according to what is appropriate. 
 
Aristotle’s general formulations, such as κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ 
λόγου, ὡρισμένῃ λόγῳ, and ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθὸς λέγει, do not make clear the manner in 
which the moral agent must determine right action and ethical virtue. Moreover, 
Aristotle himself emphasizes that merely knowing that one should act according to the 
OL is not whatsoever illuminating. He seems to imply that the moral agent is tasked 
with obtaining specialized knowledge for each particular situation; the question of 
how to synthesize this specialized knowledge remains open. Does this specialized 
knowledge exclude the reasoning view? Is this specialized knowledge a universal rule, 
or should it be tailored precisely to individual situations, (e.g., pay back debt to some 
particular person now and here, rather than pay back debt in general?) 
 
It is a challenging endeavor indeed to determine whether OL is a virtue, a universal 
rule, or a particular proposition based solely on textual analysis.There is no 
satisfactory answer that will come readily. Scholars have kept the issue under debate 
for some time, and hold fast to their respective points of view. In the next chapter, I 
present the most notable interpretations of the OL and analyze various existing 
arguments regarding said interpretations in detail to provide the reader with sufficient 
background knowledge to understand my own interpretation. 
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Chapter 2: Primary Interpretations 
In this chapter, I will present and analyze the main interpretations of the OL. The 
analysis of related texts in the first chapter should have effectively built a foundation 
for further examining these various interpretations and their respective arguments. I 
will focus on the four interpretations mentioned previously: 1) The OL as a rational 
faculty, an interpretation proffered by Cook Wilson; 2) the OL as a (set of) universal 
rule(s), which was developed based on criticism of Cook Wilson’s interpretation; 3) 
the OL as a particular proposition, which was developed based on criticism of the rule 
view and the faculty view; and 4) the OL as rational activity qua piratical reasoning or 
deliberation, which is considered a revised version of the faculty view. These four 
interpretations do not exhaust all possible readings of the OL, however, they are likely 
the most influential interpretations (and further, they are the most closely related to 
my own interpretation.)  
 
My interpretation is highly sympathetic to the revised faculty view, which makes it all 
the more important to carefully weigh the advantages and disadvantages of these four 
interpretations. (I intend to ultimately prove that the revised faculty view is more 
advantageous than the other three.) In this chapter, I mainly examine the arguments 
dialectically to show the pros and cons of each argument and preliminarily establish 
the basis for my own, though I avoid introducing my doctrinal commitment to this 
examination too hastily; my own interpretation borrows several aspects of the 
proposition view, as discussed in detail after sufficient explanation in later chapters. 
1. Cook Wilson’s View 
Wilson’s interpretation of the OL heavily influenced later researchers on this topic. 
First, he asserts that the terms OL and logos refer to the same concept and that 
Aristotle uses them interchangeably, thus, that the logos and the OL both have 
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normative force. Cook Wilson explores three levels of meaning for the normative 
force. 
 
He first argues that the logos (i.e., OL) can regulate the appetite or feeling. In this 
sense, the logos is the faculty of reason, which is the principle of the soul. The textual 
support he relies on for this argument is two passages from I 7, 13,40 and especially 
the seventh Book of the Nicomachean Ethics, where Aristotle uses the logos and OL 
interchangeably.41 Also pertinent is the text at VI 2, 1139a32, προαιρέσεως δὲ ὄρεξις 
καὶ λόγος ὁ ἕνεκά τινος. διὸ οὔτ’ ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ διανοίας, which, Cook Wilson believes 
implicitly identifies logos with nous and dianoia. Second, in moral training, the 
logos/OL delivers rational instruction to the moral learner. In this sense, logos/OL 
means reasoning, or precisely, right reasoning, for which Cook Wilson cites EN X 9 
as evidence.42 Third, the logos/OL is described as the ordinance of reason or the 
expression of reason. We can call this “law”, but this law, Cook Wilson says, “is not 
here thought of as a mere rule, but as a rule in which reason expresses itself, with the 
implied opposition of reason to desire and appetite.” (1912, p. 116) The textual 
evidence for this level of meaning comes from 1180a21.43 He hypostatizes logos into 
reason and anthropomorphizes reason itself, then proposes translating the logos/OL as 
personified Reason, which has the advantage of including all three levels of normative 
meanings. 
 
                                                        
40 I 7, 1098a4, ἐπιπειθὲς λόγῳ; I 13, 1102b14, τοῦ γὰρ ἐγκρατοῦς καὶ ἀκρατοῦς τὸν λόγον καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ λόγον 
ἔχον ἐπαινοῦμεν· ὀρθῶς γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ βέλτιστα παρακαλεῖ. 
41 For a few examples, see VII 3, 1147b1, ὥστε συμβαίνει ὑπὸ λόγου πως καὶ δόξης ἀκρατεύεσθαι, οὐκ ἐναντίας 
δὲ καθ’ αὑτήν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός—ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία ἐναντία, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἡ δόξα—τῷ ὀρθῷ λόγῳ; 1145b14, 
καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀκρατὴς εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλα πράττει διὰ πάθος, ὁ δ’ ἐγκρατὴς εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλαι αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι οὐκ 
ἀκολουθεῖ διὰ τὸν λόγον; 1147b31,τοὺς μὲν οὖν πρὸς ταῦτα παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον ὑπερβάλλοντας τὸν ἐναὑ 
τοῖς ἁπλῶς μὲν οὐ λέγομεν ἀκρατεῖς; 1151a12, ἐπεὶ δ’ ὃ μὲν τοιοῦτος οἷος μὴ διὰ τὸ πεπεῖσθαι διώκειντὰς καθ’ 
ὑπερβολὴν καὶ παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον σωματικὰς ἡδονάς, ὃ δὲ πέπεισται διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷος διώκειν 
αὐτάς, ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὖν εὐ μετάπειστος, οὗτος δὲ οὔ; 1151b10, οἳ δὲ οὐχ ὑπὸ λόγου, ἐπεὶ ἐπιθυμίας γε 
λαμβάνουσι, καὶ ἄγονται πολλοὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν. 
42 1179b3, εἰ μὲν οὖν ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι αὐτάρκεις πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐπιεικεῖς; I179b16, τοὺς δὴ τοιούτους τίς ἂν λόγος 
μεταρρυθμίσαι; b 23, ὁ δὲ λόγος καὶ ἡ διδαχὴ μή ποτ’ οὐκ ἐν ἅπασιν ἰσχύει; b26, οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀκούσειε λόγου 
ἀποτρέποντος οὐδ’ αὖ συνείη ὁ κατὰ πάθος ζῶν; 1180 a4, οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ ἀνάγκῃ μᾶλλον ἢ λόγῳ πειθαρχοῦσι 
καὶ ζημίαις ἢ τῷ καλῷ; a10, τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῶντα τῷ λόγῳ πειθαρχήσειν. 
43 ὁ δὲ νόμος ἀναγκαστικὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, λόγος ὢν ἀπό τινος φρονήσεως καὶ νοῦ. 
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Cook Wilson goes on to argue that there are many passages providing evidence of the 
use of personification, e.g., in VI 1, 1138b19 and VI 2, 1139a23, “logos or orthos 
logos is represented as speaking (the voice of Reason in us)”44; in VII 6, 1149a25 and 
X 9, 1179b26, “it is something listened to or disregarded”45; in I 13, 1102b14, “logos 
encourages like a person”46; and in III 5, 1114b29, 1119b11 and IV 5, 1125b33, “logos 
is represented as issuing commands.”(1912, p. 114)47 He concludes that “in all the 
passages reviewed logos means Reason in one of three senses: either 1) reason as the 
faculty of reason, or principle of reason in the soul, or 2) reason as reasoning, or 3) 
reason as what is reasonable, in the sense of the deliverance of reason—reason as 
ordaining the moral law, reasoning as inculcating it, or the moral law itself as a form 
of reason.”(1912, p. 117) 
 
Cook Wilson’s argument is that reason qua faculty is a vehicle which interconnects 
the three normative aspects. The rational faculty can generate exercise or activity 
which creates a production, namely, an articulated formulation or expression of 
reasoning. His position is generally labelled the “faculty view” accordingly, although 
his interpretation certainly has a wider sense than the pure positing of a faculty. Based 
on his hypothesis of the identity shared between the logos and the OL, he unifies all 
three normative meanings of the logos/OL in his translation, the personified Reason.  
 
This is very comprehensive and inclusive, but also very problematic thinking. As 
mentioned above, many later interpretations were borne from criticism of Cook 
Wilson’s view. Before we proceed to a discussion on these criticisms, I have questions 
of my own regarding Cook Wilson’s interpretation. 
 
It creates a weak argument to judge the logos and OL according to merely the 
                                                        
44 EN VI 1, 1138b19, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐστὶν ὡς ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθὸς λέγει. VI 2, 1139a23, δεῖ διὰ ταῦτα μὲν τόν τε λόγον 
ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὄρεξιν ὀρθήν, εἴπερ ἡ προαίρεσις σπουδαία, καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τὸν μὲν φάναι τὴν δὲ διώκειν. 
45 VII 6, 1149a25, ἔοικε γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς ἀκούειν μέν τι τοῦ λόγου, παρακούειν δέ; X 9, 1179b26, οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀκούσειε 
λόγου ἀποτρέποντος οὐδ’ αὖ συνείη ὁ κατὰ πάθος ζῶν. 
46 I 13, 1102b14, τοῦ γὰρ ἐγκρατοῦς καὶ ἀκρατοῦς τὸν λόγον καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ λόγον ἔχον ἐπαινοῦμεν· ὀρθῶς γὰρ 
καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ βέλτιστα παρακαλεῖ. 
47 III 5, 1114b29, καὶ οὕτως ὡς ἂν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος προστάξῃ; III 12, 1119b17, οὕτω δὲ τάττει καὶ ὁ λόγος; IV 5, 
1125b35, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος τάξῃ. See Cook Wilson (1912), p. 114. 
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observation that Aristotle uses the terms interchangeably in several texts. Aristotle 
does not explicitly say that the logos itself has the same normative meaning as the OL. 
If they were the same, the phrase orthos logos would be redundant. Moreover, if they 
were the same, Aristotle would not have to repeat the question “What is the OL?” in 
the sixth book of the ethics, as he would have provided the answer beforehand by 
application of the logos. If the logos and the OL are not the same, then the many 
meanings specific to the logos cannot be directly ascribed to the OL; the OL would 
possibly have much narrower or even entirely different meaning than the logos. 
 
Putting this puzzle temporarily aside, let us first look at commentators’ criticism of 
Cook Wilson’s view. It is important to note that these criticisms developed from 
selecting and modifying the three meanings discussed above. 
2. Rule View 
Just one year after Cook Wilson’s paper was published many philological critiques of 
his interpretation were advanced by A. R. Lord (1914), J. Burnet (1914), and J. L. 
Stocks (1914). Among them, Stocks presented the most detailed argument against 
Cook Wilson’s view, which he organized in two levels. First, he argues that the term 
“logos” cannot be taken to stand for reason as a part of the soul. Aristotle’s expression 
for the human rational faculty is not logos, rather the phrase τὸ λόγον ἔχον, the part of 
the soul that has logos. Stocks insists that the phrase τὸ λόγον ἔχον implicitly denies 
the logos as a faculty, and further, that there is no list of “parts” or faculties of the soul 
in the works of Aristotle that contains the term logos; the word that Aristotle uses to 
refer to the rational faculty is nous rather than logos. (1914, p. 9) 
 
Second, Stocks utilizes another piece of philological evidence to argue that the phrase 
ὡρισμένῃ λόγῳ is the passive form of ὁρίζειν and that it is joined with a noun in the 
dative form. Stocks argues that a noun in the dative is never the defining faculty, 
judge, or legislator, but rather the standard, measure, or mark by which the definition 
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is affected.48 Therefore, he concludes that logos in this context should be understood 
as a universal formulation, such as a defining rule, moral principle, or law. 
 
These philological arguments create quite an attack on the faculty view. The 
arguments are also accepted by the proposition group, both universal and particular. 
Based on these arguments, scholars generally find it appropriate to refute the faculty 
view.49 I agree that these are strong arguments from the philological standpoint, but I 
have two main points to make, here: 1) These philological arguments only attack 
Cook Wilson’s first-level meaning, i.e., the OL as rational faculty, which is a principle 
of the soul, unrelated to the other two aspects of the meaning of the OL in his view. 
We might still successfully defend the OL as reasoning with some modification, (a 
point which will be further discussed in Section 5 of this Chapter.) 2) Though Lord 
and Stocks raise strong arguments against the faculty view, they do not present 
positive or systematic evidence to establish their position that the OL is a general rule. 
Let us take a closer look at that second point, and explore a more systematic and 
coherent argument that has been established by other proponents of the rule view. 
Ross, the most well-known proponent of this view, states his position clearly and 
assertively through his translation. He translates the OL as the right rule or right 
principle, interchangeably. His translation remained influential for several decades in 
the 20th century, and thus merits discussion here. He emphasizes the OL as a universal 
rule “which our reasonable nature grasps for itself.” (1923, p. 203) For Ross, every 
reasonable creature endowed with this right rule can overcome or subjugate 
inappropriate feelings and apply right rule to particular circumstances. A sense of duty 
drives the moral learner to follow and apply the rule. As Ross says that feelings 
should be thoroughly subjugated to the ‘right rule’ or to the sense of duty. It is obvious 
                                                        
48 There is actually a similar philological argument raised by Lord about πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς, which I 
discussed in Chapter 1.1. 
49 Gomez-Lobo: “I find it hard to believe that anyone would want to defend this position (Cook Wilson’ position) 
today” p. 17; Corcilius: “This is unfortunate, since it seems to have been precisely (ignored) the insight into 
untenability of the faculty view that made scholars adopt the rule view in the first place.” I will come back to 
this point later in this chapter. 
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that Ross’ position is strongly influenced by Kantian moral theory,50 in fact, this 
influence is so strong that Kantian moral theory seems to Ross to be self-evident. He 
does not make any effort to justify why Aristotle’s OL has the same meaning as the 
Kantian sense, nor does he give us any detailed explanation as to why he translates the 
OL as the “right rule”. Perhaps it is because he simply thinks that the Kantian 
background is clear enough for every reasonable creature to accept, or possibly, the 
rule view is the most consistent understanding for Ross of Aristotle’s ethics; although 
he expresses awareness that Aristotle never explicitly defines the OL as a rule or 
principle, (rather once as the term of virtue, i.e., phronesis) Ross concludes as 
follows: 
 
The question propounded at the beginning of Book VI. —‘what is the right 
rule’—has not been answered in so many words, but Aristotle’s answer is now 
clear. The right rule is a rule reached by the deliberative analysis of the 
practically wise man, and telling him that the end of human life is to be best 
attained by certain actions which are intermediate between extremes. 
Obedience to such a rule is moral virtue. (1923, p. 229) 
 
According to Ross, there are two crucial stages that the practically wise man must 
reach by the end of his life: The right rule through deliberative analysis, and the 
performance of virtuous actions through obedience to the rule. The logic would be 
simple here: by the end of our lives, we must perform virtuous actions, and to perform 
virtuous actions, we need the right rule to guide us. This right rule is reached through 
deliberative analysis, which indeed sounds very Aristotelian. 
 
Deliberative analysis plays a key though somewhat vague role in the system Ross’s 
proposes. There are two ways to approach the “rule reached by deliberation”. The 
right rule can be reached by deliberation as a process of induction, namely, the rule is 
reached by amplified moral experience gained by living through concrete and 
                                                        
50 There are other famous commentators who support this universal rule view and who are also highly influenced 
by Kantian moral theory, like the French commentators Gauthier and Jolif. They even endow this “rule” with 
Kantian meaning of Authority, “La regle està la fois ce quit permet de parvenir à la fin souhaitée et ce que 
s’impose avec autoritée.” II 1, p. 149. Their argument is similar enough to Ross’s that I will not discuss it 
separately here.  
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particular situations. “Rule reached by deliberation” could also mean that there are 
rules already in place, but that the application of rules depends on a larger goal, i.e., 
what kind of life one chooses to live. The right rule is reached by determining how to 
deftly and virtuously fulfil the larger goal, which takes place via deductive process. To 
which of these approaches does Ross refer, then? 
 
We could raise another question outside of Ross’s system, here. As both the acquiring 
and the applying of the rule require deliberative analysis, deliberative analysis itself 
would be sufficient for performing a virtuous action: So why do we need a rule at all? 
What kind of role does the rule play in Aristotle’s ethics? Even if the rule view is an 
accurate reflection of Aristotle’s mind, (or in a weaker sense, if Aristotle would 
reluctantly accept this role of the rule,) Ross’s model should be further clarified to 
explain the origin of the right rule and the manner in which it cooperates with 
deliberation as-applied to particular situations. Basically, we need evidence that 
Aristotle needs such a universal rule in his ethics. 
 
The rule view faces two sizeable challenges in this regard: 1) Aristotle seems to play 
down the role of the universal proposition since it cannot be precisely applied to 
particular situations, and 2) Aristotle does not define the OL in terms of “rule,” rather 
he does so in terms of “virtue.” If we take the rule view, we also risk an inconsistent 
interpretation of the sixth book of the Ethics. At the end of the first chapter of EN VI, 
Aristotle re-asks the question regarding the exact nature of the OL and its limit; in the 
other chapters, he discusses intellectual virtue and defines the OL as one of the 
intellectual virtues, i.e., phronesis in the last chapter. If we take the OL as a rule, there 
would be a gap between the first chapter and the other chapters of Book Six. 
 
In response to the second challenge, certain proponents of the rule view (e.g., 
Gauthier and Jolif) take the first chapter of Book Six as an insertion.51 This is quite a 
radical treatment, since it is difficult to find evidence from the manuscript to support 
it. Even if we take the first chapter as an insertion and consider the rule view to be 
correct, we would still ask why Aristotle does not mention the terms of the “rule” 
                                                        
51 “Les sections 1138b14-34 et 1138b35-1139a3 sont juxtaposes sans qu’il y ait dans l’une un seul mot qui fasse 
allusion a l’autre.” II 2, p. 440. 
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while defining OL as phronesis in Book Six. Basically, forcing the rule view to 
accommodate the identification between the OL and phronesis is a challenging 
endeavor. 
 
Despite the challenges, there are certain eminent scholars (e.g., Dorothea Frede) who 
continue to defend the rule view as of today. My own interpretation does include 
some defense of the rule view, as discussed in the next two chapters. Before I begin 
defending the rule view in earnest, however, I would like to introduce other 
interpretations of the OL. 
 
Many other scholars have either returned to revise the faculty view to take the OL as 
the exercise of the rational faculty, i.e., right reasoning or right deliberation, or have 
modified the rule view to assert that the OL is not a universal statement but a correct 
prescription or a particular proposition.52 In the former group, we have Urmson, 
Pakaluk, Dirlmeier, Ursula Wolf, Carlo Natali, and Roger Crisp; the latter group, 
which represents what I call the “paticularist view”, is associated with the names 
Broadie, Rowe, and Gómez-Lobo. This latter group actually includes two different 
interpretations, namely Broadie’s and Gómez-Lobo’s, which are highly complex and 
somewhat challenging to explain. 
 
A quick note as to why I merge the latter group into one category though they actually 
contain very different interpretations: I do so simply on the grounds that they 
mutually define the OL as a type of proposition, and that they reject the faculty view 
for similar reasons. They accept the philological arguments used by the rule group to 
attack Cook Wilson’s view, and yet are not satisfied with the positive proposals of the 
rule view in general. I discuss Broadie’s and Gómez-Lobo’s arguments separately 
below. 
3. Particularist View 
Broadie and Rowe translate the OL as a correct prescription; however, it is not 
                                                        
52 The criticism of the rule view, especially the Kantian deontological version, was initiated by Anscombe in the 
late 1950s. 
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obvious how we should understand this “prescription.” They claim that “rule is 
inappropriate, since the orthos logos operates in particular situations, and Aristotle 
does not think that knowing just what to do in a particular situation is given to us by 
rules.” They also reject the translation “right reason,” which they find misleading; 
instead, they assert that the logos here means “a product of reasoning such as a 
formula or articulate declaration.”(2002, p. 297) We can thus determine that the 
“prescription” is a formula or articulate declaration that should be relevant to 
particular situations, but it remains unclear whether the universal rule has any relation 
to (or even makes any active contribution to) generating this prescription applied to 
any particular situation. 
 
When Broadie and Rowe discuss the purpose of the first chapter of the sixth Book, 
they find that the OL is used by Aristotle as a generic term; namely, there are many 
orthoi logoi for different manner of domains, e.g., logoi for techne, logoi for Sophia, 
logoi for ethical matters, and so on. They argue that the task of Book Six is not to 
define the OL as something to guide us very specifically through particular situations, 
but rather to single out the ethical OL among a number of ethical and non-ethical 
logoi. According to this reading, the task of Book Six is simply to determine the 
difference between phronesis (which is always associated with ethical virtue) and 
other forms of intellectual virtue, e.g., techne, sophia. This reading rather elegantly 
solves the main problem the rule group grapples with, namely, the gap between the 
first chapter and the other chapters of Book Six, while avoiding the philological 
disadvantages of the faculty view. Despite these merits, however, there are two urgent 
questions raised by this interpretation. 1) What really is the essence that Aristotle 
intends to attribute to the OL in the sixth Book? And 2) how can we determine the 
intermediate in a particular situation with such an ethical OL? These questions are not 
totally independent of each other: the answer to the first question might imply 
somewhat the answer to the second, namely to know what the OL is might also, more 
or less, tell us its function, and the answer to the second might also shed light on what 
the ethical OL is. Both questions concern our understanding of the sixth Book. 
 
In respect to the first question, it might be correct that there are many sorts of OL, 
although Aristotle does not say so explicitly. It is not fair to assume that Aristotle has 
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placed the ethical OL into other kinds of OL in Book Six, however. First, the first 
chapter of this Book leaves us with the impression that Aristotle connects the OL with 
ethical virtue and probes the definition of this particular OL, therefore, this OL must 
refer to the OL in the ethical field (or the ethical OL) rather than the OL in general. 
Moreover, in this central book, Aristotle seems to endow phronesis with 
overwhelming importance among other intellectual virtues. Book Six is rife with 
discussion of the phronesis and Book Six is where Aristotle naturally bounds 
phronesis only with ethical virtue. Indeed, the entirety of Book Six seems to focus on 
the question of what the ethical OL is, and then states that the answer is phronesis or 
something closely related to phronesis. Broadie and Rowe’s reading is not fair 
considering the emphasis of the ethical OL and its relation to phronesis in the sixth 
Book. 
 
Broadie herself might be aware of the problematic nature of her argument, as she 
seems to defend her interpretation by replying to the second question. In her 
influential book Ethics with Aristotle, she tells us that in order to acquire the right 
advice for the right action, a moral agent should appeal to the phronimos, a man who 
possesses the practical wisdom, just as an ill person should refer to his physician in 
order to cure his illness; that said, the type of physician a patient should appeal to 
depends on what type of disease he has. A medical specialist can offer the right 
treatment and right prescription only to treat a disease with which she is familiar. 
Similarly, in ethical matters, there is a specific kind of person who can give the right 
prescription to the moral agent according to every particular (type of) situation. This 
person is the phronimos who has the right ethical type of orthoi logoi, and the moral 
agent should consult phronimos for specific advice. Broadie says:  
 
…if anyone seeks from the ethical philosopher advice about how to make 
every decision, the latter is under no obligation to reply to him on this level (in 
this case, not because it is not his business or he is not trained, but because, as 
Aristotle has said, no one can give effective guidance of that sort); but he 
ought to be able to say something informative about the kind of person one 
should go to for advice—not about all decisions in the abstract, but about this 
or that particular problem. The kind which the philosopher should be able to 
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characterize is, of course, the person of practical wisdom, who is Aristotle's 
subject in NE VI, being the embodiment of the uniquely ethical type of orthos 
logos.(1994, p. 189) 
 
We might understand why Broadie and Rowe translate the OL as “right prescription” 
according to the argument that it is similar to a prescription handed down to an ill 
person by a physician: In an ethical quandary, it is a prescription that phronimos gives 
to the moral learner. When the moral learner has acquired the ethical virtue, he 
becomes phronimos according to Aristotle. Phronimos can then issue himself 
prescriptions as necessary. 
 
Even armed with this definition of “ethical prescription”, the right prescription still 
remains somewhat obscure. Is right ethical prescription relevant to a particular 
situation itself articulated in the form of universal or particular proposition? Or what 
is the form of the OL which is generated by phronimos for a particular situation?  
 
In light of the physician-prescription analogy, the ethically right prescription that is 
relevant to a particular situation might likewise be particular: Like a medical 
prescription, it simply tells you what kind of medicine you should take for a particular 
sickness at a particular time. In ethical matters, the prescription might just tell you to 
do “this” or “that” at a particular time and place, without necessarily explaining to 
you “why”. Instead, the why is grasped only by the phronimos, the one who can issue 
the particular ethical prescription. Accordingly, the ethical OL is the general name for 
numerous particular and concrete prescriptions. 
 
But let us consider more details of this analogy between medical and ethical domain. 
Assume that the doctor himself is sick and he wants and is aslo able to cure himself. Is 
his medical OL is simply a particular prescription? Here we might agree that the 
reasoning or deliberative form is probalbly involved in his prescription-given process. 
This process would be a reasoning process combining the universal and particular 
knowledge. In ancient medical society, both Hippocraticus and his opponents reached 
the agreement that a general theory of human (body) nature is important and 
Chapter 2: Primary Interpretations 
 49 
necessary for adapting the therapy to peculiar cases.53 So why could not the whole 
reasoning process involving both universal and particular knowledge be the real 
ethical OL for the doctor? It seems more reasonal to take the OL as the reasoning form 
than other candidates in the doctor. In the practical domain, it is, on the one hand, the 
same as the ancient medical domain, the OL of phronimos could also be proven as a 
reasoning form involving both universal and particular knowledge. And moral 
learners, on the other hand, in contrast with patients, might not only follow the 
prescription of phronimos to do right action, but also want to be phronimoi. Most 
patients follow the prescripiton of doctor only for the sake of being cured, but not for 
the sake of being doctor. In order to become phronimoi, moral learners would 
reflectively ask phronimos why they should do this or that. During the process of 
seeking why, moral leaners would grasp the morally universal knowledge or rules, (I 
will argue in next chapters that there are rules playing important role in Aristotle’s 
ethical frame work), to help them to biuld their moral state. So even for moral learners, 
there is reasoning form actively engaged in and even decisive for the performance of 
moral action. Why could not we legitimately determine the OL as a right reasoning 
form which involves both particular and universal knowledge? 
 
So Broadie and Rowe’s reading requires some clarification despite its avoidance of 
the problems inherent to both the faculty view and rule view. By contrast, 
Gómez-Lobo does directly state that the OL is a particular proposition and that a 
universal rule plays no role in determining the right action in a particular situation. 
There are three main points to his argument which are worth examining separately.  
 
1) Aristotle declares that the mean is relative to the agent and also to the time of the 
action, the objects involved, the people affected, the motive adopted, the mode of the 
action, and other factors (EN II 6, 1106b21-22). Aristotle seems to “have ruled out a 
general principle or norm as the candidate of the OL.”54 One may react differently to 
different circumstances, i.e., each individual agent handles the same circumstances in 
                                                        
53 For more on the disputes in ancient medical society, see Mark J. Schiefsky (2005), pp. 11-3. 
54 From the relativity of mean to the agent, it seems to follow that Aristotle adopts some form of moral relativism 
since different people would have different standards to make their decisions. But Gómez-Lobo does not think 
that is so. Gómez-Lobo (1995), pp. 17-8. 
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his or her own way. If there were rules for each set of circumstances, the rules would 
be excessively complex as they would involve multiple quantifications over a larger 
set of variables; they would thus be entirely useless in terms of particular actions. 
Gómez-Lobo claims, “There are, at most, vague pieces of advice” which are helpful 
to find the intermediate.55 He claims this practical advice, however, “can be applied 
only after the intermediate has been determined. Hence, it cannot be taken as an 
example of the logos used for its determination.” 56  Because the intermediate 
as-determined by the OL should be precise, and only the OL itself is a precisely 
particular proposition, then the intermediate can also be precise. Therefore, the OL, in 
Gómez-Lobo’s opinion, is a particular proposition. The supporting evidence for this 
point is taken from Aristotle’s example of the intake of food: 
 
If ten pounds are too much for a particular person to eat and two too little, it 
does not follow that the trainer will order six pounds, for this also is perhaps too 
much for the person who is to take it, or too little for Milo [the huge Sicilian 
wrestler], too much for the beginner in athletic exercise. (EN II 6, 1106a 36-b4) 
 
It would be ineffective for a trainer to provide a range of choices to a particular person 
in a particular set of circumstances; rather, he must give “only one correct amount or 
reason for a given individual in the particular context of choice.” 57  Thus, 
Gómez-Lobo suggests that the OL is a particular practical proposition that identifies 
the means to be chosen for given circumstances. He gives us an illustration of this: In 
the case of the trainer, the OL would say that “four pounds [for example] is the 
appropriate amount for you given the circumstances, your physical constitution, 
etc.”58 
 
                                                        
55 The text that Gomez-Lobo uses is the EN II 9, 1109b1-7: “But we must consider the things towards which we 
ourselves also are easily carried away; for some of us tend to one thing, some another; and this will be 
recognizable from the pleasure and the pain we feel. We must drag ourselves away to the contrary extreme; for 
we shall get into the intermediate state by drawing well away from error, as people do in straightening sticks 
that are bent.” 
56 Ibid., p. 18. 
57 Ibid., p. 21. 
58 Ibid., p. 21. 
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2) His interpretation is strengthened through the discussion of the term ὅρος. In the 
opening passage of Book Six (which I have quoted in Chapter 1 and marked “Passage 
4”,) Aristotle connects this term with the question of what the OL is, i.e., τίς ἐστιν ὁ 
ὀρθὸς λόγος καὶ τούτου τίς ὅρος. Literally, it is simply a genitive form, namely, the 
ὅρος of the OL. Scholars have made several different interpretations of this genitive 
form, however. Ross takes it to be “the standard that fixes orthos logos”; Irwin 
renders it the “definition” of the OL. Gómez-Lobo argues that either the “standard” or 
“definition” is a universal formulation that is useless to the particular situation, and 
takes the original meaning of ὅρος (“limit” or “boundary mark”), which is particular.59 
Moreover, he understands this genitive form not as “definition” or “standard” of the 
OL, but rather that the OL determines the ὅρος.60 He uses a similar argument as the 
one described above. Because the ὅρος is a particular mark that is determined by the 
OL, only if the OL is a particular proposition can the particular ὅρος be determined. 
Therefore, the OL is a particular proposition. The examples of physical training and 
medicine can again be applied here, where the OL uttered in the particular case by the 
trainer or the physician establishes limitations beyond which or below which exercise 
and food would be excessive or insufficient, respectively. The OL, the particular 
practical proposition conceived by the trainer or physician, thus determines the ὅρος 
or boundary mark for a proper choice. Since the limit is strictly particular, it explains 
why Aristotle says that ‘it is true, but not clear’ (1138b25-26). It is true that we should 
look for the ὅρος, but it would be different in every particular case, so it is not clear 
what it is. 
 
3) The path of the third argument made by Gómez-Lobo is similar to the former, and 
focuses on the passage where Aristotle mentions that practical wisdom is not only 
concerned with the universal, but also with the particular (EN VI 7. 1141b15). 
Gómez-Lobo asserts that the intermediate action is particular, and the task of practical 
wisdom is to deal with particulars. Practical wisdom operates in ethical virtue to 
identify the right action, and in order to do this, the practical wisdom must issue a 
particular proposition: the OL. 
                                                        
59 A brief overview about the translation of this term: Grant renders it “law”; Gauthier and Jolif “standard”; 
Broadie and Rowe “mark”; Dirlmeier “Grenzmark”; Rowe “criterion”; and Sandra Peterson “limit”. 
60 This reading is also suggested by Sandra Peterson. 
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Gómez-Lobo’s three arguments can be combined and summarized as follows: The 
intermediate that is determined by the OL is particular, and only if the OL is a 
particular proposition can the intermediate be precisely determined; thus the OL is a 
particular proposition. 
 
This argument is quite monotonous. Gómez-Lobo refuses the faculty view by making 
his philological argument and rejects the rule view by insisting that the intermediate is 
particular. The rule group also recognizes that the intermediate is particular, and they 
also realize that the rule should be applied and adjusted for particular situations. Thus, 
any critique of the rule view cannot simply focus on the particular intermediate, as 
Gómez-Lobo does, but rather should focus on the shortages of the rule view itself, 
namely, the two challenges I mentioned above: 1) Aristotle plays down the universal 
knowledge many times, and 2) that Aristotle never defines the OL in terms of the 
“rule,” rather in terms of virtue, (albeit in a weak sense.) 
 
Basing his interpretation on the studies established by above mentioned particularlists, 
Klaus Corcilius provides us much more insightful argument to support the 
particularist view of the OL.  
 
In view of the moral function of the OL, namely finding out the intermediate of the 
feelings and actions in each given particular situation, Corcilius argues that if and 
only if the OL is a right, particular proposition which can describe all the relevant 
information in a given situation, then this particular proposition meets the conditions 
that Aristotle endows to the OL. Moreover, he argues that in respect to such a 
particular proposition, it is difficult accurately portray it according to any form or 
content under Aristotle’s description of the OL. Therefore, the OL is “a placeholder 
for a true proposition descriptive of the morally relevant particular circumstance of a 
given situation.”61 Furthermore, he argues that this description of the OL leaves room 
to articulate something more interesting for Aristotle’s moral philosophy in general; 
with such a placeholder, moral virtue can directly connect to human feeling. Moral 
virtue with such a placeholder brings the feelings under control as necessary, and 
                                                        
61 Corcilius (unpublished), p. 19. 
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allows reaction through said feeling in an appropriate manner when faced with a 
particular situation. 
 
This interpretation makes the clear-cut claim that “Aristotle is not interested in 
making general normative statements. Nor is he interested in explaining to us why we 
ought to do.”62 I do agree that Aristotle’s main interest is not to propose general 
statements in his ethical works, but I would not go so far as to deny the positive role 
of the general statements in explaining that actions ought to fall under Aristotle’s 
ethical teachings. If some sort of explanation is required by Aristotle, maybe the OL 
simply qua a descriptive proposition would be open to dispute. I will discuss this 
point in the final two chapters of this thesis, and express my own opinions (and 
solutions to these problems) there.  
 
The particularists’ critiques of the rule view attempt to solve problems with the rule 
view, but said critiques are not entirely fair to the rule view. I believe that rules do 
play an important role for Aristotle. In order to defend this position, I will re-examine 
the particularists’ challenges to the value of general knowledge, namely, the lack of 
exactness in particular situations. This does not mean that the universal rule is useless, 
or less important than a particular proposition like “four pounds [for example] is the 
appropriate amount for you given the circumstances, your physical constitution...” If 
the trainer and physician do not provide any universal guidance, how can they possess 
the knowledge that they impart in order to teach and prescribe? Admittedly, all 
trainers and physicians are educated by means of general knowledge of human nature 
even in antiquity; they apply this general knowledge to particular cases. The general 
knowledge, while being adapted to particular cases, is also transferred into (a set of) 
particular propositions or prescriptions, and only the particular proposition is directly 
useful for the particular situation. If this is the case, what is the standard to determine 
the universal rule or the particular proposition as the OL at all? Which argument 
should be given priority? (I will come back to this point in Chapters Three and Four.)  
 
With respect to the argument established by both the universal and particular 
proposition groups, there is one main proposition to consider. The philological 
                                                        
62 Ibid., p. 20. 
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argument that is established by the rule group is also accepted by the critics of the rule 
view, and so it seems to the proposition group that philological arguments condemn 
the faculty view to obsolescence. Many scholars have returned to the faculty view, 
however, forming what I call the “revised faculty view”. 
4. Revised Faculty View 
So what exactly is the revised faculty view, and how does it differ from the faculty 
view or Cook Wilson’s view? I would first like to explain my definition of “revised 
faculty view”. Proponents of this view maintain a very similar position to Wilson’s 
and adopt some of his philological arguments. Unlike Cook Wilson, however, this 
group does not unify many different levels of meanings or functions in the OL; rather, 
they focus on the sense of the OL as the exercise or activity of the rational faculty. 
This group accordingly defends the faculty view, as they believe they have a better 
philosophical explanation of the OL. The revised faculty group does not agree with 
the rule view, mainly in the light of the two challenges discussed above (the 
down-played role of the rule and the rule never meeting the definition of the OL.) 
They share some arguments with the particularists, although they (the revised faculty 
view) do not address the particularist view. The arguments they share are as follows: 1) 
Aristotle does not even implicitly say that the intermediate is determined by rules, and 
2) the intermediate action is determined with reference to a number of variables, such 
as time, place, persons, and goals (1106b 21), and in particular situations, there is no 
general rule by which the moral agent can make decisions but rather that decisions are 
made according to perception (1109b 23).63 The proponents of the revised faculty 
position do not gravitate toward the particular proposition view; rather, they insist that 
the OL is made right by using the faculty or power of deliberation or calculation to 
reach a right end. This resembles Cook Wilson’s argument. In fact, they also adopt his 
                                                        
63 Urmson (1988, p. 85): “Aristotle is clearly saying that he is to examine how the intermediate, or mean, is to be 
determined, but not at all clearly that the answer is to consist in a set of rules. Moreover, he has repeatedly told 
us that the action which will exhibit the excellent or intermediate character has to be decided with reference to a 
number of variables, such as time, place, persons and goals (1106b 21), and that in particular circumstances 
there is no general rule by which we can decide. 'Judgment is in perception' (1109b 23) - that is, one can decide 
only when faced with the concrete situation. No simple rule would be adequate to deal with the complexities of 
real life.” 
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precise philological arguments, e.g., 1) ὡρισμένῃ λόγῳ, ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθὸς λέγει 
indicates the personification of the logos in such a way that it would be absurd to take 
the logos as rule; and 2) the primary passages used as evidence are mainly our 
Passages 1 and 2, where Aristotle seems to identify the OL with a virtue (phronesis) 
and personifies logos.64 
 
There is no explicit identification made in the second argument, however; neither 
does the linguistic implication in Passage 1 adequately identify OL as a virtue. Further, 
the identification in Passage 2 is not without qualification, leaving us in need of other 
evidence to identify the OL as a virtue. (This point is discussed at length in Chapter 1.) 
The first argument is vulnerable to philological attack from both the rule group and 
the particular proposition group, who understands the logos not as a faculty but rather 
as a formulation or articulated declaration. At this point, I have introduced this 
argument but not yet discussed any response to these philological attacks by anyone 
from the revised faculty group—this is because I have yet to encounter any such 
response. Perhaps the revised faculty group does not find these philological attacks 
sufficiently decisive. 
 
The advantages to the revised faculty view would be very clear if it were possible to 
overcome the philological attack raised by the rule group. According to the revised 
faculty view, there would be no gap between the first chapter and the other chapters in 
the sixth Book; namely, where Aristotle raises the question of what the OL is in the 
first chapter and answers it in the last chapter. When read this way, the sixth Book is a 
coherent and consistent work. 
 
This reading also seems to echo throughout the entirety of Nicomachean Ethics. In the 
                                                        
64 Pakaluk (2005, pp. 214-5) says: “But it is better to take the phrase [the OL] to refer principally to a power or 
faculty (just as, aswe have seen, logos on its own typically indicates a power or faculty.) This is clear, first of all, 
from Aristotle’s plain words. He says in 2.2, ‘Later we will discuss sound reason—what it is, and how it is 
related to the other virtues’ (1103b32-34), implying that orthos logos is one of the virtues, and he says explicitly 
in Book Six that orthos logos simply is the virtue of phronesis (1144b28). Moreover, he treats as equivalent the 
expressions ‘as sound reason indicates’ and ‘as a person with phronesis indicates’ (cf. 1107a1), and he regularly 
speaks of orthos logos as something that commands (1114b30) and speaks (1138b20). And it would be absurd 
to take a maxim or prescription to do these things, or to think that a maxim had the job of adjusting and refining 
other maxims to suit particular circumstances.” 
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first book, Aristotle presents us a psychological distinction of the human soul. The 
rational faculty is the principle of the soul, thus, the rational part should inform the 
non-rational part in the way a father imparts knowledge to his son. Furthermore, 
human happiness is based on the activity of the rational faculty and thus the rational 
part plays a dominant role in the human soul. Aristotle presents two kinds of rational 
parts: the part having reason in itself and the part listening to the reason. We can 
imagine that in the rest of the books, then, all the other activities discussed relate to 
these two manners of rational parts. It is in fact so in the Nicomachean Ethics: the 
second through the fifth Books correspond to the part listening to reason, while Book 
Six corresponds to the part having reason in itself. The exercise of the rational faculty 
plays an important role throughout these books. If we take the OL as the right use of 
the rational faculty, it seems to cohere perfectly with the entire context of the ethics. 
In order to make this advantage legitimate, it is necessary to first respond to the 
philological attack made by the rule group.65 
5. Author’s Revision of the Philological Attack 
There two main philological attacks made by the rule group which have been fully 
accepted by its followers as well as the particularists. The first argument is that 
Aristotle uses the whole phrase τὸ λόγον ἔχον to refer to the rational faculty of the 
soul, not the logos alone; the second one is that the phrase ὡρισμένῃ λόγῳ is the 
passive form of ὁρίζειν, which is joined with a noun in the dative form of logos. 
Stocks argues that a noun in the dative form plus the passive form of ὁρίζειν is never 
the defining faculty, judge, or legislator, but rather the standard, measure, or mark by 
which the definition is affected. I would like to further explain and/or expand these 
two arguments in order to open an alternative to the understanding of the logos that 
the rule view provides. 
 
In respect to the first argument, the rule-group rightly observes that Aristotle uses the 
phrase τὸ λόγον ἔχον to refer to the rational faculty of the soul, but it is hasty to define 
the logos as “rule”. It is possible to take the phrase τὸ λόγον ἔχον as “the part which 
                                                        
65 To solve the philological problems is sufficient to argue for more advantages than rule view, but not sufficient 
for more advantages than particular view. I will establish other arguments accordingly. 
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has rule,” as the rule group insists, but it is also possible to take this phrase as “the 
part which has reasoning activity.” The whole phrase refers to the rational faculty that 
possesses the use, exercise, or activity of the faculty, such as reasoning, calculation, or 
deliberation.  
 
There is another important phenomenon here that is worthy of notice, that is, it is 
difficult to distinguish the same word referring to the mental state and elsewhere 
referring to the activity or product of this faculty in Aristotle’s vocabulary. For 
example, διάνοια refers usually to the mental state: In Rep. διάνοια is a middle state of 
nous and doxa (διάνοιαν δὲ καλεῖν μοι δοκεῖς τὴν τῶν γεωμετρικῶν τε καὶ τὴν τῶν 
τοιούτων ἕξιν ἀλλ’ οὐνοῦν, ὡς μεταξύ τι δόξης τε καὶ νοῦ τὴν διάνοιαν οὖσαν. 511d); 
and in Pol. 1270b40-1271a 1 the διάνοια grows old as well as the body (ἔστι γάρ, 
ὥσπερ καὶ σώματος, καὶ διανοίας γῆρας). But somewhere else, διάνοια refers to the 
thinking process: 1. διάνοιά, δόξα, and φαντασία, each of which can be true or false 
(διάνοιά τε καὶ δόξα καὶ φαντασία, μῶν οὐκ ἤδη δῆλον ὅτι ταῦτά γε ψευδῆ τε 
καὶἀληθῆ πάνθ’ ἡμῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐγγίγνεται. soph. 263d). 2. In Meta, διάνοια is 
either practical, productive, or theoretical (ὥστε εἰ πᾶσα διάνοια ἢ πρακτικὴ ἢ 
ποιητικὴ ἢ θεωρητική, Meta.1025b25). 
 
Aristotle also uses the phrase διάνοιαν ἔχειν. In DA 410b24, he states that many 
animals do not possess the process of thinking (καὶ τῶν ζῴων τὰ πολλὰ διάνοιαν οὐκ 
ἔχειν); in EN 1174a2, Aristotle says no one would choose to live their entire life with 
a child’s level of intellect (οὐδείς τ’ ἂν ἕλοιτο ζῆν παιδίου διάνοιαν ἔχων διὰ βίου).66 
Aristotle uses διάνοιαν ἔχον in these passages, where διάνοια is a thinking process 
which refers to the rational activity of the human soul. In view of the close relation 
between logos and dianoia, the possibility is also left open to take the logos in the 
phrase τὸ λόγον ἔχον as the rational activity. We could thus infer that the logos is the 
same as, or at least partly similar to, the dianoia. The result of this inference is 
potentially legitimate or at least not contrary to Aristotle’s thinking, e.g., EN VI 2, 
1139a32, προαιρέσεως δὲ ὄρεξις καὶ λόγος ὁ ἕνεκά τινος. διὸ οὔτ’ ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ 
διανοίας, which naturally causes the reader to infer that the logos is identified with 
                                                        
66 See also DPA 650b19, where Aristotle discusses certain animals that do possess intellect (συμβαίνει δ’ ἔνιά γε 
καὶ γλαφυρω τέραν ἔχειν τὴν διάνοιαν τῶν τοιούτων.) 
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nous and dianoia. It is thus at least possible to determine the logos as a rational 
activity, although it makes a relatively weak argument.  
 
Regarding the second philological argument, (again, the proposition that ὁρίζειν with 
the dative use of logos in the definition of the ethical virtue is never the defining 
faculty, judge, or legislator but rather the standard, measure, or mark by which the 
definition is affected) I am not as convinced as Stocks. He gives us some examples of 
this use: ὁρίζειν with ἁφῃ (435b16), τέλει (1115b22), ἔργῳ (1253a23)67 where he is 
indeed correct that the dative use of the noun is obviously a kind of standard, measure, 
or mark to make distinctions. For example, touch is typical for animals; the purpose of 
something is a mark of distinction, and ergon as an activity often identified with the end 
by Aristotle, i.e., the mark for distinguishing types of living beings from each other. He 
does not give us any other examples of the logos in dative use with the passive form 
ὁρίζειν, however, and if we determine the logos in the phrase τὸ λόγον ἔχον as rational 
activity, it could also be understood as a distinct mark. Rational activity is the mark to 
distinguish rational animals and nonrational animals, just like the ergon of living 
beings is the distinct mark to distinguish plants, animals and human beings.68 
 
At this point, I have made my argument that if we take the logos as an activity of the 
rational faculty, rather than the faculty itself, the revised faculty view could be spared 
the philological attacks. The revised faculty view thus seems to be a very promising 
interpretation due to this robustness against attack, but also because it brings us to a 
coherent reading of Book Six (and perhaps even the whole Ethics.) 
 
Despite the advantages of the revised faculty view, though, it remains inappropriate to 
determine the OL as the right use of the rational faculty. How can the moral agent 
                                                        
67 The Bekker Number of this quotation is incorrect in Stocks’s paper. 
68 I respond only briefly to other argumentsthat Stocks raises, as other scholars do not give them much attention 
either. Stocks claims that logos is not the faculty of soul, and its place is taken by nous because it is unlike 
Aristotle to use the actual defining formula of one of the central terms of the treatise as an ambiguous synonym 
for nous, without a word of explanation, instead of the unambiguous term nous itself. My response: If Stocks is 
right to say that the logos is ambiguous, is not the τὸ λόγον ἔχον also, or even more, ambiguous? Why does 
Aristotle use this ambiguous formula at the beginning of the work (first in EN I 7, again in EN I 13) while the 
unambiguous term nous is discussed in Book Six in detail?  
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have and guarantee the right use of the rational faculty, exactly? One might say the 
right use comes from virtue, since the rational faculty itself is probably neutral, in 
other words, that it can be used for good but also for bad. Virtue, according to 
Aristotle, is determined by the OL, which prima facie creates circular reasoning, i.e., 
the OL is guaranteed by virtue, while virtue is determined by the OL. We could insist 
that the use of the rational faculty is not neutral, rather that rightness comes from the 
rational faculty itself, but it does not seem obvious that this is Aristotelian thinking. 
This claim is also challenged by the question of the normative question of logos, as 
discussed in Chapter 1. If the revised faculty view is really the right candidate for the 
OL, we have to examine whether using the rational faculty can determine the virtue or 
the intermediate action. If so, how does the right use of rational faculty determine the 
virtue? Further, how can be the right use guaranteed?  
 
My position is sympathetic to the view of the OL as the use or activity of the rational 
faculty, namely, that the OL is the right reasoning or right deliberation. But I will 
emphasize that this rational activity is a kind of reasoning form which involves both 
universal and particular knowledge. A new study on logos in Plato and Aristotle’s 
ethical context from Jessica Moss is quite similar and highly supportive of my 
argument, in fact.69 Moss argues that the OL is a practical syllogism serving as an 
explanatory account—an argument that served as a sound foundation upon which I 
established my own interpretation. I present my argument with a different strategy, 
but the most central and essential ground on which we rely is the same: That the OL is 
indeed loaded with explanatory function in telling the moral agent not only what 
should be done in each particular situation, but also why it is so done. 
 
In the following chapters, I will examine whether and how the use of the rational 
faculty can determine the virtue and intermediate action as the OL does. I have 
organized this examination, (as I have argued in the Introduction and in Chapter 1,) 
into two separate chapters that correspond to two moral stages: The virtue-acquiring 
stage and the virtue-acquired stage. The role of the rule and particular proposition will 
                                                        
69 Jessica Moss (2014). I submitted my dissertation before Moss’s paper was published. I made a similar proposal 
to Moss’s in that draft, but did so in a far less systematic or concise manner than she does. Her paper helped me 
a great deal to organize and clarify my argument. 
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also be discussed at length, as the particular proposition view does not do justice to 
the rule view and the revised faculty view does not mention one word of the 
particularist view. 
6. A Brief Summary 
Before we continue, let us briefly summarize the advantages and disadvantages of the 
different interpretations discussed in this chapter. 
Cook Wilson’s View 
The advantage of Cook Wilson’s view (the faculty view): 1) It provides a coherent 
and consistent reading of Book Six (and potentially of the whole Ethics); and 2) the 
meaning of the OL can be applied to various contexts, i.e., faculty, reasoning, or law 
according to necessity.  
 
The disadvantages of Cook Wilson’s view: 1) It assumes equality between logos and 
OL, which is never explicitly stated by Aristotle himself; (2) some meanings of the 
OL, e.g., the OL as rational faculty, are vulnerable to philological attack; and 3) it 
consists simply of a conglomeration of philological arguments while making no 
precise philosophical arguments that the OL is “reason”. 
 
Rule View 
The advantages of the rule view: 1) It avoids the philological attacks faced by the 
faculty view; and 2) it effectively applies to moral education. (By this I mean the OL 
is teachable and universally applicable.) 
 
The disadvantages of the rule view: 1) It causes Book Six to run the risk of 
inconsistency; and 2) it seems contradictory towards Aristotle’s own opinion of 
universal knowledge, since he seems to downplay universal knowledge in many 
places in the Ethics. 
 
Particular Proposition View 
The advantages of the particular proposition view: 1) It avoids philological attack; 2) 
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it likewise avoids all the disadvantages of the rule-view by reflecting consistency and 
coherence among Book Six and the rest of the Ethics; and 3) it makes the OL highly 
effective, i.e., allows a particular proposition to precisely and directly prescribe what 
the right action is for the particular intermediate. 
 
The disadvantages of the particular proposition view: 1) The explanation for the sake 
of a consistent reading of Book Six is not especially intelligible and seems to 
contradict the importance and emphasis of the OL Aristotle makes in Book Six, thus 
weakening the systematic function of the OL altogether; and 2) it makes the OL 
ineffective in the aspects of teaching and application. In other words, the particular 
position is useful only once and rendered inapplicable to other cases. 
 
Revised Faculty View 
The advantages of the revised faculty view: 1) It shares the first advantage of Cook 
Wilson’s view in terms of coherence and consistency in the Ethics; and 2) it avoids all 
the disadvantages of Wilson’s view in that it is not necessary to assume the identity of 
the logos and the OL. Accordingly, this view is free of philological attacks and 
provides (or at least attempts to make) a sound philosophical argument. 3) It likewise 
avoids all the disadvantages of the rule-view and the particular proposition view, as 
the universal rule is not over-emphasized as it is under the rule view. It is more 
intelligible than the particular proposition view, as well. Whether the revised faculty 
view has the advantage of being teachable is not yet clear, however, (which I will 
further discuss in a later chapter.) 
 
The disadvantages of the revised faculty view: 1) The relationship between the OL 
and ethical virtue is unclear, as there seems to be a vicious circle between them; and 2) 
it might make the moral philosophy simpler than it should be namely, makes moral 
training simply the training of a psychic faculty. 
 
The revised faculty view is more advantageous than other views, however, it is not 
quite appropriate to argue that the revised faculty view is the correct interpretation of 
Aristotle’s meaning. In the following chapter, I will more closely examine the 
disadvantages of this view. I will also further examine the original rule view, 
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especially in terms of the second disadvantage listed above (and correspondingly, the 
second advantage of the particular proposition view.) I will attempt to prove that the 
rule should play a more important role than the particular proposition group or revised 
faculty group ascribe to it. 
 
Scholars in both of these groups do recognize the positive role of the rule for right 
actions, but they do not recognize that the rule could be (a kind of) OL applied in 
particular situations. For example, Urmson says: 
There are important general principles to be discovered and applied by the 
practically wise man; the whole of the Nicomachean Ethics is devoted to 
determining some of the most ultimate of these principles, such as those that 
tell us what activities are most worth pursuing in the quest for eudaemonia. 
(1988, p. 86) 
Urmson does not think the general principle can determine the final decision made in 
a particular situation; however, as he goes on to say that “these are not principles by 
which the mean can be determined on particular occasions.”(1988, p. 86) I do fully 
agree with Urmson’s point, but refute the particularist tendency to ignore the fact that 
the rule might play different roles or have different functions in the virtue-acquiring 
stage from that in virtue-acquired stage. This is further discussed in Chapter 3, where 
I primarily focus on examining whether the OL is the rule or moral reasoning. 
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Chapter 3: The Orthos Logos in the 
Virtue-Acquiring Stage 
In this chapter, I will focus on the question of what the OL is in the virtue-acquiring 
stage. As I argued in the first chapter, the orthos logos (abbreviated as “OL”) might be 
different things in the virtue-acquiring stage (sometimes called “moral learning stage” 
by scholars70) and in the virtue-acquired stage (which is also called the “moral learned 
stage” or “morally mature stage”.) Even though the OL is, per se, the same thing in 
both stages, it will appear differently in moral learners than in fully virtuous people 
due to the immature moral state of moral learners in the virtue-acquiring stage. Here, I 
will argue for this interpretation.  
 
In this virtue-acquiring stage, moral learners do not possess the OL in their own right, 
but rather follow the OL qua external guidance. However, moral learners, as I will 
show, will internalize the external guidance into their own OL qua their own 
reasoning process during the virtue-acquiring process. Then, in the virtue-acquired 
stage, when moral learners have grown into fully virtuous people, they have the OL in 
their own right. This OL qua a reasoning process tells the moral agent not only what 
should be done, but also the reason it should be done. In the virtue-acquiring process, 
we will see that the different phases of moral education will influence the form and 
content of the OL that the learners grasp since the different phases of moral education 
bring different moral psychic states, namely how the rational faculty and desiderative 
part of the soul relate to each other. This relationship will essentially influence the 
form and content of the OL appearing to moral learners. 
However, given that we have not yet determined what the OL is, per se, this will cause 
difficulties in identifying the different ways OL appears for moral learners. On the one 
                                                        
70 For example, see Burnyeat (1974). 
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hand, my research here will focus on the inner state of moral learners rather than the 
OL itself, which is still an external thing for them; on the other hand, we have some 
candidates for the OL, and these will aid my inquiry in this chapter. In the second 
chapter, I analyzed the advantages and disadvantages of four different interpretations 
of the OL: Cook Wilson’s view (the faculty view), the rule-view, the particularist view, 
and the revised faculty view. According to my analysis, the revised faculty view has 
more advantages than the other interpretations. However, the revised faculty view 
itself also faces serious challenges. If the disadvantages of the revised faculty view 
can be surmounted, the revised faculty view would be a promising interpretation of 
the OL.  
 
The unknown OL, per se, in spite of the difficulty it causes, will be expedient here. 
We do not have to be confined to investigating what the OL really is, but the inquiry 
into the moral learning process will show how fully virtuous people acquire their own 
OL from the moral learning process. This inquiry will shed light on the content of the 
OL. During this process, the practical reasoning of moral learners and the proposition 
view will be reconsidered with reference to the moral function of the OL. Namely, I 
ask which one would be best for moral learners to find the intermediate and 
appropriately regulate their feelings in a particular situation. I will begin with the 
difficulty of the revised faculty view since the difficulty is essentially related to the 
moral function of rational faculty to acquire virtue. Then I will establish that the 
different phases of the moral learning process will influence the form and content that 
the OL takes. Finally, what the real OL is will also begin to emerge in the last phase of 
the moral learning process. The conclusion to which my inquiry will lead here will 
not only avoid all the disadvantages and meet all the requirements of the OL put forth 
by Aristotle in the whole ethical context, but will also lead to defining the real OL. 
1. The Disadvantages of the Revised Faculty View: A Review 
In the second chapter, I listed the following two general disadvantages of the revised 
faculty view: 
 
(1) The revised faculty view would create a dilemma for the relationship between the 
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OL and ethical virtue if the OL is the right deliberation of the rational faculty. One 
horn of the dilemma is that there seems to be a vicious circle between them; the other 
is the normative problem of the logos, as I call it in the first chapter. First, the vicious 
circle: since ethical virtue is determined by the OL and the OL is the right use of the 
rational faculty guaranteed by the ethical virtue, if we take the OL as the right use of 
the rational faculty, there would be a vicious circle between ethical virtue and the OL. 
Second, we must consider the normative problem of the logos: the only way to solve 
the vicious circle problem in Aristotle’s ethical context is to determine that the use of 
rational faculty is not neutral, but normative (i.e., being right is due to the rational 
faculty itself, not ethical virtue.) This claim would address the question of the 
normative problem of logos, which I mentioned in the first chapter. However, this 
does not seem to be Aristotle’s way of thinking because it would be difficult to 
explain how the use of rational faculty already contains the right thing to do. 
 
(2) The revised faculty view might make Aristotelian moral philosophy simpler than it 
should be; namely, the moral training would be simply the training of a psychic 
faculty and not so much related to other elements, such as laws, concrete situations, 
and so on.  
 
These disadvantages in the virtue-acquiring stage should be precisely detailed as 
follows: 
 
(1’) If we take the OL as the right use of the rational faculty, we would determine that 
moral learners do not possess the OL on their own since the reasoning of moral 
learners cannot always be right without possession of the virtuous state, but they 
simply act according to the OL of the practical wise man. If the OL of the practical 
wise man is the right practical reasoning, moral learners should act in accordance with 
this reasoning process. The reasoning process (e.g., the Aristotelian practical 
syllogism) arguably involves propositional reasoning. However, it is unclear whether 
the acting in accordance with the reasoning process for moral learners is the process 
of reflectively following the reasoning or just mechanically following the conclusion, 
like obedience following a command. If the former is true, moral learners understand 
the reasoning process and know why it is reasonable; if the latter is true, moral 
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learners, on the contrary, neither understand the reasoning process nor know why it is 
reasonable. In this latter situation, the OL for this kind of moral learner would simply 
reduce the reasoning process into a single proposition of the whole reasoning process, 
like a command or order. In other words, the whole reasoning process is meaningless 
for them. The latter situation seems like the right case from our daily experiences, 
especially moral learners in the very early phase of the virtue-acquiring stage. With 
respect to the former situation, assuming moral learners can understand the reasoning 
process, or even possess the ability of reasoning, we would ask how it is possible. 
Thus, what the case is for moral learners must be made clear in the virtue-acquiring 
stage. 
 
(2’) The training of a psychic faculty would be decisive for the whole process of the 
moral training. However, in this training process, would many other important 
elements (e.g., laws, traditional precepts, the concrete particular situation, and so on) 
be ignored? 
 
In order to figure out these issues, the following discussion will center on this 
question: what is the most reasonable thing that plays the role of the OL for moral 
learners to determine the intermediate and regulate their feelings in a particular 
situation? In order to answer this, we must systematically examine the process of 
acquiring ethical virtue to disclose how to achieve the virtuous state through 
performing virtue-building action and regulating feelings. In the second and following 
section, I will closely examine the doctrine of ethical virtue from the habituation 
standpoint rather than considering human nature. Human nature contains the 
reasoning capacity which will grow into the intellectual virtue phronesis along with 
the virtue-acquiring process. And this growing reasoning capacity contributes to 
building virtuous state through trying to prescribe and explain what should be done 
and why it should be done. 
 
In the third section, I will examine how the reasoning capacity can grow from a 
human nature that is a mixture of rational and sensitive (or desiderative) activities. My 
argument will be established on two premises. Namely, I will argue that imitation is 
the natural tendency of human beings and that imitators will always feel pleasant from 
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their imitating activity. Imitation with pleasure is able to stimulate the growth of 
reasoning capacity if the pleasure is guided by the OL in the right way. I will examine 
another special feeling, shame, to analyze the contribution of this feeling toward 
growing reasoning capacity in the process of acquiring ethical virtue and, in turn, how 
the reasoning activity trying to regulate the feelings. According to the analysis of this 
section, I will conclude that there are basically two phases of the moral learning 
process, and the OL will also appear differently for moral learners in these two phases 
due to the limit of reasoning capacity in the beginning and the later phase. 
 
From the above investigation, we will see that reasoning activity engages and grows 
in the process of actively acquiring ethical virtue, but could this actively engaged 
reasoning activity be the OL? In the last step (i.e., section four), I closely look at 
whether the reasoning activity of moral learners (e.g., in the form of deliberation or 
syllogism) can be the OL, especially in the later phase of the moral learning 
process—that is, whether the deliberation of moral learners can be the guideline of 
virtue-building action and the proper degree of feelings for themselves. The answer 
that emerges here will not be an absolutely positive answer since the deliberation of 
moral learners only partially functions as the OL. However, the answer is not 
absolutely negative, either; rather, it will provide the hope to determine the practical 
deliberation of phronimos as the OL. 
2. Nature, Habit, and Virtue 
In this section, I will examine what our human nature and habit do when acquiring 
virtue. I will also investigate whether the nature of moral learners already contains the 
affinity to virtue and whether the habituation is only a mechanical process or rational 
reflective understanding involved in the habituation. If the latter is the case, how does 
the rational ability of moral learners engage in the virtue-acquiring process?  
2.1. Nature and Habituation 
In the second book of Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle discusses how to acquire ethical 
virtue. He contrasts the contribution of human nature and habit to the acquisition of 
ethical virtue. He says that no ethical virtue arises in us by nature; rather, it is formed 
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from habit.71 Meanwhile, however, Aristotle does not deny the positive role of our 
nature, even though it seems to have a very limited function—namely, to receive virtue. 
Habituation cannot change our nature but only perfect (or complete) it. He says the 
following: 
 
(Passage 10) 
ἐξ οὗ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδεμία τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν φύσει ἡμῖν ἐγγίνεται· οὐθὲν 
γὰρ τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἄλλως ἐθίζεται… οὔτ’ ἄρα φύσει οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν 
ἐγγίνονται αἱ ἀρεταί, ἀλλὰ πεφυκόσι μὲν ἡμῖν δέξασθαι αὐτάς, τελειουμένοις δὲ 
διὰ τοῦ ἔθους.  
 
From this it is also plain that none of the moral virtue arises in us by nature; for 
nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature… Neither by 
nature, then, nor contrary to nature do virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted 
by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit.72 (1103a18-26) 
Passage 10 clearly shows that we, by nature or naturally, have some basis upon which 
ethical virtues could be established, but the acquisition of virtue does not happen 
naturally. Rather, it is formed through habit. However, how much the nature of our 
basis contributes to the reception of virtue perfected by the habit is unclear. Aristotle 
not only says the acquisition of virtue is not by nature, but also says the acquisition is 
not against nature. “Not by nature” seemingly implies that the “basis” has no principle 
in itself to develop itself into virtue.73 “Not against nature” seemingly implies that the 
“basis” contains the basic character that has affinity with or inclination toward virtue, 
but this affinity or inclination cannot develop on its own (that is, not by nature). 
Rather, its development requires the aid of habit. Thus, what our nature can do for 
                                                        
71 Such a distinction is made at EN VII 4, 1148 b 29-31; X 9, 1179b18-31, and Pol. VII 13, 1332a38-b11. Also see 
Plato, Laws 653b6-c4. 
72 Translation is from ROT. I only substitute “virtue” here for “excellence.” 
73 Aristotle's general discussion of nature is in Physics II 1. There, Aristotle discusses the nature by distinguishing 
living beings from artifacts; the living beings and the parts of them that have, in themselves, a principle of 
motion and stationeries exist by nature. The artifacts that have no such principle in themselves exist not by 
nature. Thus, Aristotle defines the nature as “a principle or cause of being moved and of being at rest in that to 
which it belongs primarily, in virtue of itself and not accidentally” (192b9-23). 
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virtue is not very clear here. Moreover, it is also not yet clear whether nature has 
anything to do with reasoning activity, which should be the central issue in this 
chapter. Therefore, I must first clarify the meaning of the phrases “not by nature” and 
“not against nature,” and clarify how the discussion of nature is related to reasoning 
activity in this ethical writing. 
2.2. By Nature, Against Nature, and According to Nature 
We would infer from Passage 10, as well as other passages where Aristotle puts nature 
and habit in contrast, that “nature” in his ethical writing implies something inside of 
us that we have from birth on and endowed by something outside of us (e.g., “divine 
cause”) that is out of our control.74 Habit, contrasted with nature, is something 
formed after birth in a human community. The “basis”—which is endowed by divine 
cause and can be developed into ethical virtue,75 according to Aristotle—could be 
two things: (1) many abilities of feelings. Aristotle says, “We have the abilities by 
nature, but we are not made good or bad by nature.”76 Virtue would then be a state 
formed from the right reaction of feelings. (2) Some natural state of character. In EN 
VI 13, Aristotle distinguishes “natural” and “full” (kuria) virtue. The natural virtue, 
Aristotle thinks, is the character that everyone has (even animals) immediately after 
birth. Some people are, by nature, to some extent brave, some others by nature just, 
but we still seek the full virtue of braveness and justice. Full virtue is the full good 
that develops from the natural virtue (1144b3-9). Either abilities or natural states, 
according to Aristotle, can be made for good or bad. We need habit to cultivate the 
nature to form a fully virtuous state.  
 
Thus far, at least from Aristotle’s ethical work, the basis has no principle in itself to 
develop itself into virtue, and we have not seen the inclination to virtue. However, one 
passage in Physics might indicate the inclination to virtue that the “basis” contains. 
                                                        
74 1179b21-23, τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς φύσεως δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ διά τινας θείας αἰτίας τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς 
εὐτυχέσιν ὑπάρχει. 
75 Aristotle also calls the virtuous state the second nature of human beings. Julia Annas (1993) distinguishes two 
kinds of nature. The nature that I discuss here, Annas calls the “mere nature,” and the second nature, or the 
virtuous state, simply “nature.” I agree with her distinction, but only use “nature”to refer to her “mere nature” 
since I do not discuss the virtuous state in terms of the nature or second nature here. 
76 1106a9, ἔτι δυνατοὶ μέν ἐσμεν φύσει, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ ἢ κακοὶ οὐ γινόμεθα φύσει. The translation is from ROT. I 
revise “faculty” to “ability.” 
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In Physics VII 3, Aristotle, in connection with the topic of alteration and coming into 
being, determines that virtue is a perfection that is mostly according to nature. I quote 
the passage here: 
 
(Passage 11) 
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ’ αἱ ἕξεις οὔθ’ αἱ τοῦ σώματος οὔθ’ αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀλλοιώσεις. αἱ 
μὲν γὰρ ἀρεταὶ αἱ δὲ κακίαι τῶν ἕξεων· οὐκ ἔστι δὲ οὔτε ἡ ἀρετὴ οὔτε ἡ κακία 
ἀλλοίωσις, ἀλλ’ ἡ μὲν ἀρετὴ τελείωσίς τις (ὅταν γὰρ λάβῃ τὴν αὑτοῦ ἀρετήν, 
τότε λέγεται τέλειον ἕκαστον—τότε γὰρ ἔστι μάλιστα [τὸ] κατὰ φύσιν—ὥσπερ 
κύκλος τέλειος, ὅταν μάλισταγένηται κύκλος καὶ ὅταν βέλτιστος), ἡ δὲ κακία 
φθορὰ τούτου καὶ ἔκστασις· ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδὲ τὸ τῆς οἰκίας τελείωμα λέγομεν 
ἀλλοίωσιν (ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ ὁ θριγκὸς καὶ ὁ κέραμος ἀλλοίωσις, ἢ εἰ θριγκουμένη 
καὶ κεραμουμένη ἀλλοιοῦται ἀλλὰ μὴ τελειοῦται ἡ οἰκία), τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ 
ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν καὶ τῶν κακιῶν καὶ τῶν ἐχόντων ἢ λαμβανόντων· αἱ μὲν γὰρ 
τελειώσεις αἱ δὲ ἐκστάσεις εἰσίν, ὥστ’ οὐκ ἀλλοιώσεις.77(246a10-b3) 
 
Again, states, whether of the body or of the soul, are not alterations. For some 
are virtues and others are vices, and neither virtue nor vice is an alteration: 
virtue is a perfection (for when anything acquires its proper virtue we call it 
perfect, since it is then really in its natural state: e.g. a circle is perfect when it 
becomes really a circle and when it is best), while vice is a perishing of or 
departure from this condition. So just as when speaking of a house we do not 
call its arrival at perfection an alteration (for it would be absurd to suppose that 
the coping or the tiling is an alteration or that in receiving its coping or its tiling 
a house is altered and not perfected), the same also holds good in the case of 
virtues and vices and of the things that possess or acquire them; for virtues are 
perfections and vices are departures: consequently they are not alterations.78 
 
                                                        
77 The first three chapters of Physics VII have two versions. I quote the α version from Ross’ edition. 
78 In order to conform to the discussion in the ethics, I revised the translations of arête and kakia in ROT and 
substitute “virtue” and “vice” for “excellence” and “defect.” Again, neither “virtue” nor “vice” is used here 
necessarily in a restricted moral sense, but used quite generally. 
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This passage suggests that the acquisition of virtue is not an alteration but rather 
perfection, and this perfection is most in accordance with nature (ὅταν γὰρ λάβῃ τὴν 
αὑτοῦ ἀρετήν, τότε λέγεται τέλειον ἕκαστον—τότε γὰρ ἔστι μάλιστα [τὸ] κατὰ 
φύσιν.).79 There are two questions about this claim: (1) What is alteration? (2) How 
should we understand “the perfection is most in accordance with nature”? The first 
question is related to my research, but not the main concern here. Thus, I will discuss 
the first question very briefly and pay more attention to the second.  
 
In Physics V 2, Aristotle defines the alteration as change with respect to quality.80 He 
says, “Motion in respect of quality let us call alteration … by quality I do not here 
mean a property of substance … but a passive quality in virtue of which a thing is said 
to be acted on or to be incapable of being acted on” (Physics V 2, 226a26-30). In 
Passage 11, Aristotle also gives two examples to explain that the acquisition of virtue 
is not alteration, but rather perfection—namely, the examples of the circle and the 
house. According to Aristotle, the virtue of the circle is to be as circular as possible, and 
this is perfection not alteration. This claim seems to assume that there is also a 
non-perfect circle, just as the house without coping stones or a tiled roof is a 
non-perfect house. However, the move from a non-perfect circle or house to a perfect 
circle or house is not an alteration since the basic quality is not changed. This is a very 
brief explanation of the question of alteration.81 
 
The second question of how to understand that “the perfection is most in accordance 
with nature” is more difficult. Why is virtue most (μάλιστα) in accordance with nature 
(κατὰ φύσιν) or in a natural state (Ross’ translation)? One possible answer is that the 
virtue of something is the natural state it would be inclined to acquire; the thing has 
the principle inside to move it to acquire virtue. If this is the case, there seems to be a 
kind of tension between Passage 10, which tells us that virtue is formed from habit 
rather than by nature, and Passage 11, which tells us that virtue is most in accordance 
with nature. One would say that, if the thing has the principle in itself to move it to 
                                                        
79 I will focus on the acquisition of virtue. In order to avoid the distraction, I intentionally ignore the case of vice 
here.  
80 The other two are change with respect to quantity and change with respect to place. 
81 For a much more detailed discussion on this issue, see Morrison and Coope in Maso (2012), pp. 37-72. 
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acquire virtue, it could also probably acquire virtue by nature. However, I would say 
here that, even though we admit that the thing has a principle inside itself, it could not 
acquire virtue by nature. Another Aristotelian example helps illustrate this issue. 
I have two reasons to replace the circle and the house examples from Passage 11 with 
the new examples: (1) I think Aristotle’s example is not suitable because it is not 
obvious that a circle and a house have nature.82 According to Physics II 1, where 
Aristotle tells us that only living beings and simple bodies (earth, fire, air, and water) 
have nature and that nature is “a principle or cause of being moved and of being at 
rest in that to which it belongs primarily, in virtue of itself and not accidentally,” the 
production of craft (e.g., a bed or coat such like these things) does not have such 
innate impulse to change (192b12-17). We might have many ways to defend 
Aristotle’s use of this example in Passage 11, where he mentions nature,83 but I will 
not undertake this defense here since it is not related to my concern in this work. We 
can just assume that a circle or a house has nature in some sense and still have a 
second reason to use another example here. (2) In the circle and house example, 
Aristotle seems to assume that there are non-perfect circles and houses. A non-perfect 
circle/house versus a perfect circle/house corresponds well to the case of natural 
virtue versus full virtue—namely, the non-perfect state to perfect state. However, this 
example might not correspond very well to the other case I mentioned above—namely, 
the case of abilities versus virtue—since it is hard to determine the ability as the 
non-perfect state. Thus, my example should avoid these two disadvantages—namely, 
(1) the thing should obviously have nature, and (2) it should also fit the ethical 
context.  
 
I will take the example of a normal seed of a tree to explain why there is no tension 
between “not by nature” and “most in accordance with nature.” By “normal” here, I 
mean the seed has the ability to grow; it is living, not dead. Aristotle would agree that 
                                                        
82 Especially the example of the circle is not very clear about how to illuminate the process from the imperfect 
state to the perfect one. Cf. Wardy (1990), p. 212. 
83 One way to defend Aristotle is to say that the circle and house are simply analogies that do not need to have 
nature in them; the other way to defend Aristotle is to say the nature of a house is not in a house, but rather in 
the soul of the house-builder. However, to defend these is complicated and unnecessary here since we can find 
easier examples to explain the relationship between “by nature” and “according to nature.” 
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such a seed has a nature in itself since it has the principle inside itself to grow. We can 
define the ability of growing as the nature of the seed, and no one would define the 
ability of growing as an existing state of the tree. Aristotle would also agree that the 
seed growing into a tree is perfection most according to nature since this perfection is 
potentially contained already in the nature of the seed. Thus, this example shows that 
the seed obviously has a nature and that it can perfectly correspond to the ability 
versus virtue case.  
 
Now, let us examine whether the seed would grow into a tree by nature or naturally 
(Ross’ translation). The answer, I think, could also be negative from the point of view 
of the need of external elements (e.g., nutrition, cultivation, and so on). The seed can 
attain its perfection in accordance with nature, but still needs the external conditions 
that could be favorable to this nature (e.g., soil, water, sunshine, and so on) in a 
suitable condition. The seed cannot grow into a tree simply by nature even though the 
nature of the seed is the ability to grow. This example clearly explains that there is no 
tension between “by nature” and “most in accordance with nature.” From this 
example, we could also conclude that there is no tension between “most in accordance 
with nature” and “not by nature” in the acquisition of ethical virtue. Acquiring virtue 
is mostly in accordance with our nature, but the virtuous state cannot be acquired by 
nature or naturally; rather, it still needs suitable external conditions, such as 
habituation. 
 
Thus far, the term “by nature” is clarified. Now I will establish the relationship 
between the nature and rational activity to show that the perfection most in 
accordance with nature is mainly related to or promoted by the rational activity. In the 
following section, I will argue for the connection between nature and reason in human 
beings. 
2.3. Nature and Reason 
In Ethics, Aristotle seems to be conservative about the role of nature, but emphasizes 
something else (i.e., habituation) when he discusses the acquisition of virtue. I would 
admit that habit is more important than nature in the process of acquiring virtue. 
However, the importance of habit should not overshadow the contribution of nature. 
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Passage 11, which is from Physics VII 3, shows that virtue is most in accordance with 
nature, and there is no tension or contradiction between “not by nature” and “most in 
accordance with nature.” Thus, the claim that “virtue is most in accordance with 
nature” should also be true in the ethical context. It also means that our nature itself 
inclines to acquire virtue, just like the nature of the seed inclines to grow into a tree. 
Although the inclination alone is not enough, and the proper external conditions are 
also needed, nonetheless, the positive role of nature cannot be ignored here—but what 
is our nature? How it is related to reasoning activity? 
 
Aristotle’s ergon argument is widely deemed relevant to the question of our nature 
and its relationship to the rational activity of the soul. First, the ergon argument could 
be interpreted as an argument about human nature.84 Aristotle argues that humans 
have a characteristic ergon, or function, that distinguishes them from other kinds of 
living beings, such as plants and animals.85 Thus, we may say the characteristic ergon 
reflects human nature. Second, since Aristotle defines this characteristic ergon as the 
rational activity of the human soul, it implies that rational activity is contained in our 
nature.  
 
Another passage, which is located before the discussion of ethical virtue in the 
Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle, is important and helpful here: 
 
(Passage 12) 
φαίνεται δὴ καὶ τὸ ἄλογον διττόν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ φυτικὸν οὐδαμῶς κοινωνεῖ λόγου, 
τὸ δ’ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ὅλως ὀρεκτικὸν μετέχει πως, ᾗ κατήκοόν ἐστιν αὐτοῦ 
καὶ πειθαρχικόν· οὕτω δὴ καὶ οῦ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν φίλων φαμὲν ἔχειν λόγον, καὶ 
οὐχ ὥσπερ τῶν μαθηματικῶν. ὅτι δὲ πείθεταί πως ὑπὸ λόγου τὸ ἄλογον, μηνύει 
καὶ ἡ νουθέτησις καὶ πᾶσα ἐπιτίμησίς τε καὶ παράκλησις. εἰ δὲ χρὴ καὶ τοῦτο 
                                                        
84 As Julia Annas (1993) already pointed out, Aristotle himself does not identify the ergon as nature, nor use the 
“nature” in the ergon argument, even though it can be considered relevant to human nature. 
85 See also DA II 2-3, where Aristotle inquiries into the different psychic capacities in different kinds of living 
beings and figures out what capacities are characteristic of plants, animals, and human beings—namely, the 
nutritive capacity, the sensitive capacity, and the capacity of thought, respectively. By these characteristic 
capacities, the different kinds of living beings can be distinguished from one another. Each lower capacity can be 
separated from the higher, but each higher capacity depends on the lower (413b4-8, 414b20-415a11). 
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φάναι λόγον ἔχειν, διττὸν ἔσται καὶ τὸ λόγον ἔχον, τὸ μὲν κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὑτῷ, 
τὸ δ’ ὥσπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκουστικόν τι. 
 
Therefore the irrational element also appears to be two-fold. For the vegetative 
element in no way shares in reason, but the appetitive and in general the 
desiring element in a sense shares in it, in so far as it listens to and obeys it; this 
is the sense in which we speak of paying heed to one’s father or one’s friends, 
not that in which we speak of “the rational” in mathematics. That the irrational 
element is in some sense persuaded by reason is indicated also by the giving of 
advice and by all reproof and exhortation. And if this element also must be said 
to have reason, that which has reason also will be two-fold, one subdivision 
having it in the strict sense and in itself, and the other having a tendency to 
obey as one does one’s Father. (1102b29-1103a3) 
 
In this passage, Aristotle describes a basic division of the human soul, which includes 
the rational part and non-rational part. Each of these parts could divide into two 
additional parts—namely, the non-rational part into a vegetative part sharing no 
reason and the desiderative part sharing reason and, correspondingly, the rational part 
into the part having reason in itself, and the part itself is actually non-rational but can 
only obey reason. This reason-obeying part in the rational part clearly refers to the 
desiderative part in the non-rational part. Thus, we actually have three parts of the 
soul according to Aristotle: the rational part, desiderative part, and vegetative part. 
Human virtue, which Aristotle discusses in the whole Ethics, is distributed into the 
former two parts. Putting the topic of virtue temporarily aside, we will instead focus 
on the relationship of the rational part and desiderative part.  
 
This picture is still too general and remains ambiguous, so a few points should be 
clarified. First, rational activity characterizes human nature, but is not the whole of 
human nature. Although rational activity is peculiar to human beings, it does not 
exclude the nutritive activity, which is the ergon of plants, and the sensitive activity, 
which is the ergon of animals. The high-level ergon, as the ergon of human beings, 
requires the lower level as the nutrition of plants and sense perception of animals, and 
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the lower-level ergon might also affect the higher level.86 Second, rational activity in 
the ergon argument seems neutral. By “neutral,” I mean it can be used for good or bad. 
Since Aristotle says that human good is the performance of ergon in accordance with 
virtue, it implies that, without virtue, the performance of ergon is not necessarily 
good.  
 
Therefore, from these two points, we can see that our nature is a mixture of rational 
activity and sensitive activity, and the rational activity is neutral. However, since the 
rational activity stands at the top of the psychic hierarchy in Aristotle’s moral 
psychology, it is still more important than the sensitive activity. Even though it is 
neutral, it is still able to persuade the desiderative part, but not in the moral sense. In 
EN I 13 (the quoted Passage 12 above), Aristotle not only emphasizes, again, that the 
rational part of the soul (τὸ λόγον ἔχον) is peculiar to human beings, but also divides 
the “rational part” into two parts (i.e., (1) the part listening to the logos as a son listening 
to his father and (2) the part having logos strictly in itself [διττὸν ἔσται καὶ τὸ λόγον 
ἔχον, τὸ μὲν κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὑτῷ, τὸ δ’ ὥσπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκουστικόν τι. 1103a2-3]).87 
He immediately connects the concept of virtue to these two kinds of τὸ λόγον ἔχον. He 
says that virtue, correspondingly, can be divided into the intellectual virtue and ethical 
virtue (διορίζεται δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ κατὰ τὴν διαφορὰν ταύτην· λέγομεν γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰς 
μὲν διανοητικὰς τὰς δὲ ἠθικάς. 1103a5). This distinction is made at the end of EN I 
and is then repeated immediately at the very beginning of EN II, where Aristotle 
                                                        
86 The feedback function of the lower level to the higher level is pointed out by Thomas Nagel in Rorty (1980).  
87 EN I 13, 1102b 30-32 tells us that the part obedient to logos is τὸ δ’ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ὅλως ὀρεκτικὸν. Here, a 
slight transformation might be detected if we compare this passage to the similar distinction in the ergon 
argument. In the ergon argument, Aristotle does not mention the the term ὀρεκτικὸν explicitly. Reading the 
ergon argument, we might be led to understand sense perception as the obedient part. However, if we read the 
parallel distinction in EN I 13, where he excludes the ability shared with the plants, it is reasonable to confirm 
that the desiderative part is the obedient part. Aristotle seems to use the sensitive part and desiderative part 
interchangeably. On the relationship between sense perception and desire, see DA II 2, 413b22-24, where 
Aristotle gives us a very general interpretation: he says, “εἰ δ’ αἴσθησιν, καὶ φαντασίαν καὶ ὄρεξιν· ὅπου μὲν 
γὰρ αἴσθησις, καὶ λύπη τε καὶ ἡδονή, ὅπου δὲ ταῦτα, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ἐπιθυμία.” This seems to imply that the 
desire always supervenes upon the sense perception. When we say “desire,” sense perception is involved—but 
why has Aristotle done this slight transformation in the Ethics? One guess might be that Aristotle discusses 
virtue after he makes this distinction, and one kind of virtue (i.e., ethical virtue) is relevant to the desiderative 
part of the soul, so Aristotle announces which part of the soul is directly relevant to the virtue in order to pave 
the way for the following discussion.  
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opens the discussion of the ethical virtue. 
 
According to the above analysis, then, the “virtue is most in accordance with nature” 
can be explicated as “ethical virtue is most in accordance with the mixture of rational 
activity and sensitive activity (or desiderative activity), but more in accordance with 
rational activity.” Ethical virtue should already be potentially contained in this 
mixture, but this mixture on its own cannot develop into virtue (not by nature). In the 
process of acquiring ethical virtue, rational activity itself should mature after some 
guidance. By “mature rational activity,” I mean the rational activity the phronimos 
possesses. After rational activity matures, it can guide the sensitive activity. The 
mature form of rational activity would ideally always pursue the right. Sensitive 
activity would also pursue the right after the guidance of the rational activity, for they 
are in a harmonious state.  
 
This suggestion of growing rational activity from nature can be confirmed by one 
passage in Politics, where Aristotle again discusses the contribution of nature, habit, 
and reasoning to virtue, with reasoning peculiar to human beings and dominant 
among the three. He says the following: 
 
(Passage 13) 
ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθοί γε καὶ σπουδαῖοι γίγνονται διὰ τριῶν. τὰ τρία δὲ ταῦτά ἐστι 
φύσις ἔθος λόγος. καὶ γὰρ φῦναι δεῖ πρῶτον, οἷον ἄνθρωπον ἀλλὰ μὴ τῶν 
ἄλλων τι ζῴων· οὕτω καὶποιόν τινα τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχήν. ἔνια δὲ οὐθὲν 
ὄφελος φῦναι· τὰ γὰρ ἔθη μεταβαλεῖν ποιεῖ· ἔνια γὰρ εἶσι, διὰ τῆς φύσεως 
ἐπαμφοτερίζοντα, διὰ τῶν ἐθῶν ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ τὸ βέλτιον. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα 
τῶν ζῴων μάλιστα μὲντῇ φύσει ζῇ, μικρὰ δ’ ἔνια καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσιν, ἄνθρωπος δὲ 
καὶ λόγῳ· μόνος γὰρ ἔχει λόγον· ὥστε δεῖ ταῦτα συμφωνεῖν ἀλλήλοις. πολλὰ 
γὰρ παρὰ τοὺς ἐθισμοὺς καὶ τὴν φύσιν πράττουσι διὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐὰν πεισθῶσιν 
ἄλλως ἔχειν βέλτιον.  
 
There are three things which make men good and excellent; these are nature, 
habit, reason. In the first place, everyone must be born a man and not some other 
animal; so, too, he must have a certain character, both of body and soul. But 
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some qualities there is no use in having at birth, for they are altered by habit, 
and there are some gifts which by nature are made to be turned by habit to good 
or bad. Animals lead for the most part a life of nature, although in lesser 
particulars some are influenced by habit as well. Man has reason, in addition, 
and man only. For this reason nature, habit, reason must be in harmony with one 
another; for they do not always agree; men do many things against habit and 
nature, if reason persuades them that they ought. (Pol. 1332a38-b10) 
 
This passage makes three claims: (1) human nature, which is different from the nature 
of non-rational animals, makes virtue possible; (2) habit establishes virtue; (3) 
reasoning, which is peculiar to human beings, will guide nature and habit. According 
to the ergon argument and claim (1), human nature is different from animal nature 
because human nature is a mixture of rational activity and sensitive activity, but the 
rational activity is neutral before being habituated. Claim (3) implies that the 
reasoning has matured in some sense, even if not into the form of practical wisdom 
since the reasoning can guide habit and nature.88 This means that the reasoning can 
distinguish right from wrong. Therefore, the reasoning in claim (3) has grown from 
nature, which is a mixture of rational activity and sensitive activity, into a normative 
level.  
 
According to my analysis, then, the connection between human nature and reasoning 
activity can be established in Aristotle’s context. However, this is only a brief picture 
of the connection of nature and reasoning activity in the process of acquiring ethical 
virtue, which I sketch in section 2.2. The starting point of this process is the nature, 
which is a mixture of rational activity and sensitive activity. During this process, 
rational activity will grow into a dominant role to guide the sensitive activity. This 
                                                        
88 A similar view is held by Vasilou (1996). In his paper “The Role of Good Upbringing in Aristotle’s Ethics,” 
which is influenced by Burnyeat and McDowell, he says, “Logos is what a human being possesses by virtue of 
his nature as a human being. This is a fact … which belongs to the area of ‘physics’ in Aristotle's sense-that is, 
the study of nature. Phronesis, on the other hand, is the upshot of acquiring a ‘second nature’ or an ‘ethos’ 
(‘habit’). It is also defined as orthos logos (‘right reason’); that is, reason after it has been habituated in the 
appropriate sort of way. In the Nicomachean Ethics ‘phronimos’ (the adjectival form of phronesis) is used in the 
thick sense for someone who has acquired the sort of character that fits the substantive and detailed character 
sketches that fill the middle books of the Ethics”, p. 779. 
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brief picture has to be proven in detail, and the first problem here is to argue how the 
rational activity can become dominant and normative from the mixed human nature; 
the second problem is to argue how the growing rational activity can influence the 
process of acquiring virtue. If these two problems can be proven, then we can finally 
decide whether the growing rational activity can be the OL. Thus, in the following 
section, I will argue how rational activity becomes dominant.  
3. Reasoning and Virtue-Acquiring 
In section 2, I have argued that rational activity becomes dominant in our nature, which 
is a mixture of rational activity and sensitive activity of soul in the process of acquiring 
virtue. On the one hand, Aristotle seemingly implies that acquiring virtue needs no 
rational reflective activity. He argues that acquiring virtue is a process of habituation, 
just like learning a craft; the only important thing in the process is imitation and 
repetition. On the other hand, Aristotle also emphasizes that the condition of virtue is to 
make a decision that involves rational deliberation. Therefore, these two aspects must 
be fairly considered. 
3.1. Repeatedly Practicing and Making Decisions 
Aristotle defines the process of acquiring virtue as a process of habituation. Habituation 
seems to be simply a process of repetition. Aristotle’s analogy between acquiring virtue 
and craft might prove that this virtue-acquiring process is simply a process of repetition 
that does not need the involvement of rational reflective activity. Aristotle says the 
following: 
 
(Passage 14) 
τὰς δ’ ἀρετὰς λαμβάνομεν ἐνεργήσαντες πρότερον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων 
τεχνῶν· ἃ γὰρ δεῖ μαθόντας ποιεῖν, ταῦτα ποιοῦντες μανθάνομεν, οἷον 
οἰκοδομοῦντες οἰκοδόμοι γίνονται καὶ κιθαρίζοντες κιθαρισταί· οὕτω δὴ καὶ 
τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντες δίκαιοι γινόμεθα, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα σώφρονες, τὰ δ’ 
ἀνδρεῖα ἀνδρεῖοι.  
 
But excellences we get by first exercising them, as also happen in the case of 
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the arts as well. For the things we have to learn before we can do, we learn by 
doing, e.g. men become builders by building and lyre-players by playing the 
lyre; so too we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate 
acts, brave by doing brave acts. (1103a31-1103b2) 
 
According to Aristotle’s account, we acquire virtue just as we acquire crafts (ὥσπερ 
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν). Like learning to build a house or play the lyre, through 
performing those actions, namely, we become just through performing just actions, 
temperate through temperate actions, brave through brave actions. I call this practice 
of virtuous action “virtue-building action” to distinguish it from truly virtuous 
action—namely, action according to the virtuous state. The craft analogy tells us that 
the process of acquiring virtue involves a kind of imitation and practice. That is, the 
agent imitates and practices virtuous actions just like the apprentice imitates and 
practices the master’s craft. By repeating the practice, we form the habit. 
 
This general picture of acquiring ethical virtue does not clearly show whether 
reasoning activity is involved.89 It would be open to two interpretations: either this 
                                                        
89 Sarah Broadie (1991) raises many ambiguities of the virtue-acquiring process in other ways, and some of them 
are related to my concern here. I will make only a very brief introduction and response here. She says, “What he 
does not make clear is how by engaging in the behavior we come to develop the virtuous disposition expressed 
by that sort of behavior. This means that his conception of the virtuous disposition is open to different 
interpretations, depending on how we think he conceives of the process through which it arises. (1) Is it that by 
doing brave things we get better and better at doing them, in the same way as we acquire skills—through 
practicing? (2) Or is it that by doing brave things enough times, we acquire a habit of doing them automatically? 
(3) In other words, is the brave man an expert, so to speak, at performing brave actions? (4) Or is it more as if 
he is addicted to performing them?” I added the seriation within the quotation for clarity, pp. 72-3. 
These questions are very difficult, and it is hard to get clear answers to them from Aristotle. Regarding question 
(1), in the case of virtue acquisition, we might say we get a better and better virtuous state, but only from the 
outward appearance, character-building actions and virtuous actions look alike; it is also hard to determine 
which one is better except by reference to the inner state. Question (2) is more related to my concerns; Sarah 
Broadie might assume that the acquisition of craft is a mode of “automatic acquisition.” In this “automatic 
acquisition,” the imitation and practice play the most important role. When we practice enough (times and 
ways), we succeed “automatically,” while reason, our rational faculty, or any reflective thinking plays a minor 
role in this process. Now we can identify the “automatic acquisition” with the limited use of the rational faculty. 
Thus, we get another question (2) here: namely, would Aristotle agree that the acquisition of virtue by habit 
implies that it involves the limited use of the rational faculty? Questions (3) and (4) can be left aside here as, I 
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virtue-acquiring process is a mechanical process in which no reasoning activity is 
involved or it is a rational reflective process involving reasoning activity. By 
“mechanical,” I mean that it is not an intentional, let alone rational, activity of a moral 
learner. Rather, it is a matter of simply following guidance repeatedly, and the 
virtuous state is automatically established. By “rational reflective,” I mean that there 
is rational deliberation or reasoning, or even a decision to take character-building 
action. 
 
My position is sympathetic with the rational reflective view, which is becoming the 
mainstream position on this issue today. However, it does not mean that the 
mechanical view holds no persuasive and reasonable argument. Aristotle himself does 
not give any clear-cut, comprehensive account as to which one is right, but seems to 
alternate in his opinion. No matter which view one would take, he will face the 
difficulties that many eminent scholars have faced for centuries.  
 
The first of those I will discuss are the difficulties of the mechanical view: Aristotle 
also realizes the differences between craft and virtue. He determines that the virtuous 
actions should meet three conditions: namely, (1) performing them knowingly (εἰδώς); 
(2) deciding to perform these actions and deciding to perform them for themselves 
(προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι’ αὐτά);90 and (3) performing them from a firm 
and unchanging character (βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων πράττῃ).91 
 
The first condition is shared by both craft and virtue, and it is a less important 
condition for virtuous action,92 while the other two are more important for virtuous 
action and come to differentiate craft from virtue (1105b1-3). Aristotle does not use a 
                                                                                                                                                              
think, a virtuous person could be called an “expert” in virtue, and the phrase “is addicted to” itself implies 
improper feelings, which Aristotle would not accept. 
90 I use “decide” or “choose” to refer to προαιρέω interchangeably in my dissertation. However, “choose” or 
“decide” cannot cover all the meanings of this Greek word. I will come back to this concept below. 
91 1105a26-b1, ἔτι οὐδ’ ὅμοιόν ἐστιν ἐπί τε τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· … πρῶτον μὲν ἐὰν εἰδώς, ἔπειτ’ ἐὰν 
προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι’ αὐτά, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἐὰν καὶ βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων πράττῃ. 
92 About the reasons that Aristotle plays down the importance of this condition, Lesley Brown (2009) makes a 
plausible guess: “(1) to counter the well-known Socratic claim that virtue is nothing but knowledge (see VI 13, 
1144b18), and (2) to stress the importance of the other conditions”. I prefer to think that the second reason is 
Aristotle’s development based on the Socratic claim, p. 214. 
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γὰρ-clause (or something similar) to explicitly explain the reason these two conditions 
are so important and distinct; he only says that both of them are the result of 
frequently performing the just and temperate actions (ἅπερ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις πράττειν 
τὰ δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα περιγίνεται.1105b4-5). It seems that these two peculiar 
conditions for virtue also result from frequent practice or from habituation. However, if 
the virtue-acquiring process is just a mechanical process, how can condition (2)—the 
decision-making (prohairesis), which involves rational deliberation—come into being? 
Plus, if Aristotle does seriously envision decision-making as one important condition 
for virtue, we will ask the following question: how do the rational activities penetrate 
the mechanical process?  
Furthermore, this kind of paradox is even sharper under the account of the 
relationship between ethical virtue and practical wisdom (phronesis). Aristotle says 
that ethical virtue is determined by phronimos, who possesses practical wisdom (EN II 
6, 1107a1-2), and it is impossible to have ethical virtue without having practical 
wisdom or to have practical wisdom without having ethical virtue (EN VI 13, 
1144b30-32). Now we have the paradox: on the one hand, how can we acquire 
practical wisdom if we are just mechanically habituated? On the other hand, how can 
practical wisdom guide the mechanical process, or is practical wisdom even useful in 
this mechanical process? 
 
The second difficulties I will discuss are the difficulties of the rational reflection view: 
Aristotle does not think people who are learning to be virtuous are capable of 
consistently making good decisions on their own. Good decision-making (prohairesis) 
is the distinct mark of fully virtuous people—but what could produce a transition 
from incapability to the capability? Put another way, how can this immature rational 
reflection establish the virtuous state? Moral learners must also calculate and make 
choices when they face morally new situations (e.g., they would consider what they 
ought to do, how to do it, and even why to do this way or that way). However, people 
who possess the rational reflective view have to prove that this kind of calculation and 
decision-making can help us establish the virtuous state.  
 
Whether the mechanical or rational reflective view is right for virtue acquisitions is 
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one of the most debatable issues in the study of the Ethics. In this paper, I will argue 
for the rational reflective view, but my position is subtly different from the common 
version of rational reflective view. I will use the similar argument that the main 
rational reflective view has used, on the one hand; on the other, I will also make my 
rational reflective view, to some extent, compatible with the mechanical view. Then, 
so that this topic does not overwhelm, I will focus on this latter aim and briefly make 
the regular argument for rational reflective view. 
 
In the following section, I will briefly review the debate and analyze the arguments 
the scholars have used. Then, with the help of this improved argument, I will argue 
that, in the virtue-acquiring process, rational activity is not only engaged but also 
becoming mature. In order to fulfil this aim, I will examine the imitation-practice 
pattern (section 3.3.). I will argue that the rational ability grows from the nature of 
imitation and the stimulation of accompanied pleasure. In section 3.4, I will do the 
same work on the concept of shame to explore the ability of rational reflection 
growing toward mature. Meanwhile I will argue that this growing rational activity is 
one important factor for moral learners to build virtuous character. 
3.2. Two Basic Positions 
The mechanical view is actually a very traditional reading of Aristotelian moral 
development. In the process of acquiring virtue, habituation is envisaged as 
essentially separate from or an antecedent to the development of rational reflective 
capacities. The well-known commentator, Grant, comments as follows: 
 
A mechanical theory is here given both of the intellect and the moral character, 
as if the one could be acquired by teaching, the other by a course of habits… 
We need only compare the theory of virtue in this book with the discussions in 
the Meno of Plato, to see how immensely moral philosophy has gained in 
definiteness in the meantime. While becoming definite and systematic, 
however, it had also to some extent become scholastic and mechanical. (1858, 
pp. 480-1) 
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Burnyeat (1974) has a developed, but still somewhat similar idea on this point. He 
argues that Aristotle emphasizes the importance of beginnings and the gradual 
development of good habits of feeling and that, in this earlier stage, the reasoning 
plays no role if one lacks the appropriate starting point—“the that” ( τὸ ὅτι). “The that” 
is that which the moral agent knows or believes to be so. After he has firmly grasped 
“the that,” then it is possible for him to understand the reason (τοῦ διότι) that the fact 
is so—Burnyeat renders it “the because.” The passage on which Burnyeat relies is the 
following: 
 
(Passage 15) 
ἀρκτέον μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων, ταῦτα δὲ διττῶς· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν τὰ δ’ 
ἁπλῶς. ἴσως οὖν ἡμῖν γε ἀρκτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμῖν γνωρίμων. διὸ δεῖ τοῖς ἔθεσιν 
ἦχθαι καλῶς τὸν περὶ καλῶν καὶ δικαίων καὶ ὅλως τῶν πολιτικῶν 
ἀκουσόμενον ἱκανῶς. ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι, καὶ εἰ τοῦτο φαίνοιτο ἀρκούντως, 
οὐδὲν προσδεήσει τοῦ διότι· ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἔχει ἢ λάβοι ἂν ἀρχὰς ῥᾳδίως.  
 
For, while we must begin with what is familiar, things are so in two 
ways—some to us, some without qualification. Presumably, then, we must 
begin with things familiar to us. Hence anyone who is to listen intelligently to 
lectures about what is noble and just and, generally, about the subjects of 
political science must have been brought up in good habits. For the facts are 
the starting-point, and if they are sufficiently plain to him, he will not need the 
reason as well; and the man who has been well brought up has or can easily 
get starting-points. (EN I 4, 1095b2-8) 
 
This passage tells us that it is important to get the starting-point in the ethical matters 
that are the facts familiar to us (“the that”). However, this passage does not tell us 
explicitly the necessary transition from “the that” to “the because” as Burnyeat 
describes. Arguably, we could also understand this passage, as the ROT indicates, to 
be saying that “the that” would be sufficient for the ethical matters, and “the because” 
is not necessary in many cases.93 
                                                        
93 The translation of τὸ ὅτι and τοῦ διότι in ROT, as “the fact” and “the reason,” is more understandable than 
Burnyeat’s. Burnyeat keeps his translation more literal, I guess, just for the sake of his interpretation. If we read 
Chapter 3: The Orthos Logos in the Virtue-Acquiring Stage 
 85 
 
Put aside first whether Burnyeat’s reading is the only correct way to interpret this 
passage. According to his interpretation, the moral development must be less than a 
fully rational process for a long time. On the other hand, Burnyeat is also aware of the 
importance of rational reflection at a later stage. He admits that practice involves 
cognitive powers. According to EN II 4, the ultimate goal toward which the beginner 
is aiming is that of becoming the sort of person who does virtuous things in full 
knowledge, choosing to do them for their own sake, and from a firmly established 
state (1105a28-33). The beginner would hardly be on the way to this desirable 
condition if he were not in the process of forming corresponding ideas as to the 
goodness or justice of his actions. Thus, Burnyeat seems to envisage the process of 
training as a combination of two different stages: first, the non-rational one where the 
moral learners need to only follow the orders, instructions, or traditional precepts and, 
secondly, a rational one where the learners have been equipped with the rational 
reflective capacity. It is in this stage that the description and explanation are needed. 
 
Burnyeat’s view is reinforced and developed with a significant step by Nancy 
Sherman (1989). She points out the fundamental problem of the mechanical theory of 
habituation and says the following:  
 
It [mechanical theory] ultimately makes mysterious transition between 
childhood and moral maturity. It leaves unexplained how the child with merely 
‘habituated’ virtue can develop the capacities requisite for practical reason and 
inseparable from full virtue. (p. 158) 
 
She also argues against the mechanical view very radically, arguing that from the very 
beginning of the habituation, moral learners should be exercising their judgment and 
reason. At the very beginning, moral learners might make only a few spontaneous 
choices, but through training these spontaneous choices, they grow into mature 
reasoning. Moral learners become virtuous through virtuous action if it is always 
                                                                                                                                                              
the Greek or ROT translation, we might not divide the moral learning process as “the that” and “the because” of 
these two stages as Burnyeat (1974) does. We can also read οὐδὲν προσδεήσει τοῦ διότι as “the fact does not 
need the explanation, or the reason.” 
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accompanied by description and explanation. Sherman uses an example from our 
daily experiences: “Aristotle would probably object to the practice of the parent, who 
says, ‘Do this, don’t do that’ without further description or explanation. The child can 
legitimately ask ‘why,’ and some description and explanation will be in order.”(p. 172) 
She adds an example from our psychological experiences: “Emotions cannot be 
shaped without some simultaneous cultivation of discriminatory abilities. This is 
included as a part of habituation.”(p. 173) “Habituation” is not meant to indicate 
“manipulation,” but rather constitutes a gradually growing critical discrimination with 
the guidance of an outside instructor.  
 
However, Curzer rejects Burnyeat’s interpretation of Aristotelian habituation, which is 
developed by Sherman.94 Curzer criticizes Burnyeat for having mixed the teaching 
(description and explanation) and the habituation since there is no textual evidence to 
support Burnyeat’s reading. In fact, Curzer argues, there are a few passages that prove 
that there are no two such stages in habituation.95 Rather, teaching or argument is a 
different, independent process that only works once moral learners have completed 
the process of habituation. If the teaching in Burnyeat’s methodology is excluded 
from the process of habituation, then the habituation, in Curzer’s view, seems to be 
back to the mere mindless mechanical process, although Curzer himself does not say 
so explicitly. 
 
All of them, except Sherman, are convinced that Aristotle’s habituation (or, in 
Burnyeat’s case, at least part of it) is a mechanical process, and only after this 
mechanical process can we have the capacity for rational thought (e.g., 
decision-making and practical wisdom). However, all of them (including Burnyeat) 
would have difficulty facing the problems that Sherman raises—namely, the 
mysterious transition from the mechanical habituation to the right practical reasoning, 
the transition from the mere “habituated” virtue to the true virtue, which can only be 
                                                        
94 Curzer (2002, p. 146) mainly objects to Burnyeat’s view. Curzer only mentions Nancy Sherman once in a 
footnote, saying briefly, “Sherman is quite right to maintain that ‘descriptions and explanations’ are crucial to 
the process of moral development. But there is no reason to think that Aristotle would include them within the 
notion of habituation. Description and explanation are teaching, and Aristotle insists that successful teaching 
presupposes successful habituation.”  
95 The passages that Curzer relies on are as follows: EN 1095b2-7, EN 1179b23-31, Pol. 1338b4-5. 
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achieved through practical wisdom. This mysterious transition of mechanical view, 
however, is not necessarily the fatal flaw in their theory—the mechanical theory could 
still be correct if there is some mysterious transition in our cognitive state.96 When 
considering Sherman’s theory carefully, we will also find a serious obscurity. 
 
According to Sherman, the practical wisdom seems to grow smoothly from the 
practice of rational capacity during the virtue-acquiring stage. However, we will ask 
the same question to the rational reflective view as to the mechanical view: how does 
the immature practical reasoning grow into mature reasoning, namely, into practical 
wisdom? Sherman needs another element to make this transition happen. We know in 
the virtue-acquiring stage, the rational activity of moral learners alone is not enough 
to make this transition. The external guidance is still needed. How can we surely 
exclude the element of mechanical repetition in this learning process? 
 
Facing these serious questions, we should begin our inquiry with the most 
fundamental questions; that is, how much do the mechanic view and the rational 
reflective view differ from each other? Which one is right for Aristotle? Could we 
find a middle way with the aid of the established argument by both camps to avoid the 
difficulties they have?  
 
I agree with Sherman that the rational ability is already engaged and coming into use, 
but because it is very weak, I determine the very beginning phase of the moral 
learning stage mechanical (following Burnyeat), though the rational activity somehow 
exists in it. Recall Sherman’s interpretation; she determines the capacity of 
discriminating moral situations at the very beginning of moral training might be too 
weak to tell right from wrong. During the training of virtue, discrimination is trained 
and developed. Having experience in dealing with different moral situations gives us 
an eye to judge what is right to do. However, here are two obscure points deserving 
more attention: (1) how can we distinguish the weak discrimination so that it does not 
mechanically follow the guidance? (2) How does the weak discriminating ability 
                                                        
96 It is somewhat like the epistemological process—namely, the transition from the collection of the sense-data to 
knowing the principle. Habituation is like collecting sense-data, and practical wisdom is like having acquired 
the principle. 
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grow into the strong, if not mechanically?  
 
With respect to the first one, for instance, from our experiences, when a child (as a 
moral learner) wonders why he should do this, but not that, the reason that the 
instructor gives is also another “the that,” or any excuse at all, and is by no means the 
real “the because.” For example, a young girl, S, wants a toy of her elder brother’s, B 
(also very young), but B does not it give her. As a result, S is so sad that she starts a 
“war.” Out of the natural reaction, B would beat S. Fortunately, the parents, P (as 
phronimos), stopped them and told them that they are doing wrong. Probably both of 
them, or especially B, would ask why; P would answer, “Because she is your sister 
[another “the that”], and beating your sister is not right [seems to be a universal rule: 
beating is not right].” S would launch this wrong war first, and B would follow his 
anger rather than the rule at that moment. P could also answer with, “Beating is not 
allowed [an order].” B would not get the real reason that he cannot beat his sister, but 
neither would S get a reason that she cannot have the toy. In the absence of the real 
reason for action, we, with good reason, determine that he does the acts mechanically. 
Thus, in this early stage, moral learners might already have reasoning capacity since 
they are already inclined to ask why. However, since this reasoning capacity is either 
too weak or not in use at all, we still can call this a stage in the mechanical process. 
After moral learners have acquired “the that,” the reasoing capacity grows and is 
useful for making choices—but how could this growing happen non-mechanically? 
 
Consider another hypothetical situation involving B and S. S wants the funny toy 
again but cannot reach it by herself. B is the only person available to help her out. 
Thus, S asks B for his help. Because of an unhappy affair (S broke the toy once), B 
refuses to help, but S’ desire for the toy is not extinguished by the refusal. In order to 
fulfil her goal, she figures out all the possibilities to persuade B rather than resort to a 
“war.” Finally, she succeeds by trading, and it is a win-win ending. In this case, they 
have made a reasoning process exactly the same as the Aristotelian practical 
deliberation, even though the P is absent. The reasoning activity in this example is 
much more complex than the first case above, but these are just the speculative 
experiences we might encounter in our daily lives. Further, they might be in 
accordance with Aristotle’s doctrine. In the following section, I will expose Aristotle’s 
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original source to flesh out these thinking experiments. 
 
A small conclusion for this section should be made first. My basic view follows 
Burnyeat’s—namely, the very beginning stage of the virtue-acquiring process is a 
mechanical process. After acquiring “the that,” moral learners can use their rational 
faculty actively to make moral judgments on their own, although they cannot make 
them always rightly. However, in order to avoid the criticism of the “mystery 
transition,” I will argue, different from Burnyeat, that the reasoning capacity grows 
already in the mechanical stage, but not enough to allow independent moral judgment. 
In order to make my position more transparent, I will examine the growing process of 
reasoning capacity in detail in the perspective of Aristotle’s doctrine of imitation and 
pleasure. 
3.3. Imitation, Pleasure, and Reasoning 
Since, in the learning process, moral learners have to imitate the virtuous person and 
keep practicing, I call this virtue-acquiring process the imitation-practice pattern. In 
this imitation-practice pattern, the moral learner imitates the virtuous person, and the 
virtuous person guides the moral learner. However, neither the cause of imitation nor 
the form of guidance is clearly explained by Aristotle. First, with respect to the form 
of the guidance by the virtuous person, the guidance could probably be the OL, while 
the moral learner by no means possesses the OL on its own. A few lines below 
Passage 7, Aristotle states that the action should be done in accordance with the OL 
(κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πράττειν. 1103b32), which I have quoted and marked as 
Passage 1 in Chapter 1. The form of the guidance, though, which could probably be 
the meaning of the OL, is not clear. (1) The guidance could be in the form of virtuous 
action, which is an expression of the virtuous state, but not a systematically articulate 
formulation. (2) The guidance also could be some habitual or conventional principle 
or rule since the context of a particular society (social, political, and so on) will more 
or less influence the moral learner during the process of habituation. We cannot 
exclude the necessity and importance of the articulate formulation, which might not 
even be so systematic as a rule or principle (e.g., simply a command or a claim). 
 
As previously noted, the guidance is from the virtuous person. The moral learner does 
Chapter 3: The Orthos Logos in the Virtue-Acquiring Stage 
 90 
not possess any (mature) form of the guidance on his own; rather, he learns the OL 
from the virtuous person. However, this imitation-practice pattern, which seems to be 
a mechanical process, could entail the growing rational activity. Let us go back to the 
question of the cause of the moral learner’s imitation. The cause of imitation might be 
a request or a command from the virtuous person; the moral learner simply follows 
the command to perform his character-building action. In this way, the learning 
process is simply a mechanical process and totally under the manipulation of the 
virtuous person. The cause of imitation, however, also could be the inner desire that 
the moral learner possesses from birth on. The external guidance is not necessary in 
the form of command or request, but rather in the form of inductive or illuminating 
explanation. If the latter is the case, the moral education might stimulate the growing 
rational activity. 
 
The growing rational activity begins with the imitation, which Aristotle determines is 
a natural tendency of human beings. Imitation at the very beginning might not be an 
intentional activity, but rather merely a natural tendency, and it might be unconscious. 
However, I propose here that, during the moral learning process, the moral learner 
would develop the natural tendency into the intentional activity and from the 
intentional activity into the rational activity. Moral learners have this natural tendency 
to imitate from birth on, then to intentionally imitate for the sake of learning 
something, and finally, reasoning is developed from the intentional learning. I call this 
the proposal of the growing of rational activity. Now I will argue for this proposal. 
 
The first step to argue for this imitation-reasoning proposal is to introduce Aristotle’s 
acknowledgment that imitation is a natural tendency of human beings in the learning 
process. Aristotle does not discuss much about imitation in the Ethics, but in his other 
works, we can find the relevant passages. In Poet.4, Aristotle says the following:  
 
(Passage 16) 
τό τε γὰρ μιμεῖσθαι σύμφυτον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐκ παίδων ἐστὶ καὶ τούτῳ 
διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ὅτι μιμητικώτατόν ἐστι καὶ τὰς μαθήσεις ποιεῖται 
διὰ μιμήσεως τὰς πρώτας, καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μιμήμασι πάντας. 
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Imitation is natural to man from childhood, one of his advantages over the lower 
animals being this, that he is the most imitative creature in the world, and learns 
at first by imitation. And it is also natural for all to delight in works of imitation. 
(1448b5-9) 
 
There are three claims noticeable in this passage: (1) imitation is natural for man from 
childhood; (2) imitation is the first act of learning; and (3) imitation accompanies 
pleasure for everyone.97 Claim (1) proves that Aristotle admits the imitation as the 
natural tendency born with human beings. Thus, the first step of the argument is 
clearly provided by Aristotle, but the development from this natural tendency into 
rational activity is not explicitly reported in this passage. With aid of claims (2) and 
(3), however, the argument can be reasonably established. 
 
According to claims (2) and (3), imitation is a first step in learning and accompanies 
pleasure. Following Burnyeat’s argument, when one tastes the pleasure by learning, 
the delightful feeling would encourage him to continue learning. Then, in order to 
taste the pleasure further or fulfill his desire to know, he would intentionally keep 
learning, which involves using and practicing, especially in the practical domain. In 
other words, imitation grows from the natural tendency into rational activity because 
of the desire for pleasure (or for knowledge.) The rational activity becomes active 
during the learning process.  
 
However, one would say that pleasure does not accompany all kinds of imitation. 
Especially in the ethical domain, it would be possibly unpleasant for moral learners to 
imitate the noble things since the imitation and practice would be tough and boring. 
Further, our feelings might push us to the base and easy things. Aristotle must also 
have realized this possibility, so he emphasizes the importance of cultivating the true 
pleasure and pain in moral education. By “true pleasure and pain,” I mean, in 
                                                        
97 Why is imitation always pleasant? Aristotle’s logic maybe like this: because the learning is pleasant and 
imitation is a part of learning, imitation is, therefore, pleasant. It might be clearer to see this logic in Rhet. I 11, 
where Aristotle says, “Since learning and wondering are pleasant, it follows that such things as acts of imitation 
must be pleasant—for instance, painting, sculpture, poetry—and every product of skilful imitation...” (Rhet. I 
11, 1371b4ff). This kind of syllogism is presumably working under wider series Aristotelian premises—namely, 
people desire to know, leaning is able to fulfil desire, and fulfilment of desire is pleasant.  
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Aristotle’s words, one would feel pleasure when he does right actions and feel pain 
when he does wrong. In EN II 3, Aristotle realizes that, in the practical life, pleasure 
causes us to do bad things, and pain makes us abstain from the good ones. The 
character-building actions are difficult to perform if our primitive feelings (mainly 
pleasure and pain) hinder us.  
 
Thus, Aristotle, following Plato, insists that true pleasure and pain should be built into 
the moral learning process. He says, “We ought to have been brought up in a 
particular way from our very youth, as Plato says,98 so as both to delight in and to be 
pained by the things that we ought” (1104b10-13). The appropriate moral education 
aims first at the right feelings of pleasure and pain at the right action. That is to say, 
we should be educated to have appropriate pleasure and pain at the character-building 
actions; namely, the pleasure and pain should cooperate with action for building virtue, 
rather than function as the hindrance of achieving virtue. It is one of very important 
steps to regulate the feeling into the middle state in the moral education.To achieve 
the middle state of feeling is, first of all, to bring up the appropriate pleasure and pain. 
In other words, moral education should make the pleasure and pain not be the 
hindrance of virtue, but rather be the motivation for the action that helps us acquire 
the stable character state. The appropriate pleasure and pain are the necessary 
conditions for virtue. If we do the right action always accompanying the appropriate 
pleasure and pain, then we can confirm that we have such a state. If we do the right 
action with inappropriate pleasure and pain (in the long stage), then it proves that we 
still have not achieved the state since, in this case, pleasure and pain are still hinder 
the right action. In this sense, pleasure and pain are not only important for the 
beginning phase of moral training, but they are also the sign of having achieved the 
virtuous state. 
 
However, this pleasure and pain training theory does not tell us explicitly either how 
we can train our natural feeling of pleasure and pain into the true pleasure and pain, or 
whether and how a rational activity is involved in this training process. Thus, the 
question seems to draw back to the place where we set out in this inquiry. However, 
elsewhere, Aristotle seems to provide us enough textual evidence to help us get out 
                                                        
98 Plato, Laws, 653a ff., Rep. 401e-402a. 
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from this difficulty and convince us the reasoning can (try to) persuade the desire or 
appetite. In the seventh book of Nicomachean Ethics, we find the logos, sometimes 
with orthos added, which plays the role of guiding or persuading the appetite.99 In the 
virtuous man, logos and appetite work harmoniously, while in the enkrates and 
akrates, they struggle back and forth. Accordingly, then, it seems that the reasoning 
can also persuade us to overcome the apparent pain and experience the true pleasure.  
 
However, the case of akrates and enkrates indicates a phase that comes close to the 
virtuous state. Akrates and Enkrates can also, to some extent, share reason and make 
decisions. But moral learners at the very beginning stage cannot understand the 
practically wise guide. How could they turn painful feeling into pleasant feeling by 
rational advice? Rather, it is possible and reasonable that the appetite or feelings are 
also mechanically formed by certain opinions of a moral guider who instills in moral 
learners that such and such is pleasant and such and such is painful. Also, after moral 
learners having acquired “the that,” their feeling or appetite can listen to and be 
persuaded by reasoning. From that point on, then, the contribution of reasoning 
becomes active and significant.  
 
When moral learners love to taste true pleasure and use it to improve their character 
state, it proves that the reasoning activity has begun to play a positive role in moral 
education. True pleasure and pain accompanying the right action assumes that the 
moral learner has a basic idea of what is right and noble and that he has acquired “the 
that.” When he feels pain at boring and tough imitation and practice, his reason would 
(try to) persuade him that he would acquire the true pleasure after he builds the 
virtuous state, and this pleasure is steadier and long lasting. The persistent learning is 
not only because the moral learner is afraid of the punishment of the moral guide, but 
also because his rational ability grows in this process and begins to work for the noble 
and right.100 
                                                        
99 EN VII 1, 1145b14; 3, 1147b1; 4, 1147b31; 8, 1151a12; 9, 1151b10; similar formulation in other books of EN I 
13, 1102b16-30; III12, 1119b11.  
100 Here, it is not necessary to emphasize radically either pleasure or pain, as to which one plays a more important 
role in moral education, as much as some people do. Burnyeat and Sherman think pleasure provides the 
motivation for learning, while Curzer insists that it is pain that motivates people to learn. However, Aristotle 
seems to have arranged the role of pleasure and pain as equal. In Pol., he says, “Learning is no amusement, but 
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Thus far, we have examined two basic phases of moral learning. In the very beginning 
phase of the virtue-acquiring stage, moral learners acquire “the that” purely 
mechanically through an external practical wise guide—whether in the form of the 
gentle promptings of parents or physical punishment, or many kinds of description 
and explanation. A capacity for rational reasoning may already exist, but is not yet 
strong enough to understand the rational form of guidance. In order to acquire “the 
that,” moral learners practice repetitively what instructors tell or teach them. In this 
phase, the moral learners cannot really understand the OL, regardless of whether the 
OL is in the form of practical reasoning or proposition. Instead, they would take the 
OL simply as a command to obey, although they have very limited reasoning ability to 
pursue the why. After they have acquired a basic idea of what is just or good with the 
aid of experience, their rational thought becomes active and makes significant 
contributions to acquiring virtue.  
 
In this later phase, we might occasionally be able to make the right decisions to take 
the right action according to our own reasoning. However, we might still sometimes 
submit to our feelings and, in the end, be swayed by our feelings into taking the 
wrong (or rather, intemperate) action. Therefore, we still need repetitive practice to 
habituate our feelings and to create a harmonious character state between reason and 
feelings. The point here, though, is that moral learners can and are willing to 
understand the OL. If the OL is a rule (or set of rules), moral learners will try to 
deliberatively adapt this rule (or rules) into a particular situation. If it is simply a 
particular proposition that concretely commands what to do, moral learners would ask 
why, trying to determine the reason. If the OL is in the form of practical syllogism, it 
will not only fit well with the demand of moral learners in the later phase; namely, the 
right practical syllogism tells the why to moral learners who, in the later phase, are 
urgent to ask why in the particular moral situation. This interpretation also has very 
good textual evidence to support it—namely, the text of akrates and enkrates, where 
the OL appears many times in contrast with desire and feelings. The position of 
enkrates and akrates is similar to moral learners in the later phase, just in the 
                                                                                                                                                              
is accompanied with pain.” 1139a29-30. A few lines later, though, he also says, “Education is a rattle or toy 
for children of a larger growth.” 1340b30. 
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perspective of the rational ability. It is highly possible, then, that the OL in this text, as 
stated before, could be used in the same meaning of deliberation. 
 
This interpretation will be enhanced in my following inquiry. 
3.4. Shame (αἰδώς) and Reasoning 
In this section, I will argue that the ability of rational reflection grows to maturity 
through one of our feelings (i.e., shame). Shame (αἰδώς) is portrayed not as a virtue, 
but as a semi-virtue in Aristotle’s theory. It is agreed that shame plays a special 
role—that is, it can help moral learners achieve virtue. It is implied that shame can 
push moral learners toward making the right decisions. I wonder whether moral 
learners in the shame-phase could understand and follow the right practical reasoning 
of phronimos, whether their rational ability is still too immature to understand it, or 
whether their rational ability is already mature enough to make the right decisions on 
their own, even if just occasionally.  
 
What exactly can shame do for virtue? Aristotle says the following:  
 
(Passage 17) 
Περὶ δὲ αἰδοῦς ὥς τινος ἀρετῆς οὐ προσήκει λέγειν· πάθει γὰρ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν 
ἢ ἕξει. ὁρίζεται γοῦν φόβος τις ἀδοξίας, καὶ ἀποτελεῖται τῷ περὶ τὰ δεινὰ 
φόβῳ παραπλήσιον… οὐ πάσῃ δ’ ἡλικίᾳ τὸ πάθος ἁρμόζει, ἀλλὰ τῇ νέᾳ. 
οἰόμεθα γὰρ δεῖν τοὺς τηλικούτους αἰδήμονας εἶναι διὰ τὸ πάθει ζῶντας 
πολλὰ ἁμαρτάνειν, ὑπὸ τῆς αἰδοῦς δὲ κωλύεσθαι· καὶ ἐπαινοῦμεν τῶν μὲν 
νέων τοὺς αἰδήμονας, πρεσβύτερον δ’ οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐπαινέσειεν ὅτι 
αἰσχυντηλός· οὐδὲν γὰρ οἰόμεθα δεῖν αὐτὸν πράττειν ἐφ’ οἷς ἐστὶν αἰσχύνη.  
 
Shame should not be described as a virtue; for it is more like a feeling than a 
state. It is defined, at any rate, as a kind of fear of disrepute and produces an 
effect similar to that produced by fear of danger... The feeling is not becoming 
to every age, but only to youth. For we think young people should be prone to 
shame because they live by feeling and therefore commit many errors, but are 
restrained by shame; and we praise young people who are prone to this feeling, 
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but an older person no one would praise for being prone to the sense of 
disgrace, since we think he should not do anything that need cause this 
sense.101 (EN IV 9, 1128b10-21) 
Aristotle defines shame as being more like a feeling than a virtue. Nonetheless, shame 
is useful for young people in acquiring virtue since shame can help them refrain from 
error. “Young people” refers here to moral learners, but their stage of learning is 
difficult to determine. As stated previously, in the very beginning of the moral 
learning stage, even if we have the rational capacity, it is still not useful to moral 
learning. In this stage, moral learners have to acquire “the that” first, and this is 
mainly a mechanical process. If shame works in this stage, we will not expect that the 
rational faculty could do much for acquiring virtue. However, if the young have 
already acquired “the that,” the rational faculty is activated. Under the stimulation of 
shame, rational activity might grow mature enough to make the right decisions and be 
helpful in acquiring virtue. Thus, let us first determine which stage the young are in 
and whether their rational activity is mature enough to make moral judgments. 
 
Another important passage on which scholars have different opinions on the 
conception of “the young” is in EN X 9. Aristotle writes the following: 
 
(Passage 18) 
εἰ μὲν οὖν ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι αὐτάρκεις πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐπιεικεῖς, πολλοὺς ἂν 
μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους δικαίως ἔφερον κατὰ τὸν Θέογνιν, καὶ ἔδει ἂν τούτους 
πορίσασθαι· νῦν δὲ φαίνονται προτρέψασθαι μὲν καὶ παρορμῆσαι τῶν νέων 
τοὺς ἐλευθερίους ἰσχύειν, ἦθός τ’ εὐγενὲς καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόκαλον ποιῆσαι 
ἂν κατοκώχιμον ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ἀδυνατεῖν πρὸς 
καλοκαγαθίαν προτρέψασθαι· οὐ γὰρ πεφύκασιν αἰδοῖ πειθαρχεῖν ἀλλὰ φόβῳ, 
οὐδ’ ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν φαύλων διὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς τιμωρίας· πάθει γὰρ 
ζῶντες τὰς οἰκείας ἡδονὰς διώκουσι καὶ δι’ ὧν αὗται ἔσονται, φεύγουσι δὲ τὰς 
                                                        
101 Aristotle uses αἰδώς and αἰσχύνη interchangeably. This is also present in Passage 10. Here, I will not discuss 
whether there is any difference between these two words. Here, I follow Gauthier/Jolif (1958) and consider 
them the same, “les deux concepts sont en effet pour lui identiques”. In this section, I will focus only on the 
whether the rational activity can grow from the stimulation of shame. 
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ἀντικειμένας λύπας, τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἡδέος οὐδ’ ἔννοιαν ἔχουσιν, 
ἄγευστοι ὄντες. 
 
Now if arguments were in themselves enough to make men good, they would 
justly, as Theognis says, have won very great rewards, and such rewards 
should have been provided; but as things are, while they seem to have power 
to encourage and stimulate the generous-minded among the young, and to 
make a character which is gently born, and a true lover of what is noble, ready 
to be possessed by excellence, they are not able to encourage the many to 
nobility and goodness. For these do not by nature obey the sense of shame, but 
only fear, and do not abstain from bad acts because of their baseness but 
through fear of punishment; living by passion they pursue their own pleasures 
and the means to them, and avoid the opposite pains, and have not even a 
conception of what is noble and truly pleasant, since they have never tasted 
it.102 (1179b4-17) 
 
This passage informs us that the arguments (οἱ λόγοι) can encourage and stimulate the 
generous-minded of the young (τῶν νέων τοὺς ἐλευθερίους), who are ready to be 
possessed by virtue. The generous-minded have been gently born and are true lovers 
of what is noble. They are a subset and a minority of the young. Conversely, most of 
the young (τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς) have no such character, and the arguments cannot drive 
them toward the noble and good because they do not obey the sense of shame and 
have no idea of the noble and true pleasure.  
 
Notably, in the passage, the word logoi means clearly explanatory accounts, 
persuasive speeches, or even arguments. It cannot be the rational faculty because it is 
in the plural and is being contrasted with nature. One may wonder whether this logos 
has the same or similar meaning of the logos in the OL. If they are same, then it tells 
us that the OL has no effect on moral learners who have no noble nature and who 
have not accepted virtue in the early phase of the virtue-acquiring stage. On this 
                                                        
102 See EN X 9, 1179b4-31, where Aristotle reviews the contribution of nature, argument, and habit to the virtue. 
He also argues that the argument is only useful for the moral learner who has already acquired the basic idea 
of what is good or noble. Habit is the universal method of achieving virtue.  
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ground, we might be inclined to consider the two logos as possessing different 
meanings. 
 
This contrast between the generous-minded and the many seems to imply that the 
generous-minded can be encouraged by arguments because they can obey the feeling 
of shame and understand the ideas of noble and true pleasure. Burnyeat, in light of 
Passage 12, argues that a young person who can obey the promptings of shame has 
already acquired “the that,” which means that he can begin to use his rational activity 
to acquire virtue going forward. Burnyeat says the following:  
 
He has acquired a taste for, a capacity to enjoy for their own sake, things that 
are noble and enjoyable for their own sake. He has learned, really learned, that 
they are noble and enjoyable, but as yet does not understand why they are so. 
He does not have the good man’s unqualified knowledge or practical wisdom, 
although he does have “the that” which is the necessary starting point for 
acquiring the practical wisdom and full virtue.103 
 
Thus, according to Burnyeat and Passage 18, the ability to obey shame does not come 
at the very beginning of moral education, but rather comes after having acquired “the 
that” and once one already knows what is noble and good. These kinds of young 
people are distinguished from “the many,” who have not learned what is noble and 
good. “The many” do not heed shame, only fear of punishment. 
 
Following Burnyeat, Curzer divides those who can heed shame and those who cannot 
into two different stages of moral development. In addition, in light of Passage 18, 
Curzer determines more specifically that the generous-minded are the moral learners 
in the second stage of moral development. He claims that  
the many (hoi polloi) are moral beginners who have the potential for virtue, 
but as yet possess none of the components of virtue. The generous-minded 
(eleutherios) are the people at the second stage of moral development. They 
                                                        
103 Burnyeat, in Rorty (1980), p. 78. 
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have chosen to lead the virtuous life, but are confused about what virtue is.104 
 
He also claims that 
 
the many come to choose virtuous actions for their own sake through 
habituation motivated by punishment and threat of punishment, and the 
generous-minded become able to identify virtuous acts through habituation 
motivated by the pain of retrospective and prospective aidos.105 
 
Comparing the claims of Burnyeat and Curzer, we see that they both agree that shame 
is useful for the moral learner in a late stage, but they differ from each other in many 
other substantial aspects. First, Burnyeat thinks that they have acquired “the that” in 
this stage, but not yet “the because” since they have not acquired practical wisdom. 
Conversely, Curzer argues that this is their second stage of moral development, but 
they have not yet acquired “the that,” let alone “the because,” and thus, they are still 
far from genuine virtue. They have committed to be virtuous, but still have no ability 
to identify real virtue. Burnyeat does not explicitly say at which stage shame begins to 
work during the process of moral development, nor how far this stage is from real 
virtue, while Curzer argues his interpretation at length.106 Another big difference is 
that Burnyeat thinks that the generous-minded are those who take pleasure in acting 
nobly, 107  while Curzer insists that the generous-minded are those who have 
experienced the pain of punishment at the beginning of moral education. I will not 
discuss the latter difference here, but I will pay some attention to the former to see 
whether Curzer’s argument is reasonable. 
 
In the Ethics, there is clearly a stage in which shame plays a special role. We can 
temporarily call it the “second stage,” as Curzer does. However, arguing, as Curzer 
                                                        
104 Curzer (2002), p. 154. He emphasizes here that “the many” is not necessarily meant for children or adults, 
rather all people with childish character. 
105 Ibid., p. 158. 
106 Ibid., Again, Curzer reclaims here that young people refer to the young character rather than young age, p. 156. 
107 Burnyeat does not use the word “generous-minded” to refer to the people in the second stage of moral 
development particularly. I just borrow this term from Curzer for the easy expression. He develops this idea 
from the passage in EN X 9. 
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does, that the moral learner in this second stage has not acquired “the that” is 
problematic. Curzer argues that the character of the young is far removed from the 
character of virtue in light of passage EN I 3, 1095a2-7, where Aristotle claims that 
young people are not proper listeners to lectures on political science.108 Curzer 
identifies improper listeners as those who have not yet acquired the starting points of 
lectures and discussions on political science—namely, they lack “the that.” In order to 
make the generous-minded who are true lovers of what is noble, encouraged, and 
stimulated by the power of argument also be improper listeners to political lectures, 
Curzer makes the following suggestion to distinguish between “proper hearers” and 
“people encouraged and stimulated by arguments”:  
 
Proper hearers are persuaded by the facts and logic of lectures or arguments. 
But people who are encouraged and stimulated, listen to an argument or a 
lecture about what to do, and without really understanding it, they become 
excited and inspired.109 
 
However, Curzer’s argument is not convincing, either. First, it is hard to determine 
whether “young people” in passage 1095a2-7 refers to moral learners at the initial 
stage (the many) or generally to all moral learners, including the subset—namely, 
those who feel shame (the generous-minded). It is absolutely possible that it might 
mean the youth at a very early stage, where shame has no function yet. If so, no such 
distinctions are needed between the “proper hearer” and “the young encouraged and 
stimulated by the power of arguments” since they refer to two essentially different 
groups of young people. Secondly, it is unreasonable to say that a “true lover” of 
virtue is just in love with the idea of virtue without knowing what virtue really 
consists of or means. If one’s love stays at such a superficial level, how can Aristotle 
call this being a true lover of virtue (ἀληθῶς φιλόκαλον)? Thirdly, the interpretation 
of the distinction between the “proper listener” and “those young encouraged and 
stimulated by the power of arguments” is far-fetched. There is no additional evidence 
                                                        
108 EN I 3, διὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς οὐκ ἔστιν οἰκεῖος ἀκροατὴς ὁ νέος· ἄπειρος γὰρ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον πράξεων, οἱ λόγοι 
δ’ ἐκ τούτων καὶ περὶ τούτων· ἔτι δὲ τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀκολουθητικὸς ὢν ματα ίως ἀκούσεται καὶ ἀνωφελῶς, ἐπει 
δὴ τὸ τέλος ἐστὶν οὐ γνῶσις ἀλλὰ πρᾶξις. Διαφέρει δ’ οὐδὲν νέος τὴν ἡλικίαν ἢ τὸ ἦθος νεαρός. 
109 Ibid., p. 157. 
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to back up Curzer’s claim that proper listeners are those who can be persuaded by the 
facts and logic of arguments, while people who are encouraged and stimulated by the 
power of arguments are just excited and inspired by them without really 
understanding the arguments themselves. The very nature of an argument is such that 
the only way in which it can inspire or excite the listener is if the listener can follow 
the argument and understand it.110 With this theory, then, Curzer is giving false 
support to his argument. He might be confused between the persuasive tone of the 
argument, which plays on the emotions, and the argument itself, as is stated clearly in 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric.111 Fourthly, in EN I 3, Aristotle talks about the improper hearers 
of political staff, while in X 9, nothing political is mentioned. We can suppose that, in 
Aristotle’s mind, the generous-minded encouraged and stimulated by arguments are 
still not mature enough for political staff since political activity involves much more 
than true love of the noble and the understanding of arguments. In other words, 
having acquired “the that” is not enough for the political activity.  
 
Thus, Curzer is right to distinguish the generous-minded from “the many”, but wrong 
to place them too far from virtue. Curzer admits that the generous-minded are those 
who have been brought up well and have formed good habits, but does not allow that 
they have acquired “the that.” He emphasizes that the standard of having acquired 
“the that” is having the concrete ability to identify what would be the virtuous act in 
particular situations. However, I would argue that this ability is only acquired after we 
have attained practical wisdom. Burnyeat uses a relatively loose concept—namely, 
“knowing or believing something so”—to refer to someone who has acquired “the 
that.” Here, I follow Burnyeat that the generous-minded are those who have acquired 
                                                        
110 Aristotle divides argument into two types—namely, deduction and induction. About deduction see An. Post. I 1, 
24b18-20; cf. Top. I 1, 100a25-27; Soph. el. 1, 165a1ff; about induction, see Top. I 12, 105a13ff. 
111 Rhet. 1356a2-21. Of the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word, there are three kinds. The first 
kind depends on the personal character of the speaker; the second on putting the audience into a certain frame 
of mind; and the third on the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself. Secondly, 
persuasion may come through the hearers when the speech stirs their emotions. Our judgments, when we are 
pleased and friendly, are not the same as when we are pained and hostile. It is toward producing these effects, 
as we maintain, that present-day writers on rhetoric direct the whole of their efforts. I will address this subject 
in detail when I return to the discussion on emotions. Thirdly, persuasion is affected through the speech itself 
when we have proven a truth or an apparent truth by means of the persuasive arguments suitable to the case in 
question. 
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“the that” and the starting point of using rational activity to acquire virtue.  
 
Moreover, if we read Curzer’s brilliant analysis on shame, we would be even more 
surprised by his having put the generous-minded so far from the virtuous. According 
to Curzer, shame is formed by internalizing the punishment, and this is the way for the 
many to proceed to generous-mindedness. Thus, it is a way guided by pain rather than 
by pleasure, as Burnyeat maintains. I think that Curzer goes too far in objecting to 
Burnyeat, but both of them agree that feeling shame makes further moral progress 
possible for the generous-minded. I also agree here that the stage of the 
generous-minded heeding shame is a necessary stage in the process of acquiring 
virtue. Plus, “the many” are those even “younger” in character than the 
generous-minded. They (the many) would also have to step to the generous-mind 
stage under the guidance of both pleasure and pain, I think, not necessarily merely by 
pain (Curzer) or merely by pleasure (Burnyeat).112 
 
Passage 18 tells us that the generous-minded heed shame, are true lovers of what is 
noble, and are also encouraged and stimulated by arguments (oi logoi). If I am right 
on the analysis of the conception of “true lover” and “people encouraged and 
stimulated by logoi,” this statement implies that rational faculty is activated already in 
this stage and is helpful to acquire virtue, “to make men good” (1179b4). Under the 
stimulation of shame, moral learners would practice their rational faculty frequently 
so that the rational faculty would be developed through this frequent practice. Curzer 
develops a very detailed, and reasonable, theory of the practice of rational faculty in 
the shame stage in his inquiry. Here is what he says about this (I added the numbers 
for better readability): 
 
(1) When a generous-minded person feels aidos, the act’s viciousness is 
impressed upon her mind. The aidos vividly brings to the foreground the 
fact that the aidos producing act is wrong… 
                                                        
112 In my opinion, both pleasure and pain play an important role in moral development, but I will not discuss this 
point in detail here. Briefly, Burnyeat does mention merely the function of pleasure, but he, I think, does not 
exclude the contribution of pain. Aristotle just says that shame works among the youth who are brought up 
well with good habits (good family, good surroundings), but not necessarily only with the aid of punishment; 
the moral learner can acquire “the that” or the feeling of shame. 
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(2) Aidos does not tell us that an act is wrong; we must already recognize that 
the act is wrong in order to feel aidos. So what information does aidos 
provide? Aidos emphasizes and makes us internalize the judgment that the 
act is wrong… 
(3) Aidos sets us thinking what should have been done. It also provides 
context clues to the alternatives within the situation… 
(4) Aidos develops the learner’s ability to judge acts in new situations, too. 
First, one person can feel aidos for another person’s act if the former 
identifies somehow with the latter. Fiction and friendship allow people to 
feel aidos for the acts of others. Thus, through vicarious aidos people 
come to recognize that certain acts are wrong and discover which acts are 
right without actually performing any of these acts. Second, aidos has a 
prospective as well as a retrospective sense. One can feel aidos with 
respect to an act that one is considering, but has not yet performed.113 
 
It is very clear that the rational faculty is involved and developed in the stage of 
shame. Feeling shame presupposes the general knowledge of what is right or wrong. 
Shame enables people to identify the characteristics of wrong action and internalize 
the judgment of the wrong action; it stimulates moral learners to consider and find the 
right alternatives. Gradually, then, moral learners promote their judgments of both 
what is right and what is wrong with the eye of experience.114 They will also apply 
the ability to judging acts in new situations. The experience of friends as “the other 
self in mirror” and the phantasia of the similar action will develop the ability to 
identify increasingly more new situations. At last, Curzer concludes that, “Prompted 
                                                        
113 Curzer (2002), pp. 160-1. 
114 Curzer emphasizes here that, unlike Burnyeat’s account of moral development, the shame-account need not fall 
back on “learning” and “really learning” what is noble or which is wrong. He claims that the moral learner 
himself or herself (rather than a teacher), pushed by shame, identifies (or intends to identify) virtuous acts. 
However, I think that Curzer misfires again here. Burnyeat emphasizes the very early stage in which the 
learner should learn what is noble, and then he can feel shame for the wrong actions. Curzer himself also 
admits that the shame-feeler presupposes the judgment of right or wrong, and this kind of judgment should be 
made upon a very early basis—namely, he should learn what is right or wrong in a minimal sense. This does 
not contradict Burnyeat. 
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by aidos the generous-minded gradually come to choose, not just the acts they think 
are virtuous, but the acts that really are virtuous. They make the right choices.”115 
 
According the above picture, moral learners in this stage could have integrated the OL 
into their own understanding since they can make the right choices with the aid of 
shame, even in a new situation. They will apply the general knowledge into a 
particular situation to make a moral judgment or moral decision. Although they might 
still feel or act wrongly, this would just be due to their passions, which lead them to 
act wrongly despite their making the right decisions. It is only because we lack 
training that we are still sometimes slaves to our passions.116 In this picture, the 
generous-minded are able to make the right choices on the grounds of grasping, at 
least partially, “the because,” which can tell moral learners which feeling or desire is 
right. However, due to lack of a stable state, they would still act wrongly. From this 
phase onward, moral learners can not only understand the OL, but also can generate 
the OL on their own occasionally. Here, the OL is determined as the right practical 
reasoning or the right practical calculation. 
 
It is fairly clear that calculative activity is involved and developed in 
shame-producing actions—that is, rational activity is also involved in and contributes 
to the process of acquiring virtue. However, whether it is adequate in this stage to 
make the right decisions, as Curzer claims, is so far very questionable. In what sense 
do we understand “right decisions”? How does this process of “making right decisions” 
work exactly? In addition, in this process, how does general knowledge, such as rules 
or principles, become involved in “making the right decisions”? 
 
Before I proceed to these questions, I will make one small conclusion to clarify my 
position. I accept Curzer’s basic idea of his analysis of shame, but I do not accept 
either his view of the origin of shame or the stage of moral development where shame 
works. Firstly, as I have argued above, I believe that the moral learner in the stage 
                                                        
115 Curzer (2002), p. 161. 
116 Curzer thinks the lack of an understanding of why virtuous actions are virtuous is also a reason that we yield to 
passion. However, I do not think that understanding will be helpful to persuade the passion, but it is right to 
say that understanding “the because” is the standard to distinguish between generous-minded and akrasia.  
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where shame comes into play has already acquired “the that.” Secondly, Curzer thinks 
of shame as the painful internalization of punishment, while I believe this view is just 
one possibility among many. For those who are born into good, virtuous families and 
are brought up well, it is not necessary to have the process of the internalization of 
punishment. They would acquire “the that” in such circumstances through the gentle 
promptings of parents rather than through punishment.  
 
According to my analysis, the acquisition of “the that” is still kind of mechanical. 
“The that” is not, however, purely mechanical like a machine receiving an order and 
putting out an act. The capacity for rational reasoning exists already, but is not yet 
developed usefully for moral learning. I call this stage “habituation 1.” In order to 
acquire “the that,” learners of morality should experience as many different situations 
as possible and just follow what the instructor tells them—the main task in 
habituation 1 is to follow the guidance to gather the basic idea of what is just or good, 
not to understand why.117 In this stage, if the OL were one form of practical reasoning, 
it would be meaningless for moral learners, for they cannot understand this inference 
sequence. They would just follow the conclusion that the inference made or, at most, 
get some part of this inference (indication of trying to get “the why”). 
 
After moral learners have acquired a basic idea of what is just or good, they will 
automatically gain the feeling of shame. In the stage of shame, we are beginning to 
use our capacity for rational thought and to make choices for ourselves about acting 
virtuously. However, in this stage, even if we could make some right choices 
according to our own rational capacity, we might submit to our feelings and, in the 
end, be swayed by our feelings to take the wrong (or rather, intemperate) action. 
Therefore, we still need habituation to create harmony between reason and passion. I 
call this stage “habituation 2,” where we need much repetition of the right action, 
which the practical reasoning tells us in order to form the firm and stable state. In this 
stage, even if our feelings make us act intemperately, the shame we experience later 
will remind us that we have acted wrongly and can be used to stop us from repeating 
our wrongdoing. Thus, shame can reinforce habituation 2. Therefore, the rational 
                                                        
117 I will not exclude practice in this stage at all, rather only emphasize that to achieve the basic idea of what is 
noble or good is the sufficient condition to have “the that.”  
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reasoning process that always follows shame will also reinforce habituation 2.  
 
However, even though shame and rational thought perform perfectly in this stage, we 
will face many new situations where we have to figure out the right thing to do. In 
other words, we need to learn to make decisions by ourselves. However, in this stage 
in which we understand that we are making the right decisions, the criteria according 
to which we are making decisions is still not clear. We might gain a rough idea, 
though, if we consider the fact that the capacity to recognize right decisions is 
developed by practical reasoning from the shame stage onward, and this practical 
reasoning can reinforce habituation 2. Therefore, we can conclude that these two 
conditions, deciding to act rightly and attaining a firm state of goodness, are very 
closely interrelated118since both of them actually need the contribution of the rational 
calculation. If we take the right reasoning or even deliberation in Aristotle’s strict 
meaning, as the OL here, it would be clear how the OL builds up the virtuous state 
through doing virtuous action, which is prohairetic. This interpretation will also put 
us one step nearer to another important Aristotelian doctrine, namely that the ethical 
virtue needs phronesis, and vice versa. I will explain this in the beginning of the next 
chapter. 
 
Now, we must account for prohairesis, which involves deliberation, in order to 
explore the contribution of this deliberation-prohairesis process to the 
virtue-acquiring stage and virtue-acquired stage. I consider the deliberation as a form 
of the reasoning process here, since Aristotle, first of all, confines this term in the 
structure of means-end in EN III. The job of deliberation is to calculatively find the 
means to fulfil the end of agent. Outside this means-end structure, we may have many 
other forms of the reasoning process. But in the following section, I will argue that the 
deliberation in this structure can be a promising candidate of the OL for moral 
learners from the later stage onward. I will also hold the opinion that the deliberation 
in this means-end form of reasoning process is not necessary to preclude that other 
forms of the reasoning process will also be involved in this structure. I will argue this 
point in detail in the next chapter—namely, that the Aristotelian deliberation in the 
means-end structure can also contain the syllogistic form of the reasoning process. 
                                                        
118 Cf. Sarah Broadie/Rowe (2002), pp. 300-1. 
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The syllogism or deductive form, which involves universal rules in its premise, 
actually functions behind the means-end structure, and only this whole picture can 
provide an explanatory account for action. Now let us first grasp the basic means-end 
structure of deliberation process in the following section. 
4. Deliberation and Prohairesis 
Aristotle claims that being able to make right choices or decisions (prohairesis) is 
most proper to virtue and the distinguishing mark of the virtuous man.119 Aristotle 
defines moral virtue as a "hexis prohairetike," that is, a state that is prohairetic.120 He 
places the discussion of prohairesis after his analysis of the voluntary in EN III 2 and 
tells us that prohairesis is different from a voluntary choice. Prohairesis seems to 
need more rational calculation than voluntary.121 Aristotle envisages prohairesis as 
one of the conditions of virtue. In addition, he also considers it as an important factor 
for the best kind of friendship, ethike philia.122 Aristotle also says this when he 
argues that we decide on good or bad things and that people sometimes choose what 
they should not choose. We can compare this conception with his discussion of 
akrates and enkrates; the enkrates act on decision, while akrates do not.123 The 
beginning of EN VI seems to tell us that prohairesis also takes part in the intellectual 
virtue.124 Prohairesis appears almost everywhere and definitely stays a very central 
part in all these important issues—but what is prohairesis? 
 
Here, I will not propose any new interpretation of this concept; rather, I will provide a 
basic analysis in order to identify whether moral learners can contain the OL in 
themselves or, precisely, whether the prohairesis of moral learners can indicate the 
function of the OL. In EN III 3, Aristotle defines prohairesis as deliberative desire 
(βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις).125 From this definition, we can see that two elements are 
                                                        
119 EN II 4, 1105a31-32; II 5, 1106a2-4; III 2, 1111b5; VIII 13, 1163a22-23; Rhet. I 9, 1367b22-23. 
120 EN II 6, 1106b36-a2; EE II 10, 1227b5-11. 
121 EN III 2, 1111b6-10. 
122 EN VIII 5, 1157B30-31; EE VII 10, 1243B9-10. 
123 EN III 2, 1112a1-3, 7-11; 1111b14-15. 
124 EN VI 2, 1139a25ff. 
125 EN III 3, 1113a10-11; see also EN V I2, 1139a22-26. 
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required for prohairesis, namely, deliberation and desire. Prohairesis is a sort of 
desire—not simply irrational desire, but rather desire that is always combined with 
rational calculation. However, here we can have at least two different readings of 
prohairesis: the first I call “basic reading,” the second one “advanced reading.” The 
basic reading defines orexis, the desire in prohairesis, as the outcome of the 
deliberation, while the end is set by a wish, boulesis. For example, I have an end, E, 
which is set by my wish. In order to fulfill E, my deliberation tells me that I should do 
a, b, and c. Then I have a prohairesis—namely, the decision to do a, b, and c.  
 
This basic reading is surely not wrong, but neither is it complete. We still need the 
advanced reading. The advanced reading determines the prohairesis, and deliberation 
can also affect the end, which is set by a wish. Prohairesis is not only deciding to do a, 
b, and c, but also will effectively adjust the end that the wish originally sets. The basic 
reading is only to characterize the motivational aspect of reasoning and deliberation, 
while the advanced reading also emphasizes the normative or evaluative aspect of the 
reasoning and deliberation. The motivational function of deliberation is generated by 
the first-order end, while the normative function can second-orderly regulate the 
first-order end. If we have only the basic reading here, it would lead us to the Humean 
position on this issue. However, the Humean Position is reluctant to label Aristotle. 
Thus, I will argue that the advanced reading has to be engaged in the 
deliberation-prohairesis process. 
 
As briefly mentioned, there are basically two kinds of interpretations of the 
relationship between the end and deliberation. (1) We might take a Humean reading 
(i.e., that reason can only be the slave of the passions, that it serves and obeys the 
passions).126 The end is set by one kind of desire (i.e., boulesis) according to Aristotle. 
Reason is merely an instrument to calculate how the end can be achieved. Such 
calculation is neutral, merely searching for the most effective way to fulfil the end; the 
effective way is the best way. Thus, under this interpretation, it seems unnecessary to 
determine this reading in a strict moral sense. Whether the end is good or bad depends 
on the character of the agent, but means are said to be effective or ineffective. (2) We 
can envisage the rational calculation itself as a constitutive part of the ends rather than 
                                                        
126 Treatise II. iii. 3. 
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just instrumental means. Fulfilling and evaluating the end depends on fulfilling and 
evaluating the constitutive parts. Constituents themselves, unlike the instrumental 
means, should dictate the ethical value.  
4.1. The Means-End or the Constituents-End 
The Humean reading does not contradict the meaning of EN III3. In EN III, 
deliberation is just technically determined to find the means for the end. We first 
determine the end and then examine how and by what means to achieve it. The 
deliberator should find the most effective way to achieve the end (1112b12-17). 
However, the end is determined by our wish (boulesis) (1111b26-31, 1113a15). Wish, 
as one kind of desire (orexis),127 is sometimes branded as rational by Aristotle, but 
sometimes as irrational.128 In the EN III 3, it seems to be irrational desire since 
Aristotle says there that the wish itself can be for what is impossible or something 
unachievable (1111b22-26). The rational desire should be called prohairesis in his 
ethics since it is defined as deliberative desire (βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις). The irrational 
desire should be restrained by the rational deliberation. However, this restriction is 
only for whether there are any means to achieve the end, not whether the action will 
have a right or just outcome.  
 
This Humean interpretation places desire in the most important position, and reason 
just provides the means to the end. It would be hard, though, to label it as 
Aristotelian.129 EN I 13 seems to have already established the inverse of Hume’s 
                                                        
127 De. Motu. 700b22, βούλησις δὲ καὶ θυμὸς καὶ ἐπιθυμία πάντα ὄρεξις; however, a few lines later, Aristotle 
seems to put boulesis together with orexis as contrasts with epithumia and thumos. τὰ μὲν δι’ ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ 
θυμὸν τὰ δὲ  δι’ ὄρεξιν ἢ βούλησιν (701a37-b1). Here, I take orexis as genus of the epithumia, thumos, and 
boulesis. 
128 Boulesis as irrational: Pol. 1334b21, ὥσπερ δὲ τὸ σῶμα πρότερον τῇ γενέσει τῆς ψυχῆς, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἄλογον 
τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο· θυμὸς γὰρ καὶ βούλησις, ἔτι δὲ ἐπιθυμία, καὶ γενομένοις εὐθὺς 
ὑπάρχει τοῖς παιδίοις, ὁ δὲ λογισμὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς προϊοῦσιν ἐγγίγνεσθαι πέφυκεν. 
As rational: Top. 126a13, πᾶσα γὰρ βούλησις ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ; Rhet. 1369 a1-2, τὰ μὲνδιὰ λογιστικὴν ὄρεξιν 
τὰ δὲ δι’ ἄλογον· ἔστιν δ’ ἡ μὲνβούλησις ἀγαθοῦ ὄρεξις (οὐδεὶς γὰρ βούλεται ἀλλ’ ἢ ὅταν οἰηθῇ εἶναι ἀγαθόν), 
ἄλογοι δ’ ὀρέξεις ὀργὴ καὶ ἐπιθυμία. 
129 Before the first decade of the 19th century, this Humean reading was favored by some great commentators; see 
Walter, Zeller, and Burnet. Nowadays, however, very few people still stick to this standpoint (e.g., 
Fotenbaugh). 
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metaphor; it tells us that desire should obey reason. 130  Aristotle describes the 
desiderative part sharing reason as a son listening to or obeying his father or one 
friend listening to or obeying another friend. In order to reach the purpose of this 
“listening to” and “obeying,” there are many ways or means introduced by Aristotle 
here in this passage—namely, persuading, giving advice, warning or reproofing, and 
exhorting. We see some of these ways—such as persuading and 
advice-giving—demand the ability of understanding of the persuaded. This is the 
analogical description of the relationship of the desiderative part to the rational part. 
Meanwhile, this naturally provides a clue that, in the virtue-acquiring process, moral 
learners probably also actively use the rational ability to understand and consider the 
OL given by the practical wise man rather than a simply mechanical obeying-process. 
However, this is only a clue from the analogical description of this passage. In order 
to prove that rational activity works in this virtue-acquiring stage, I must closely 
examine how moral learners make moral decisions. 
 
Several other passages show that reason and desire should have at least the same 
importance in prohairesis.131 The Humean understanding of prohairesis seems not to 
be the correct one, and the account of deliberation in EN III, which is understood as a 
means to an end, is not complete. As recent research indicates, “The things promoting 
the end (ta pros to telos)” could be the instrumental means leading to an end, but also 
could be the parts that constitute the end.132 In the means-end mode, the emphasis is 
placed more on the end than on the means. On the other hand, if the realization of the 
end is made up of the things leading to the end, the importance moves to the 
constituents rather than to the end itself. In the latter case, the end could only be a 
rubric concept that guides the agent to deliberate about the concrete actions to fulfil it, 
but figuring out the concrete action is the most difficult and important part in this 
process. In EN III, Aristotle might loosely include these two readings in his usage of 
“the things promoting to the end,” or perhaps Aristotle is attempting to use the 
                                                        
130 What Aristotle says in his Metaphysics can also give us a general guide: “Desire is grounded by opinion, rather 
than opinion by desire; for thinking is the starting point.” (Meta. 12.7, 1072a29-30) 
131 EN VI 2, 1139b4-5, διὸ ἢ ὀρεκτικὸς νοῦς ἡ προαίρεσις ἢ ὄρεξις διανοητική, καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρχὴ ἄνθρωπος. DA 
III 10, 433 a21-22, εἰ γὰρ δύο, νοῦς καὶ ὄρεξις, ἐκίνουν, κατὰ κοινὸν ἄν τι ἐκίνουν εἶδος. De. Motu. 6, 700b23, 
ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις κοινὸν διανοίας καὶ ὀρέξεως. 
132 See Sorabji, in Rorty (1980), p. 202; Wiggins, in Rorty (1980), p. 224. 
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means-end mode to illuminate the obscurities of the constituents-end mode, as 
Wiggins argues. 133  In this case, we should focus more on deliberating what 
constitutes eudaemonia (i.e., in a given context, which of several possible courses of 
action would conform most closely to the ideal they hold up for themselves, or the 
kind of life they want to lead). The end merely functions, in this case, as a rubric or 
compass to guide the deliberative process. 
 
Most contemporary scholars accept the constituents-end model. In this mode, since 
we deliberate about the constituents, we also, in a loose sense, deliberate about the 
ends themselves.134 However, we do not deliberate about eudaemonia since it cannot 
be the constituent of any further end.135 Anything promoting eudaemonia can be the 
object of deliberation (i.e., the means or the constituents of eudaemonia). The moral 
learners in the shame stage have decided to accept virtue; they have a basic idea of 
what is good, but they have not acquired “the why” and still have difficulties reading 
the different particular situations. Is it possible to also say that they have the idea of 
the right end already? On the one hand, the answer might be yes because they have 
decided to live a good and virtuous life, which is envisaged as the ultimate goal. A 
happy life (eudaemonia) is their right and ultimate end. On the other hand, the answer 
might be no because a good or virtuous life is made up of all the individual concrete 
situations—merely having grasped the general concept of virtue is not enough. 
However, it is hard for a moral learner to have already learned the virtuous choices for 
all subordinate situations. In EN VI, Aristotle tells us that the capacity to read a 
particular situation belongs to phronimos: the one who possess the practical wisdom 
actually possesses full virtue. Thus, for moral learners, having only general ideas of 
the ultimate end might not be a guarantee for knowing the concrete good end in 
particular situations. Even though they can deliberate in this stage, they cannot always 
control their desires. Thus, they would find it difficult to make the right decision on 
these concrete constituents. Further, even if they can make the right decision, they do 
not always do the right actions since they have not acquired a firm, stable state. They 
                                                        
133 Wiggins in Rorty (1980), p. 224. 
134 Another sense of deliberating about ends is that what is a means to an end in this chain of deliberation can, in 
another chain, be an end. However, both of these cases of deliberating ends are not in the strict sense. 
135 Cf. Nussbaum (1986), she claims that Aristotle “does not hold that ultimate ends cannot be the objects of 
rational deliberation.” This claim is not correct according the doctrine of EN III3, p. 162. 
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can make the right decisions occasionally when they meet familiar situations, and 
they can make right actions when they have a consistent state between reason and 
desires.  
 
Does deliberation make some contribution to recognizing the new situation and to 
forming the firm state, though? According my analysis of shame, the deliberation or, 
reasoning activity in general, is developed by the stimulation of shame, and this 
deliberation also, in turn, helps moral learners to control feelings to an appropriate 
degree. In addition, according to the constituents-end reading, constituents are 
important and can affect the end. Further, the production of deliberation, namely 
prohairesis in the basic reading, is the starting point of the constituents for the end. In 
this model, deliberation has to make a very decisive contribution to the end. In other 
words, the end, to some extent, depends on the deliberation and the prohairesis in the 
advanced reading. Thus, the function of prohairesis is reasonably enlarged. 
Deliberation can influence the end. The end is not only set up by the irrational desire, 
but also from the reasoning activity. The firm state is also built through training the 
harmony of reason and desire. This explains the advanced reading of prohairesis. 
4.2. Deliberation and the Orthos Logos 
If the means-end model is right for Aristotle, it seems that the moral learners can 
achieve their ultimate end through deliberation. They have a correct end; the job of 
deliberation is only to find the means to fulfil that end. It seems very 
doable—Aristotle calls it the “starting point of deliberation”—to find the means, step 
by step, starting from the end. For instance, moral learner L, who is already in the 
shame stage, decides to accept virtue and pursue his eudaemonia. He thinks that, as a 
doctor, he will achieve the eudaemonia (having the ultimate end) since he would be 
able to help other people (becoming virtuous) and would, therefore, feel absolutely 
happy. Thus, he studies hard, applies to medical school, and so on (deliberating about 
the means). Finally, he graduates and receives a license to practice medicine. Thus, 
we could say that he has achieved his eudaemonia. In this model, when the ultimate 
end is set, every action is done well according to the right deliberation or the correct 
planning of a good life in order to achieve the end. The deliberation seems to play the 
role of the OL well in this model. 
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However, as we discussed before, the means-end model is not complete for Aristotle, 
for his doctrine of deliberation has another aspect: constituents-end. From this point 
of view, we can diagnose a few problems in the process of deliberation for moral 
learners. The main problem here might be that, for the moral learner, L, to achieve 
eudaemonia, he should achieve the virtuous state before or right after he becomes a 
doctor since virtue is one of the main constituents of the ultimate end, eudaemonia. 
He does not achieve the virtuous state during this process if he cannot resist 
temptation (e.g., money). For instance, if he is still continent (enkratic, e.g., wanting 
to earn more money through providing unnecessary treatments, yet not acting on his 
desire) or is incontinent (akratic, e.g., wanting to earn more money through providing 
unnecessary treatments and doing so). Even worse, the process becomes a vice (e.g., 
pursuing medicine not for health, but rather for the money). In any of these cases, 
Aristotle would definitely not define L as a happy person. For moral learners, and 
even for enkratics and akratics, their deliberation functions exactly as the OL, which 
guides them to build virtuous character, although the right deliberation and decision 
cannot guarantee they will perform the right action before achieving the virtuous state. 
However, in the case of vice, we may confirm that there is also deliberation at work 
there, but only for the vicious end. Thus, we will not determine the deliberation there 
as the OL. Therefore, deliberation can be determined as the OL only if moral learners 
have acquired “the that” and are ready to be possessed by virtue. 
 
The second problem would be that L might not be able to reason out all the other 
necessary conditions and constituents of eudaemonia (e.g., wealth, health, friendship, 
and so on) besides virtue. L wants to be a good doctor and a virtuous person, but he 
does not care much about his own health and has no time to take care of family and 
friends. Finally, he becomes a good and virtuous doctor; however, his own health has 
become a very serious problem, and he is absolutely isolated from society. Could we 
say that he has achieved his eudaemonia? We could not, and Aristotle would agree 
since L should be responsible for his own health and social status. In this case, the OL 
qua deliberation seems to work only for part of, not the whole constituents of the 
ultimate end. What determines how moral learners deliberate to choose this or that 
among many other good things, all of which are important for their ends, after all? 
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Could we determine one would be happy, if he only achieved one of the most 
important constituent elements? 
 
From the first problem, it is clear that moral learners cannot ensure that they will 
achieve the ultimate end, even though they have decided to accept virtue and to lead 
happy lives. They should first grow to be truly virtuous people. This case also seems 
to confirm that habituation is more important than rational calculation. From the 
earlier example, L can deliberate well, but he seems to need more habituation 
(especially what I call habituation 2) to build a firm state. From the second problem, it 
is clear that, even though deliberation can help L be virtuous, only deliberation seems 
to make it difficult for him achieve the full eudaemonia. 
 
However, according to my analysis of prohairesis, the over-simplified judgment that 
habituation is more important than rational calculation is not fair for L. Of course, as a 
moral learner, L needs habituation (both habituation 1 and 2) even though he is a 
moral learner in the shame stage. However, in the shame stage, he has already 
acquired “the that.” If he wants to be a doctor, he must have acquired the basic idea of 
what a good doctor should do (he might acquire “the that” through education, 
traditional precepts, or something else). Thus, when he faces, for example, temptation, 
he can tell right from wrong; he will deliberatively make a choice. He might struggle 
and think, “If I earn money in this way, it is wrong. It would not help me to be 
virtuous, and it would damage my happiness. However, if I do not accept money, I 
will be poorer than other doctors, and it might keep me from finding a wife.” This 
struggle, though, is a kind of rational calculation, some of the pieces of which even 
amount to deliberation. This rational calculation helps make clear which choice is, in 
fact, right.  
 
The rational calculation also helps him obtain an even clearer and sounder idea of 
what is right and wrong than he had before. Based on this clearer idea, he might still 
chose to do wrong. However, the right choice is also based on this clearer idea, and 
the good, firm state is based on the repetition of making the right choices (habituation 
2). From this point of view, the incontinent and the continent states can be overcome 
using the right deliberation and repeatedly fulfilling the right prohairesis; then, the 
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continent and incontinent states can transform to the virtuous state. More importantly, 
rational calculation, at least from the shame stage onward, is actually more 
fundamental than habituation since the latter relies on the former in the later phase of 
the moral learning stage, especially in the face of a new moral situation. 
 
In the second problem, we cannot deny the role of deliberation, either. We determine 
that L, as a moral learner, acquired “the that,” so he must have realized that health is 
also a very important constituent he should seriously deal with—but why has L 
chosen to lose his health? His deliberation probably told him that a virtuous and good 
doctor is more important than health and his own social life. If he could get the former, 
the latter would not be indispensable. 
 
It is true that L surely cannot become a virtuous person solely by aiming to achieve 
the ultimate end. It is also true that L surely cannot achieve the ultimate end purely 
through deliberation. He needs habituation to build his virtue, and he needs virtue to 
guarantee that his deliberation tends in the right direction toward the ultimate end. 
However, before he achieves virtue, rational calculation or deliberation contributes to 
making the right choices and is helpful in building the virtuous state through 
habituation. The end of habituation is to make our feelings and desires harmonize 
with the right reason. Thus, our feelings and desires are guided and habituated in this 
deliberative process. Rational calculation or deliberation is effectively directing the 
feelings and desires in the moral learning stage (especially from the shame stage 
onward). 
 
Now we can determine whether deliberation is the OL or, at least, a kind of OL. Let us 
recall the basic characteristics of the OL: (1) the OL determines the intermediate for 
the right action in a particular situation and (2) the OL regulates the feeling into an 
appropriate degree in a given situation. According to my analysis above, the action of 
moral learners is virtue-building action; and deliberation seems to be very important 
(or even decisive) for this kind of action in the later stage of the moral learning 
process. Right virtue-building action aims to build the firm state, implying the 
agreement of feelings and reason. Deliberation is the main contributor in the later 
stage of the moral learning process leading to this agreement. The task of deliberation 
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is to identify this intermediate for action and regulate the feelings in a given moral 
situation for moral learners. Thus, we seem to be able to conclude here that 
deliberation is the OL in the moral learning stage (from the shame stage on). However, 
at the same time, we might not rightly deliberate every constituent to achieve the 
ultimate end. The OL qua deliberation seems to be valid only occasionally. 
 
However, we should not have ignored one point I mentioned earlier in this chapter. 
We cannot ignore the role of proposition, both conventionally universal rules and a 
particular prescription, such as a concrete command from parents in shaping moral 
learners. As I showed above, acquiring “the that” is a very mechanical process in the 
first stage. Moral learners would only be able to follow the particular prescription. 
Even in this stage, moral learners often ask why, and empirical observation tells us 
that the instructor’s explanations usually appeal to a moral general formulation (e.g., 
Question: Why shouldn’t I beat him? Answer: Because beating is not right. /Question: 
Why shouldn’t I pick fruit from my neighbor’s garden? Answer: We should not take 
things from other people). Moreover, there are some universal rules (e.g., “do not kill,” 
“do not steal,” and so on) that are also important guides of our actions. In the shame 
stage, having acquired “the that,” moral learners begin to use their rational faculty to 
calculate and deliberate. They reflect on these rules and justify, modify, or even reject 
these rules through calculation and deliberation.  
 
However, moral learners in this earlier stage cannot issue a complete reasoning 
process or syllogism by themselves or cannot understand the reasoning process of the 
practical wise man to explain why this or that action should be done. Meanwhile for 
them, though, taking action does not simply mean to follow the particular proposition, 
such as a command or order, since the rational reflective ability would naturally have 
more or less reaction to the command and ask why. Therefore, we cannot determine 
the deliberation as the OL in this earlier stage without any qualification since moral 
learners can only follow the particular proposition with limited ability of rational 
reflection. We cannot resist the guidance of the function of universal rules and 
particular prescription. Thus, even though the OL is, per se, the deliberation or 
syllogism, in the moral leaning stage, especially in the earlier phase, the complete 
syllogism would degenerate into part of the syllogism, such as a piece of proposition 
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for moral learners. 
 
However, a universal rule can neither be used directly in every particular situation, 
nor can the particular prescription explain why that should be done. The application of 
the rules in an unfamiliar situation and the explanation of why have to appeal to the 
reasoning activity. The mature reasoning activity is more fundamental than the 
universal rule or the particular prescription. From the shame stage on, moral learners 
can use their deliberation to adjust (or even abandon) the rule or plan according to the 
desired end and a given concrete situation. This capacity is also developed from the 
shame stage on and gradually becomes a viable judging capacity. It is only in the 
sense of practical reasoning of phronimos that we can call it OL in a strict sense. 
However, we have seen that our reasoning capacity is growing toward this direction. 
5. Conclusive Suggestion 
The definition of the OL in the virtue-acquiring stage seems changeable. According to 
my analysis, at the very beginning of the moral learning stage, the OL for moral 
learners might preferably be (1) a type of formulation or articulated declaration (e.g., 
the guidance as a request or command of the moral guider), and this guidance could 
be (1a) a proposition either about a universal rule or (1b) about a particular situation. 
Since in this very beginning stage of moral learning, moral learners have not acquired 
“the that,” they cannot actively use their reasoning to make any moral judgment. 
What they can do, though, is simply imitate and follow the guidance of the moral 
guider—or as Aristotle defines it, the one who possesses the practical wisdom, or 
phronimos. This process is more mechanical than rationally reflective, although the 
rational activity is already somewhat involved. 
 
In the later stage of moral leaning (e.g., from the shame stage onward), the OL could 
also possibly be (1) a proposition about universal rules or laws, or a particular 
situation that the moral learners would simply follow in some situations. It also could 
occasionally be (2) the good deliberation or reasoning, or well-defined life planning 
that allows moral learners to rightly make moral judgments in familiar situations. 
They use rational activity to help them make the right choices in the later stage, but 
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they cannot make the right choices all the time since they might not have learned all 
the features of the particular situations or cannot have a right end (or right desire) in 
every particular situation. They have decided to lead a virtuous life and have accepted 
eudaemonia as the ultimate end.  
 
However, the capacity to make the right choice in every situation is still in training, 
and the rational faculty also has the task of making a decision that accords with the 
emotions. We also, though, have to recognize the contribution of calculation and 
deliberation in this moral learning stage. We can determine it as a kind of OL in a 
loose sense, but it is growing in the right direction. When it can deal well with every 
particular situation, we can call it OL in the strict sense. Since the application of the 
plan and rule in particular situations depends on our deliberation, and the firm state 
also depends somewhat on deliberation and decision-making in the later stage, I 
determine deliberation to be more fundamental than proposition in the later stage of 
moral learning. 
 
We can see that rational activity of moral learners is maturing during the learning 
process; already in the very beginning stage, through imitation, the rational activity is 
growing. In addition, the growing rational activity and ever-increasing reliance on the 
reasoning activity to acquire virtue is already contained in human nature. Although 
we cannot acquire virtue by nature, possession of virtue is the state most in 
accordance with human nature. Thus far, I have addressed the OL in the moral 
learning stage. Following the discussion established in this chapter, I will continue to 
argue in the next chapter that the practical reasoning of phronimos is the OL, per se, in 
the virtue-acquired stage. 
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Chapter 4: The Orthos Logos in the 
Virtue-Acquired Stage 
In the previous chapter, I discussed the definition and function of the orthos logos 
(OL) in the virtue-acquiring stage. In the virtue-acquiring stage, the OL appears 
different things for moral learners: at the very beginning of the learning process it 
may be propositional in the form of rules or laws, particular prescriptions, or an 
incomplete piece of the reasoning sequence for a given particular situation; at the later 
stage of the moral learning process, the OL can occasionally be a reasoning process. 
Rational activity is enhanced in the virtue-acquiring stage during which moral 
learners better understand the genuine OL, namely, the OL of the practically wise man. 
They can also issue the reasoning sequence (occasionally) to identify the “right action” 
and its justification for the given particular situation. 
 
In this chapter, I will argue that the right reasoning process of fully virtuous men is 
the real OL in the virtue-acquired stage. In Aristotle’s ethical context, this reasoning 
process is motived by a desired end. The end wished by virtuous people is noble and 
worthy of chasing. Further, the reasoning process itself functions in the form of the 
deliberation (cf. Ch. 3) and is deployed in order to identify the means to fulfilling the 
noble end. The right deliberation of virtuous people, I will argue, can also be 
identified with a kind of deductive or syllogistic reasoning process to establish an 
explanation for the action required. This syllogistic reasoning concerned with action is 
usually called practical syllogism.136 
                                                        
136 As Kenny already pointed out, Aristotle himself does not use the term “practical syllogism”; Kenny (1979), 
Most scholars agree that the relationship between deliberation and practical syllogism can be identified in 
some way, but D. J. Allan (1955), J. Cooper (1975), and Corcilius (2008a, b) deny the identification, pp. 
111-2.  
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Practical syllogism is comprised of the knowledge of universal rules and of particular 
situations. Practical syllogism altogether tells us not only what action should be done, 
but also explains to us why it should be done according to the concrete situation at 
hand. This prescriptive and explanatory account conforms to the moral function of the 
OL. I will argue accordingly that the right practical syllogism or deliberation of the 
fully virtuous man, or the activity of phronesis, is the best candidate for the real 
definition of the OL. 
 
Let us first address the point I raised at the end of Chapter 2: because the ethical 
virtue is determined by the OL and the OL is the right practical reasoning, and the 
right end of the reasoning is guaranteed by the ethical virtue (otherwise reasoning 
could be used for good or bad), then there is an“explanatory circle” between ethical 
virtue and the OL. Which of the two is dependent upon the other is, to this effect, 
entirely unclear.137 
 
Aristotle seems to endorse yet another circular argument related to my research. The 
right practical deliberation (euboulia) which is the activity of the intellectual virtue, 
phronesis, is also circularly connected with ethical virtue. Aristotle says that without 
the phronesis there is no ethical good, and without ethical virtue there is no phronesis. 
This claim itself appears to be circular, though Aristotle does not seem to consider it 
to be vicious. In the discussion below, by disclosing the relationship between the OL 
and phronesis, I will show that circle between the OL and ethical virtue functions 
exactly like the circle between phronesis and ethical virtue. 
If we consider the OL to be the right practical deliberation qua the activity of 
phronesis, we can effectively avoid creating a circle between the ethical virtue and the 
                                                        
137 The normative problem of the logos was addressed in Chapter 3. The normative depends on ethical virtue 
rather than the fact that the logos, by nature, could be normative. This point was addressed with respect to the 
second disadvantage, since in the virtue-acquired stage, we do not examine whether the moral learning process 
is simply a psychic training or something else (e.g., the OL in the virtue-acquiring stage.) I argued that moral 
training is part of the training of the psychic faculty, but other factors (such as various forms of moral 
guidance) also play an important role in the moral learning process. Having established this argument allows 
me in this chapter to focus on the result of this moral training, namely, the mature form of the rational activity: 
the exercise of phronesis. 
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OL: ethical virtue makes the goal of deliberation right, and deliberation finds the right 
action in given particular situation (i.e., the intermediate) serves ethical virtue. 
Moreover, my interpretation will shed more light on the circle between phronesis and 
ethical virtue; namely, I insist that virtue first provides the right goal for phronesis 
while the virtuous action appropriate for the situation is identified via the activity of 
phronesis, i.e., through right deliberation. This right action generated by phronesis 
then also reinforces and consolidates the virtuous state. This might not be the only 
positive function of phronesis in regards to ethical virtue, but it is an important one 
(and one compatible with any other positive contribution of phronesis to ethical 
virtue.) Let us put aside the issue of virtue making goals “right”, for now, and rather 
focus on the contribution of phronesis to ethical virtue to determine how the activity 
of phronesis can function qua the OL. 
 
In order to achieve my goal, I first must carefully examine the meaning of the activity 
of phronesis, which necessitates a closer look at what Aristotle says about the 
phronesis and its features, especially in terms of its relation to ethical virtue. I will 
also attempt to determine based on these features whether the activity of phronesis 
itself can lead to a morally right decision and right action in a particular situation. 
Finally, I will establish my argument that the identification between phronesis and the 
OL is actually dependent on the identification between the activity of phronesis and 
the OL in the virtue-acquired stage. I will also respond to the most notable 
hypothetical challenges to my interpretation.  
1. Phronesis: An Outline 
Phronesis is a popular word in antiquity. It is quite often used in the sense of wisdom, 
reasoning, or thinking behind the search for truth. In this sense, it is often used 
interchangeably with the word sophia.138 Aristotle uses this word also in this sense in 
                                                        
138 In Plato’s Rep., for example, the verb form phronein and Sophia are utilized interchangeably, but sometimes 
sophia is also used in the practical domain where phronesis is expected, e.g., prot. 321d, 329e, Rep. 365d, 
427e, 429a, 443e. 
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several places throughout his work,139 but in the EN, especially in the common books 
of the EN and EE, it is defined as an intellectual virtue. This intellectual virtue, 
something special, is connected with ethical virtue (in the second book of EE, for 
example, it is identified with one of ethical virtues.) Ethical virtue makes ends right, 
and phronesis provides the means to fulfill the ends. In this context, phronesis is 
usually called “practical wisdom”. 
1.1 Phronesis and Ethical Virtue 
In the Nicomachean Ethics, phronesis is first known as one of the intellectual 
virtues.140 At the end of EN I 13 Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of virtue, namely, 
ethical virtue and intellectual virtue; and phronesis is listed together with wisdom 
(σοφία) and cleverness (σύνεσιν) as an example of the intellectual virtues (1103a5-6). 
Phronesis does not appear before Book VI, where Aristotle discusses the intellectual 
virtues in detail. In this central Book, nonetheless, Aristotle endows phronesis with a 
very important and special function. Phronesis as an intellectual virtue should be 
separate from other ethical virtues, since intellectual virtue and ethical virtue are 
established on different parts of the soul: one strictly rational, and the other 
desiderative which is open to reason. Throughout this discussion, though, phronesis is 
essentially bound to the ethical virtues. This seems to correspond to a doctrine under 
which the desiderative part of the soul should listen to the rational part as a son listen 
to his father. Phronesis as an intellectual virtue can guide ethical virtue (like a father 
guides his son). If we take a close look at Aristotle’s articulation on the relation 
between phronesis and the ethical virtue, however, the relation is much more complex 
than the relation between two parts of the soul. 
 
In EN VI 13, Aristotle says: 
                                                        
139 E.g., Meta. 982b24; 1009b13, 32; 1078b15; Cael. 298b23. The word Sophia in Corpus Aristotelium appears 
fairly infrequently, almost only in Meta., EN VI, X and MM I 34, Hist. An. 558a29, Meteor. 353a35, b6. 
140 In EN phronesis seems to be a very important intellectual virtue. Aristotle does not give us a particularly 
consistent account of phronesis in his works. 1) In his metaphysical and biological works he ascribes 
phronesis even to non-rational animals (Meta. I 1, 980a27-b25; HA IX, 611a16, 612a3, b1; PA II, 648a6ff; GA 
III, 753a11-12); this view is repeated in EN VI 7, 1141a26-26. 2) In EE II 3, 1221a10, phronesis appears in a 
list of ethical virtues. 3) Even in the EN itself, Aristotle contrasts phronesis and virtue in general, seeming to 
imply that phronesis is not a virtue at all (EN I 8, 1098b24). Special thanks to Sarah Broadie for pointing out 
this somewhat inconsistent definition of the phronesis to me.  
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(Passage 19) 
δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι κυρίως ἄνευ 
φρονήσεως, οὐδὲ φρόνιμον ἄνευ τῆς ἠθικῆς ἀρετῆς.  
 
It is clear, then, from what has been said, that it is not possible to be good in the 
strict sense without practical wisdom, nor practically wise without moral 
excellence. (1144b30-32) 
 
This passage summarizes the interrelation between phronesis and ethical virtue. The 
acquisition of this intellectual virtue, i.e., phronesis, can be fulfilled only with the aid 
of the ethical virtue; at the same time, the ethical virtue is impossible without practical 
wisdom. It is not possible to possess one without the other.  
 
This argument is supported by several of Aristotle’s descriptions of each side of the 
relationship. Concerning the statement that ethical virtue is the result of prohairesis or 
that ethical virtue follows reason, which the practical wise man tells us, the most 
important passage is Passage 3 (which I quoted in Chapter 1) where Aristotle defines 
ethical virtue as a state concerned with decision residing in a mean which is 
determined by logos by the man of practical wisdom.141 From these passages, the 
rational activity or (properly) practical reasoning is the principle of ethical virtue. 
However, Aristotle also says several times that practical wisdom is acquired with the 
aid of ethical virtue or that without ethical virtue there is no practical wisdom, e.g., in 
1144a28-31, “Practical wisdom is not the faculty, but it does not exist without this 
faculty. And this eye of the soul acquires its formed state not without the aid of 
excellence as has been said and is plain.”142 These passages imply that the ethical 
virtue or “good character” is the foundation for practical wisdom. In Passage 19, 
Aristotle concludes that “it is not possible to be good in the strict sense without 
practical wisdom, nor practically wise without moral excellence.” We could ask here 
                                                        
141 Other passages on this point: EN 1102b25ff, 1138b5ff. 
142 Other passages on this point: EN 1144a7-9, 20; 1151a17-19; EE 1227b35-36. 
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how it is possible to acquire both at the same time; a mysterious circle has formed. 
How do the two entities operate in tandem?143 
 
The way to solve this circular reasoning is to establish one of the two components as 
the true foundation of the other. As discussed in earlier chapters (Ch. 3 in particular,) 
most scholars nowadays consider the practical reasoning as the leading (foundational) 
part; I call this camp the “intellectualists”.144 By contrast, in the early 19th century, 
several important scholars envisioned the ethical virtue as the leading part. 
Fortenbaugh and Moss are the most notable representative of this position. Because 
this reading highlights the role of the desiderative part of the soul, it is somehow 
similar to the Humean doctrine under which slavery serves passion. I call proponents 
of this view “Humeans”.145 In my earlier discussion, I made clear that my position is, 
in principle, in accordance with that of the intellectualists. The specific reading 
endorsed by Aristotle himself is not my main concern here, however, so I will not go 
into the debate in detail.146 Rather, I will simply accept this interrelation between 
                                                        
143 Some people would not take this problem seriously at all, or create solely extrinsic distinction between them. 
Kenny for example, tries to eliminate the problem by creating an analogy of husband and wife; only after 
marrying do they acquire the names “husband” and “wife” (1978), p. 188. 
144 See Wiggins and Sorabji in Rorty (1980), etc.. 
145 Burnet (1900), Zeller (1960), Walter (1874), Fortenbaugh (1969), and Moss (2011). 
146 According to my analysis in Chapter 3, I resolve the circular argument by insisting that ethical virtue and 
practical wisdom grow together from immaturity into maturity simultaneously. Neither can exist separately 
from the acquisition process through the mature stage. Aristotle defines practical wisdom as good deliberation 
and ethical virtue as a firm state achieved from habituation. In my model, I define two kinds of habituation. 
Habituation (1), in the earlier stage of moral learning, exists to inform the learner of what is just or good but 
not why it is good; moral learners must gain experience while following good instructions. In the later stage, 
the learner begins to use his or her capacity for rational thought and make independent choices to act 
virtuously. In this stage, deliberation can make significant contribution to habituation; deliberation now can 
provide the right judgment or decision in familiar or even unfamiliar situations. A good and firm state is built 
through the repetition of right actions. Thus, deliberation is the foundation of the good state. In this sense, 
ethical virtue necessitates good deliberation. However, in this stage, the learner may succumb to raw emotions 
driving him to do wrong (or intemperate) actions despite his capacity to make right choices according to his 
rational capacity. To this effect, habituation is still necessary to create harmony between reason and passion. 
This is the task of Habituation (2), through which right actions must be performed repetitively for the learner 
to gain a firm state upon which she acts rightly and consistently (firmly). In this way, deliberation necessitates 
ethical virtue (or a right, firm state.) Deliberation on rightness in action and attaining a firm state of goodness 
are very closely interrelated. The formation of a firm state involves deliberation, and deliberation is developed 
during the habituation process.  
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phronesis and ethical virtue as a fact—a fact upon which my inquiry into the 
definition of the OL in the virtue-acquired stage is based. 
 
So according to this interrelation between phronesis and ethical virtue, we should 
keep in mind the fact that in the virtue-acquired stage, the virtuous person is also the 
practically wise man. When determining what the OL is in this stage, it is as if we are 
asking what the OL is to the practically wise man. Passage 2 (quoted in Chapter 1) 
seems to explicitly state that the virtuous state is not only in accordance with the OL, 
but also implies the presence of the OL and that in this ethical matter the OL is 
phronesis. I argued in Chapter 1 that this identification is not without qualification in 
general; here in Chapter 4, I will assert that in the virtue-acquired stage, this 
identification becomes critically important: the activity of phronesis, namely the right 
practical reasoning or good deliberation about particular situations, is the OL. Ethical 
virtue is not only in accordance with this right reasoning, but also always present with 
this right reasoning. This also echoes what 1106b36 (Passage 3, Ch. 1) indicates, 
namely, that virtue is a prohairetic state.  
 
After we have accepted this circular reasoning between ethical virtue and phronesis 
and the OL qua the right practical reasoning or deliberation (which is the activity of 
phronesis,) one is led naturally toward two main questions. First, how could this 
practical deliberation be useful to ethical virtue? Second, what is the use of ethical 
virtue for practical deliberation? The answer, briefly, is that the established virtuous 
state can maintain reasoning or deliberation consistently and in the consistently right 
direction by making the end right. Deliberation elucidates the means to achieve the 
end, i.e., the virtuous action in a given situation. In the virtue-acquired stage, rational 
activity occurs always under the influence of ethical virtue. That is to say, ethical 
virtue keeps the ends of reasoning and deliberation right while necessitating 
deliberation to read particular situations correctly and to fulfill the ends with right 
actions.147 
 
In view of how the OL qua the activity of phronesis contributes to ethical virtue, I will 
examine in detail what exactly phronesis can do to establish ethical virtue. Because 
                                                        
147 See EN VI 12, 1144a8-9; 20-26; 13, 1145a5-6. 
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Aristotle defines phronesis as the capacity for good deliberation, this is mainly about 
what good deliberation can actually do for ethical virtue and how this good 
deliberation is conducted per each given situation, as ethical virtue cannot 
immediately inform the learner of the correct action. (The other aspect, namely, how 
ethical virtue provides practical wisdom with the right end, is not discussed at length 
in this thesis.) 
 
We should keep two commitments in mind here: in the virtue-acquired stage, the end 
that the moral agent desires to achieve is already guaranteed to be right and the 
feelings of the moral agent to be appropriate regardless of the situation being 
encountered. Under these commitments, the phronesis functions to identify the best 
means to achieve the right end, i.e., the morally correct action for the particular 
situation. I will argue that these best means are also by definition the right action for 
the given situationand the “intermediate” in Aristotle’s terminology (which was 
discussed at length in Chapter 3.) I will go on to argue that right or good deliberation 
can play well and exactly the role of the OL, and that the rightness to which the OL 
refers can be fully explained similarly. 
1.2 Phronesis and True Logos 
Phronesis is also connected with “truth” or that which is “true” in EN VI. First, in EN 
VI 3, Aristotle describes five intellectual virtues as the states in which the soul 
possesses truth by way of affirmation or denial; phronesis is one of them.148 Then, in 
EN VI 5, after having introduced deliberation as a function of phronesis, he defines 
phronesis as a true state which accompanies logos (or as state which accompanies true 
logos) that is concerned with actions which are good or bad for human beings.149 
Logos here can be reasonably considered identical to the logos in the OL qua 
deliberation. In this sense, phronesis is the true deliberative state through which 
humans identify the right action. This right action is necessary to meet the ends which 
ethical virtue requires.  
 
                                                        
148 ἔστω δὴ οἷς ἀληθεύει ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ καταφάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι, πέντετὸνἀριθμόν· ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶ τέχνη ἐπιστήμη 
φρόνησις σοφία νοῦς· 1139b15-17. 
149 λείπεται ἄρα αὐτὴν εἶναι ἕξιν ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου πρακτικὴν περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπῳ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά. 1140b4-6. In 
Susemihl’s version, the ἀληθῆ modifies the logos. 
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This identification between the OL and deliberationcan also be confirmed by another 
passage in EN VI 2, though phronesis has not yet appeared. 
 
(Passage 20) 
ἔστι δ’ ὅπερ ἐν διανοίᾳ κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις, τοῦτ’ ἐν ὀρέξει δίωξις καὶ 
φυγή· ὥστ’ ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ὄρεξις 
βουλευτική, δεῖ διὰ ταῦτα μὲν τόν τε λόγον ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὄρεξιν ὀρθήν, 
εἴπερ ἡ προαίρεσις σπουδαία, καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τὸν μὲν φάναι τὴν δὲ διώκειν. αὕτη 
μὲν οὖν ἡ διάνοια καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια πρακτική· τῆς δὲ θεωρητικῆς διανοίας καὶ μὴ 
πρακτικῆς μηδὲ ποιητικῆς τὸ εὖ καὶ κακῶς τἀληθές ἐστι καὶ ψεῦδος (τοῦτο 
γάρ ἐστι παντὸς διανοητικοῦ ἔργον)· τοῦ δὲ πρακτικοῦ καὶ διανοητικοῦ 
ἀλήθεια ὁμολόγως ἔχουσα τῇ ὀρέξει τῇ ὀρθῇ. 
 
What affirmation and negation are in thinking, pursuit and avoidance are in 
desire; so that since moral excellence is a state concerned with choice, and 
choice is deliberate desire, therefore both the reasoning must be true and the 
desire right, if the choice is to be good, and the latter must pursue just what the 
former asserts. Now this kind of intellect and of truth is practical; of the 
intellect which is contemplative, not practical nor productive, the good and the 
bad state are truth and falsity (for this is the function of everything 
intellectual); while of the part which is practical and intellectual the good state 
is truth in agreement with right desire. (1139a21-31) 
 
In this thesis, I do not probe the exact meaning of practical truth.150 For the purposes 
of my argument, I focus only on the necessary condition for this practical truth.151 
 
Practical truth involves the combination of the true logos and the right desire. The 
function of true logos is to find truth through affirmation and negation. The right 
desire makes the truth practical through pursuing or avoiding what the logos 
                                                        
150 There is no article in the phrase ἡ διάνοια καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια πρακτική, therefore, as the ROT translation rightly 
renders, πρακτική is predicative not attributive. The formulation of “practical truth” is not in conflict with the 
meaning in the original text, however. 
151 There are many scholars who have made very insightful but also subtly different interpretations of the 
definition of “practical truth”. See Broadie (1991), Lear (2004); Pakaluk (2010). 
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indicates,152 so the practical truth entails the agreement of the true logos and right 
desire. This agreement is defined by Aristotle as the good decision or choice (ἡ 
προαίρεσις σπουδαία), i.e., the most important characteristic of ethical virtue. A good 
decision involves both reasoning (logos) and desire (orexis); the reasoning must be 
true and the desire be right. They must be in a harmonious agreement, namely, the 
desire must pursue just what the reasoning asserts. To this effect, the “practical” truth 
is actually demanded by ethical virtue, which is a state concerned with morally good 
decisions, while decisions are characterized by deliberative desire. What phronesis 
can and should do is to grasp the truth in a particular action via deliberation. So in this 
sense, phronesis is defined as a state of grasping practical truth. 
 
We should bear in mind that this practical truth is achieved through a right decision 
about the right action in a particular situation. This right decision involves true 
reasoning (τόν λόγον ἀληθῆ) and right desire (τὴν ὄρεξιν ὀρθήν).153 Within this 
framework of ethical virtue, this right action which is prescribed by good deliberation 
is not only the means towards the end, but also actually is the intermediate between 
deficiency and excess. 
 
We have now moved one important step forward in our inquiry of the definition of the 
OL. The true logos in the right decision and the logos accompanying the phronesis 
seem very close to the role of the OL. Further, the true logos motivated by the desired 
end fits very well the role of the deliberative thinking process in the means-to-end 
structure. In the passage quoted above, the true logos as a condition of good decisions 
is used with deliberation, also the conditions of decision-making, interchangeably. In 
the following section, I will further reinforce my argument of the identification 
between the OL and the right deliberation suggested here. The OL cannot be a 
universal rule or particular prescription in the virtue-acquired stage, but only can be 
                                                        
152 Here, Aristotle implies that there are many different kinds of truth. What only intellect (dianoia) affirms or 
denies is also truth, but it is not practical truth, rather it might be called theoretical truth. Practical truth 
involves not only the intellect’s ability to affirm or deny it, but also the desire (orexis) to pursue or avoid it. 
Practical truth is not merely the combination of theoretical truth with right desire, however, as theoretical truth 
concerns the eternal and necessary while practical truth can be otherwise. This passage also implies that there 
should be truth in regards to techne, but the nature of this truth is not very clear.  
153 This conforms to Anscombe’s (1965) thinking that the action is the carrier of practical truth, p. 157ff.  
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the right or good deliberation. In this stage, the OL 1) is internalized and always 
present with the moral agent, and 2) tells the moral agent what should be done, and 
even how and why it should be done under the given circumstances. Only good 
deliberation, in Aristotle’s ethical context, can complete this task. 
 
Next, let us focus on this deliberation-decision process to examine how it can play the 
role of the OL under the doctrine of phronesis. 
2. Phronesis, Good Deliberation, and Practical Syllogism 
In this section, I will examine the objective and composition of the deliberation 
process of phronimos, the one possessing phronesis. Aristotle calls this deliberation 
“good deliberation” (eubolia). I will show that the characteristics of good deliberation 
are well-suited to the standard of the moral function of the OL. 
2.1 Phronesis and Good Deliberation 
At the very beginning of EN VI 5, Aristotle tells us that from the phronimos we can 
see that one of the functions of phronesis is to be able to deliberate about things 
conduce to happiness. 
 
(Passage 21) 
Περὶ δὲ φρονήσεως οὕτως ἂν λάβοιμεν, θεωρήσαντες τίνας λέγομεν τοὺς 
φρονίμους. δοκεῖ δὴ φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τὰ 
αὑτῷ ἀγαθὰ καὶ συμφέροντα, οὐ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ποῖα πρὸς ὑγίειαν, πρὸς 
ἰσχύν, ἀλλὰ ποῖα πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν ὅλως. 
 
Regarding practical wisdom we shall get at the truth by considering who are 
the persons we credit with it. Now it is thought to be a mark of a man of 
practical wisdom to be able to deliberate well about what is good and 
expedient for himself, not in some particular respect, e.g. about what sorts of 
thing conduce to health or to strength, but about what sorts of thing conduce to 
the good life in general. (1140a24-28) 
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From this passage, we know that to deliberate well is the characteristic mark of 
phronimos, the man who possesses practical wisdom. Phronimos must be able to 
deliberate about what manner of things is conducive to the “good life” in general (τὸ 
εὖ ζῆν ὅλως), i.e., what sorts of things are conducive to eudaemonia. To Aristotle, 
virtue of the soul, health, wealth, friendship, and so on are the constituents or 
necessary conditions of eudaemonia. 154  According to Aristotle’s words in this 
passage, phronimos should have a comprehensive knowledge of the things conducive 
to happiness.  
 
This passage emphasizes that a happy life, in general, is the ultimate end which is 
only achieved by the good deliberation of phronimos. The description of the 
deliberation of phronimos seems to be an extension of the account provided in EN III 
3. First, the task of the good deliberation is indeed to identify the means for the end, 
but this end is the ultimate one, standing atop the teleological chain. The means for 
this ultimate end could also be particular ends, e.g. virtue, health, and friendship, 
which require other deliberative processes to find their appropriate means. These 
particular ends are the constituents or conditions of the ultimate end. Second, the good 
deliberation is always undertaken according to a morally good end: good deliberation 
is not only instrumentally or effectively used to find any means to fulfill the end, but 
also to (morally) find the right means. 
 
As I mentioned previously, these two accounts of deliberation do not conflict, rather 
they express different aspects of deliberation; moreover, only under both of these 
aspects can we have a complete understanding of “deliberation”. In Book III, Aristotle 
focuses more on the motivational aspect in which deliberation provides the means to 
the end in a general, practical domain. Book VI emphasizes more the ethically 
evaluative aspect; agents create a valuable life plan for themselves via deliberation.155 
To fully understand deliberation requires that both aspects be taken into account. The 
former aspect tells us that to deliberate about the means allows us to effectively fulfill 
                                                        
154 It is very controversial whether external goods (e.g. health, wealth,) are constituents or only necessary 
conditions of Aristotle’s eudaimonia. This controversy does not affect my argument, as I believe both 
constituents and conditions can be allowed to be the object of deliberation. 
155 Cf. Charles (1984), p. 262. 
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any particular end; the latter tells us that the deliberation of phronimos must also be 
ethically good. Any particular end of a virtuous person could be the means or 
constituents of his or her happy life, the supreme good, or eudaemonia.  
I do have a point I would like to emphasize here. According to my interpretation in 
Chapter 3, the right end is ensured by ethical virtue. In the virtue-acquiring stage, only 
after the moral agent has acquired basic knowledge of right and wrong can 
deliberation be used to enhance said knowledge; in other words, deliberation 
significantly contributes to the acquisition of virtue. In the virtue-acquired stage, a 
stable and virtuous state has been firmly set; this means that the end determined by 
virtuous person is always right, so the function of deliberation is to find the means to 
achieve the end. In the second stage, virtuous actions reinforce and consolidate the 
virtuous state. The ultimate end is also set gradually by the virtuous person once he or 
she comes into a full understanding of what the “good life” is.  
 
My interpretation of deliberation is not as strong as some intellectualists.156 They 
assert that practical reason is the most important element in end-making, while desire 
plays a relatively negligible role. Practical reason can command desire, and desire (if 
it obeys reason) converts the judgment of a good action into a wish (boulesis) through 
which a concrete action is performed. Deliberation is not merely a process to confirm 
the end which is issued by desire, but rather operates independently of desire to make 
the “real” end. 
 
This very strongly worded version of the intellectualist interpretation endows practical 
reason with a remarkable attribute: that it can formulate the end for the moral agent. 
Surely, this marks a reversal of the traditional interpretation of this issue.157 In the 
traditional perspective, the end is determined by virtue, while practical reason exists 
for the means. Modern scholars typically take a relatively weak position on this. They 
                                                        
156 The most famous one to emphasize the practical reason being able to formulate an end might be D. J. Allan 
(1953). As opposed to most scholars, however, he does not think deliberation is the same as practical reason, 
though he does not explicitly express this distinction until 1955. For Allan, practical reason is expressed in 
action, while deliberation is made before the action. I will come back to the relationship between deliberation 
and practical reason in Section 2.2. 
157 As mentioned before, the interpretation established by Walter, Zeller, and Burnet. 
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admit that practical reason plays a role in determining ends,158 but they do not place 
desire under the control of practical reason as it makes said ends; rather, desire and 
practical reason are given the same importance in determining action. 
 
So how is the content of the ultimate end to a happy life formed, and what kind of 
contribution can deliberation have toward this end? According to Irwin, eudaimonia 
as the ultimate end is reached via consideration of one’s entire life and its various 
stages, as the endpoint must be something whole and complete. Life as a whole, Irwin 
claims, “extends both over different times and over different desires and capacities” 
(1980, pp. 65-6). All stages of life, and the particular interests and desires experienced 
in those stages, together comprise a “whole” life. In order to realize the ultimate end, 
each stage must be carefully considered. We must deliberate well on the manner in 
which we can (or have) fulfill(ed) particular moments to build apotentially happy life; 
otherwise, life can become dominated by instant gratification, e.g. bodily and sensual 
pleasures, and the ultimate end is difficult to realize. The ultimate end of eudaimonia 
is actually, then, made up of many subordinate goals such as courage, generosity, and 
justice. The fulfillment of all of these subordinate goals constitutes the fulfillment of 
the ultimate end. The ultimate end simultaneously guides what constitutes a virtuous 
action in any particular situation. As Irwin says, “to claim that H (judgment about 
happiness) should determine R (judgment of reason) is to claim that the end I 
rationally aim at on a particular occasion should be, or should be ultimately derived 
from, the end I recognize as my ultimate good” (1980, p. 65). 
 
The life trajectory (or “plan”) towards eudaimonia is one in which every deliberative 
step, and also every subordinate end, serves to fulfill the ultimate end, eudaimonia. 
We also seem to have good reason to trust moral people to deliberate simply for the 
sake of eudaimonia. A virtuous person should be able to deliberate on the means and 
constituents best-suited to the ultimate end and make decisions to meet said end by 
turning decisions into actions. If this is true, this deliberative process plays exactly the 
role of the OL. Deliberation shows not only what the action should be done, but why 
it should be done. 
 
                                                        
158 See Sorabji and Wiggins in Rorty (1980). 
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Unfortunately, there are some issues with this definition. The plan to achieve 
eudaimonia, even a well-defined plan, would be too general to prescribe a particular 
action in certain concrete situations. Even virtuous people cannot ensure that their life 
plan can supply the correct deliberation to prescribe the right and moral action in 
every particular situation throughout life. I call this the “indeterminate problem”, and 
would suggest that there are three ways in which it is expressed. 
 
First, identifying the particular subordinate ends or constituents and how they must be 
achieved relies on phronimos’s deliberation, but should virtuous people collect all the 
constituents of eudaemonia or only achieve those that they regard as the most 
important/necessary? This also echoes the problem of the moral learner (L) described 
in Chapter 3: he ranks things by importance while potentially ignoring their 
“goodness”. 
 
Second, the means or constituents found via deliberation on various phronimoi might 
also be (more or less) different. One might choose “A” as means to the end after 
deliberation, but other virtuous people in the same situation might choose “B” after an 
equal amount of deliberation. 
 
Third, phronimos’s deliberation might return many good options for means in difficult 
situations, among which none is more morally preferable than the others. 
 
Under the guidance of the ultimate end, good deliberation will still sometimes fail to 
make good means clear, thus also failing to prescribe the right action. Aristotle does 
not admit, however, that good deliberation can fail even occasionally. He emphasizes 
many times that deliberation or logos determines the right actions, period,159 creating 
a means-end picture that is overly simplistic. There are other factors supplying good 
deliberation that help the moral agent solve the indeterminate problem. In EN VI 7-9 
and VII 3, for example, Aristotle discusses deliberation in a kind of deductive or 
syllogistic form as involving universal knowledge and sharp moral perception used to 
read situations. I will argue that these factors can help us solve the indeterminate 
problem.  
                                                        
159 See also 1136b36-1137a2, 1138b18-20. 
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2.2 Good Deliberation and Practical Syllogism 
Phronesis involves deliberation. To deliberate well is, above all, the ergon of the 
phronimos (τοῦ γὰρ φρονίμου μάλιστα τοῦτ’ ἔργον εἶναί φαμεν, τὸ εὖ βουλεύεσθαι. 
EN VI 7, 1141b9-10).160 Aristotle often states that good deliberation should be done 
in order to identify the means for the noble end. At the end of EN VI 7, he seems to 
associate deliberation with calculation (λογισμός).161 He says that the unconditionally 
good deliberator (ὁ δ’ ἁπλῶς εὔβουλος) achieves the utmost goodness of a human 
being according to calculation. More importantly, this calculation manifests itself in a 
basic deductive or syllogistic form. The information acquired through calculation 
enriches the concept of deliberation toward identifying the means to an end. 
Deliberation also must appeal to the syllogistic reasoning. Please refer to the 
following passage: 
 
(Passage 22) 
ὁ δ’ ἁπλῶς εὔβουλος ὁ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνθρώπῳ τῶν πρακτῶν στοχαστικὸς κατὰ 
τὸν λογισμόν. οὐδ’ ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις τῶν καθόλου μόνον, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τὰ καθ’ 
ἕκαστα γνωρίζειν· πρακτικὴ γάρ, ἡ δὲ πρᾶξις περὶ τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα. διὸ καὶ ἔνιοι 
οὐκ εἰδότες ἑτέρων εἰδότων πρακτικώτεροι, καὶ ἐντοῖς ἄλλοις οἱ ἔμπειροι· εἰ 
γὰρ εἰδείη ὅτι τὰ κοῦφα εὔπεπτα κρέα καὶ ὑγιεινά, ποῖα δὲ κοῦφα ἀγνοοῖ, οὐ 
ποιήσει ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ’ ὁ εἰδὼς ὅτι τὰ ὀρνίθεια κοῦφα καὶ ὑγιεινὰ ποιήσει 
μᾶλλον.  
 
The man who is without qualification good at deliberating is the man who is 
capable of aiming in accordance with calculation at the best for man of things 
attainable by action. Nor is practical wisdom concerned with universals 
only—it must also recognize the particulars; for it is practical, and practice is 
concerned with particulars. This is why some who do not know, and especially 
those who have experience, are more practical than others who know. For if a 
man knew that light meats are digestible and wholesome, but did not know 
                                                        
160 Segvic points out that Irwin’s translation of this sentence is incorrect. Here, I adopt Segvic’s argument: the 
μάλιστα modifies the ergon, rather than the phronimos. Segvic in Pakaluk and Pearson (2011), pp. 159-61. 
161 In 1139a12-3, Aristotle states explicitly this identification too: “τὸ γὰρ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ λογίζεσθαι ταὐτόν,” 
where to deliberate and to calculate is the same. 
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which sorts of meat are light, he would not produce health, but the man who 
knows that chicken is wholesome is more likely to produce health. 
(1141b12-20) 
 
This calculation requires not only universal knowledge, but also the sensibility of the 
particular in order to function properly. The “light meat” example tells us this 
calculation is a type of syllogistic reasoning: the universal (light meat is digestible) is 
the major premise and the particular (chicken is light meat) is the minor premise, 
where the conclusion is the decision to eat chicken.162 This syllogistic reasoning is 
usually called “Aristotelian practical syllogism”, although Aristotle himself does not 
use this term. If both the universal and particular premises are rightly and properly 
fixed in a given moral situation, the corresponding action may not necessarily be done, 
but a right decision can certainly be made after this syllogistic reasoning process; this 
syllogistic reasoning is deliberation. 
 
In EN VI 9, Aristotle identifies “good deliberation” with a certain sort of correct 
deliberation. This correct deliberation also manifests itself in syllogistic form.  
(Passage 23) 
δοκεῖ δ’ ἀγαθόν τι τὸ εὖ βεβουλεῦσθαι· ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη ὀρθότης βουλῆς 
εὐβουλία, ἡ ἀγαθοῦ τευκτική. ἀλλ’ ἔστι καὶ τούτου ψευδεῖ συλλογισμῷ τυχεῖν, 
καὶ ὃ μὲν δεῖ ποιῆσαι τυχεῖν, δι’ οὗ δ’ οὔ, ἀλλὰ ψευδῆ τὸν μέσον ὅρον 
εἶναι· ὥστ’ οὐδ’ αὕτη πω εὐβουλία, καθ’ ἣν οὗ δεῖ μὲν τυγχάνει, οὐ μέντοι δι’ 
οὗ ἔδει.  
 
Now to have deliberated well is thought to be a good thing; for it is this kind of 
correctness of deliberation that is excellence in deliberation, viz. that which 
tends to attain what is good. But it is possible to attain even good by a false 
deduction and to attain what one ought to do but not by the right means, the 
                                                        
162 Aristotle says at least three times that the conclusion of practical syllogism is action. Whether we should take 
his saying literally is still open for debate. For example, Allan (1955) and Anscombe (1963) support the literal 
reading, while Kenny (1979) thinks that it should be understood as a decision to act. For the sake of space I 
will not enter this discussion, but I do follow Kenny’s standpoint. 
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middle term being false; so that this too is not yet excellence in 
deliberation—this state in virtue of which one attains what one ought but not by 
the right means. (1042b20-26) 
 
Vocabulary such as “syllogistic” and “middle term” naturally lead the reader to 
understand this sort of correctness of deliberation as a correct syllogism.163 As 
Aristotle emphasizes, this syllogism must meet two conditions: first, there is a right 
end at which the deliberation should aim and this end can be formed as a universal 
premise; and second, deliberation is a type of deduction inferred from the end toward 
which the steps of the inference must be true. If the end is rightly achieved, but 
through false deductive inference, there is no correctness of deliberation in the 
process. If the inference is true, but from the wrong premises (the universal, particular, 
or both being wrong,) the deliberation likewise is not good.  
 
This seemingly also is an apt fit for Aristotle’s general doctrine of good deliberation. 
The good deliberator is a fully virtuous person who consistently reaches the right end 
through making correct inferences. Moreover, the identification between practical 
deliberation and syllogism makes the deliberation more specifically defined as a 
process of finding the means for the end.  
 
It is important to note that this definition still leaves unanswered questions. Generally 
speaking, it may not be appropriate to make the identification between deliberation 
and syllogism without qualification, as it is still necessary to explain: 1) is the desired 
end motivated by universal knowledge, or is universal knowledge simply generated 
by justifying the end? 2) How does one explain the particular as the object of 
perception as also the object of deliberation? Further, 3) is the conclusion a decision 
to take an action or an action itself?  
 
I do not consider the identification between deliberation and syllogism without any 
qualification, but considering Passages 22 and 23, I would assert that we can at least 
determine that good deliberation and practical syllogism both exist in the fully 
                                                        
163 Cooper (1975) argues that Aristotle does not use this logical term technically; it isused here only to illustrate 
the decision made by the false inference, pp. 45-6.  
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virtuous man. For virtuous people, it is possible to determine the end based on 
universal knowledge, and also possible to find the universal knowledge to justify the 
desired end, as they possess the virtuous state and can grasp the value of universal 
knowledge.  
 
The conclusion of deliberation is a decision to act. For virtuous people, this decision 
necessarily leads to corresponding action; for moral learners or incontinent people, it 
does not. In EN VI 2, Aristotle defines the decision of a virtuous man (which is made 
through deliberation) as a good or serious decision (prohairesis spoudaia) which is 
the efficient cause of action (1139a25-32). In this case, we can also say that the 
decision is almost identical to action (in the sense of necessarily leading to action.) 
This understanding is compatible with Aristotle’s statement that the conclusion of 
practical syllogism is action. The problematic nature of the particular as the object of 
deliberation is discussed further in Section 3.3. 
 
For virtuous (as well as continent and incontinent) people, the practical syllogism or 
good deliberation is the OL per se. This practical syllogism of virtuous people not 
only exhibits the structure of an end set by desire and means found by deliberation, 
but also brings us to a stronger explanation for why a certain action should be done.  
3. Good Deliberation qua the Orthos Logos 
In this section, I will argue that the good deliberation or the right practical reasoning 
process, including both the universal and particular proposition, is the OL per se. 
Neither universal rules nor particular propositions alone can be the OL. I will first 
analyze the precise role of the universal and the particular in terms of practical 
syllogism, and then I will discuss inadequacies inherent to both the rule view and the 
particularists’ view of the OL. In order to accurately establish the relationship 
between the OL and good deliberation/practical syllogism, I will tackle the 
afore-mentioned difficulties arising from the identification between good deliberation 
and practical syllogism. To conclude, I will make a positive argument for good 
deliberation qua the OL.  
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3.1 The Universal and the Particular 
To answer the questions raised above, we first need to take a closer look at the 
elements and the compositions involved in good deliberation. Passage 22 merits 
re-analysis for this purpose. 
 
(Passage 24) 
ὁ δ’ ἁπλῶς εὔβουλος ὁ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνθρώπῳ τῶν πρακτῶν στοχαστικὸς κατὰ 
τὸν λογισμόν. οὐδ’ ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις τῶν καθόλου μόνον, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τὰ καθ’ 
ἕκαστα γνωρίζειν· πρακτικὴ γάρ, ἡ δὲ πρᾶξις περὶ τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα. διὸ καὶ 
ἔνιοι οὐκ εἰδότες ἑτέρων εἰδότων πρακτικώτεροι, καὶ ἐντοῖς ἄλλοις οἱ 
ἔμπειροι· εἰ γὰρ εἰδείη ὅτι τὰ κοῦφα εὔπεπτα κρέα καὶ ὑγιεινά, ποῖα δὲ κοῦφα 
ἀγνοοῖ, οὐ ποιήσει ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ’ ὁ εἰδὼς ὅτι τὰ ὀρνίθεια κοῦφα καὶ ὑγιεινὰ 
ποιήσει μᾶλλον. 
 
The man who is without qualification good at deliberating is the man who is 
capable of aiming in accordance with calculation at the best for man of things 
attainable by action. Nor is practical wisdom concerned with universals 
only—it must also recognize the particulars; for it is practical, and practice is 
concerned with particulars. This is why some who do not know, and especially 
those who have experience, are more practical than others who know. For if a 
man knew that light meats are digestible and wholesome, but did not know 
which sorts of meat are light, he would not produce health, but the man who 
knows that chicken is wholesome is more likely to produce health. 
(1141b12-20) 
 
This passage implicitly tells us that the good deliberator formulates the good end as a 
universal proposition. In the example of light meat, we know that “health” is the good 
end being sought. We can accordingly form a series of syllogisms which together 
comprise a universal proposition referring to the end: everyone (normal people) 
should seek health; I am a normal person, so I should seek health; I must do what is 
necessary for the sake of my health; eating light meat is a means to health, so I should 
eat light meat; chicken is light meat, so I will eat chicken. Assuming health is a 
constituent of eudaimonia, seeking health is for the sake of eudaimonia, because 
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virtuous people should seek eudaimonia. The series of elements which make up the 
syllogistic chain can be formulated differently person to person, but the fundamental 
idea that “every virtuous person should seek the eudainonia” is final. It is the most 
universal proposition which explains why every virtuous action should be done. 
 
The universal proposition alone as the final cause is not sufficient to justify the 
concrete, right action, however. The universal is even not the most important 
proposition leading to the action. In Passage 22, Aristotle emphasizes that knowing 
the particular is more important than knowing the universal when it comes to making 
the right decision. 164  Those who insist that the OL as a (set of) particular 
prescription(s) build their criticism of the rule view also based on this passage. 
Aristotle plays down universal knowledge here. Further, knowledge is even less 
useful than experience in practical domain; thus, the OL cannot be the universal rule 
rather than a particular proposition which is directly related to the particular action. 
The particular proposition describes the morally salient feature of the given situation 
and this proposition is the last order of action, namely, the decision to act propelled by 
deliberation; the conclusion of the practical syllogism is the OL.165 
 
                                                        
164 See also EN VI 8, 1141b21-22; EN VI 9, 1142a14-15, 1142a20-22, 24-27; EN VI 12, 1143a28-29, 1143a35-b5, 
1143b13-14. 
165 This reading of “the particular” is a very traditional and standard reading. The earliest such interpretation may 
be that of Thomas Aquinas in his Summa theologiae, I/II, qu. 7.1: “Dicitur autem in localibus aliquid 
circumestare quod est quidem extrinsecum a re, tamen attingit ipsam, vel appropinquat ei secundum locum. Et 
ideo quaecumque conditiones sunt extra substantiam actus, et tamen attingunt aliquot modo actum humanum, 
circumstantiae dicuntur.” Summa theologiae, Latin Text and English translation, ed. Thomas Gilby, vol. 17, 
London 1970, p. 36. This standard reading was recently challenged by John Cooper, who asserts that 
deliberation terminates in a decision to act in a particular situation, rather in action-type choices. How to 
perform the action in a particular situation is the task of perception, rather than of deliberation. “Universal” 
and “particular” is a false contrast in EN VI 9, where Aristotle discusses practical perception. Cooper argues 
that to kath’ hekaston is used by Aristotle occasionally as a reference to particulars, but sometimes as a 
reference to particular kinds, e.g., horse or man as opposed to animal. In EN VI 9, Aristotle indicates that 
deliberation involves the consideration of action-type rather than the particular. See Cooper (1975), pp. 23-9. 
Space limitations prevent me from discussing Cooper’s argument in detail. Very briefly, I think he 
oversimplifies the condition under which an action is involved in a particular situation—If the decision of the 
action is merely reduced to the work of perception, some cases would certainly necessitate more than 
perception.  
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The particularists criticize the generalist standpoint similarly. They reject the idea of 
deliberation as a theory-building or deductive reasoning exercise (which is a 
fundamental component of the generalist viewpoint.) According to the particularist’s 
interpretation of deliberation, the ultimate end of human life, eudaemonia, is a 
conception of the good which lacks content and instead simply amounts to the 
propensity to read or perceive particular situations in the light of the rubric 
conception—to kalon.166 Due to the variability among particular situations, it is 
effectually impossible to establish a set of fixed rules which correspond neatly. As 
Aristotle often claims, judgment of a particular situation depends on individual 
perception.167 The appreciation of moral situations is the most important capacity of 
phronesis. The particularists assert that building theories or setting rules is not as 
important as weighing various alternatives and identifying the morally salient features 
of the situation at hand; they believe that the role of perception is inappropriately 
minimized by the generalists, for whom the function of perception in phronesis is to 
acquaint the agent with her surroundings and then to use perceptual judgment to 
determine which rule to invoke.168 The particularists instead endow Aristotle’s moral 
perception with a more robust role: that of reading situations, or (they might prefer) 
situational appreciation according to which the right decision is made. 169  The 
emphasis on the perception of particular situations suggests that practical knowledge 
is expressed through perception of the morally salient feature of a given situation 
rather than through any well-defined plan.  
 
Another facet of the generalist view with which the particularists disagree is the fact 
that Aristotle often claims that the subject-matter of politics is variable (ἔχει 
διαφορὰν), to the effect that there is no exactness (ἀκριβὲς) in politics as in other 
demonstrative sciences: it is enough to outline the truth roughly (παχυλῶς καὶ 
                                                        
166 E.g. McDowell (1998), pp. 27-8. 
167 See EN II 9, 1109b12-23. 
168 C.f. McDowell (1998): “In the ‘rule’-‘case’ picture, the most obvious role for perception is to contribute 
awareness that certain conditions, which are in fact the conditions specified in a rule, are satisfied.” p. 28. 
169 This term was coined by Wiggins. Although he emphasizes that moral perception provides us the features of 
particular situation, he does not claim that he is a particularist explicitly, pp. 232-3. 
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τύπῳ).170 The particularists think that the subject matter of ethics is, in Aristotle’s 
mind, too fluid and variable to be codified.171 
 
If the particularist view is correct, it supports the OL as a proposition which applies to 
a particular situation, because moral perception encountering the situation seems to be 
the most important step in the reasoning process. They would also not address the 
problems which my deliberation view grapples with. I agree that the particular is more 
important than the universal in the practical domain, but I do not agree that the 
particular alone can be the OL. The particular needs, but also entails, the universal. 
This passage also tells us that the calculation can lead to the right or best action—and 
the calculation includes both the universal and particular. In effect, the right 
calculation or deliberation is the OL which is a reasoning process including both the 
universal and particular. I will continue to argue this claim below by my specific 
objection to the particularist view. 
3.2 Objection to the Particularist View 
Both generalists and particularists recognize the importance both of the particular and 
the general proposition in Aristotle’s ethics; the difficulty with these interpretations 
lies in assigning normative priority to either one. Irwin (2000) argues that the 
particular proposition has no priority over the general one, but rather the opposite. 
The priority of the general proposition, Irwin argues, is that principles or rules guide 
the particular judgment and the latter simply conforms to the former. In the following, 
I borrow from his argument not in order to endorse Irwin’s view without qualification, 
but to demonstrate the contribution of universal rules and deliberation necessary for 
the particularist view. 
 
First, though Aristotle states several times that ethical generalizations are usual and 
inexact, these statements are not necessarily characterized by uselessness or 
unimportance. Irwin argues that the “usual” implies not only a sense of frequency, but 
also a sense of normalcy. For example: horses usually have four legs, as the nature of 
the horse dictates, but some horses may have three legs; this exception does not deny 
                                                        
170 See EN 1094b11-27; 1104a1-9; 1141a16-19. 
171 E.g. McDowell (1979); Nussbaum (1990). 
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the validity of the generalization that horses usually have four legs, however. The 
nature of the horse is the “norm” described by Irwin. He goes on to argue that the 
field of ethics is similar to the science of biology or physics which also entails a norm. 
In ethics as well as physical sciences, we must appeal to principles both unqualified 
and usual.172 Irwin asserts that in ethical theory, it is “unwise, for practical purposes, 
to try to build all the qualifications into our principles, even if it is possible to build 
them in.” (2000, p. 113) In other words, different disciplines have different demands 
for exactness and ethics should stop at principles that are stated only roughly,173 lest 
the practice be misguided by exact principles that apply only to other sciences.174 
 
We do have such rules: wealth is good without qualification (but not good for 
everyone,) for example. Virtue results in happiness in appropriate conditions (though 
not in all conditions without exception.) Aristotle does not list all the exceptions and 
qualifications with exact formulations to replace the usual rules, however. To account 
for this, Irwin suggests that we should not “take the usual rules any less seriously 
simply because they are usual…. Our recognition of the usual character of some rules 
helps us to take them seriously; for we will not be disconcerted to find that they have 
exceptions.”(2000, p. 114) 
 
Second, the “inexactness” is not due to our propensity for creating generalizations 
simply as summaries, but because we recognize them as providing normative 
guidance. For example, virtue is defined as a mean state (which is a generalization) 
and individual virtues, e.g., bravery and temperance (which are particular) are defined 
by specifying that generalization: “…bravery is this kind of mean, temperance is that 
                                                        
172 Irwin relies mainly on the beginning passage of EN, in which Aristotle implies that we are on the road towards 
principles. “Let us not fail to notice, however, that there is a difference between arguments from and those to 
the first principles. For Plato, too, was right in raising this question and asking, as he used to do, ‘are we on the 
way from or to the first principles?’ There is a difference, as there is in a race-course between the course from 
the judges to the turning-point and the way back. For, while we must begin with what is familiar, things are so 
in two ways—some to us, some without qualification. Presumably, then, we must begin with things familiar to 
us” (1095a30-b4).  
173 Plato expressed a similar idea: different crafts have different exactness. See Philebus 55eff. 
174 This passage is cited by Irwin to support this argument: “For a carpenter and a geometer look for right angles 
in different ways; the former does so in so far as the right angle is useful for his work, while the latter inquires 
what it is or what sort of thing it is; for he is a spectator of the truth” (1098a29-31). 
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kind, and so on. When Aristotle tells us to attend to particulars, he does not abandon 
generalizations; he describes the generalizations we should look for.”(2000, p. 116) 
Basically, the definition is not based on a summary of the individual virtues, rather the 
individual virtues through the universal definition of virtue. 
 
Why does Aristotle not replace the inexact, usual generalization with an exact 
generalization equipped with all the possible exceptions? Well, according to Irwin, 
deliberation can contribute in the domain in which we have fewer rules to use. Let’s 
look again at the passage on deliberation in EN to help us understand Irwin’s 
argument. 
 
(Passage 25) 
καὶ περὶ μὲν τὰς ἀκριβεῖς καὶ αὐτάρκεις τῶν ἐπιστημῶν οὐκ ἔστι βουλή, οἷον 
περὶ γραμμάτων (οὐ γὰρ διστάζομεν πῶς γραπτέον)· ἀλλ’ ὅσα γίνεται δι’ 
ἡμῶν, μὴ ὡσαύτως δ’ ἀεί, περὶ τούτων βουλευόμεθα, οἷον περὶ τῶν κατ’ 
ἰατρικὴν καὶ χρηματιστικήν, καὶ περὶ κυβερνητικὴν μᾶλλον ἢ γυμναστικήν, 
ὅσῳ ἧττον διηκρίβωται, καὶ ἔτι περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ὁμοίως, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ περὶ 
τὰς τέχνας ἢ τὰς ἐπιστήμας· μᾶλλον γὰρ περὶ ταύτας διστάζομεν. τὸ 
βουλεύεσθαι δὲ ἐν τοῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ἀδήλοις δὲ πῶς ἀποβήσεται, καὶ ἐνοἷς 
ἀδιόριστον.  
 
And in the case of exact and self-contained sciences there is no deliberation, 
e.g. about the letters of the alphabet (for we have no doubt how they should be 
written); but the things that are brought about by our own efforts, but not 
always in the same way, are the things about which we deliberate, e.g. 
questions of medical treatment or of money-making. And we do so more in the 
case of the art of navigation than in that of gymnastics, inasmuch as it has 
been less exactly worked out, and again about other things in the same ratio, 
and more also in the case of the arts than in that of the sciences; for we have 
more doubt about the former. Deliberation is concerned with things that 
happen in a certain way for the most part, but in which the event is obscure, 
and with things in which it is indeterminate. (1112a34-b9) 
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Deliberation is merely involved in the domain where we have only inexact rules. 
When these inexact rules cannot directly tell us what we ought to do, deliberation 
works. Because ethics is a science which has a vast array of inexact rules, deliberation 
is necessary for the agent who acts in moral situations. Inexact rules are qualified in 
particular situations by deliberation, but this merely means that inexact general rules 
are limited in use rather than that they have no function as guidance in particular 
situations.If we make inexact, usual rules into exact rules with the addition of 
numerous qualifications or specifications, we would make rules too complicated to 
learn or apply. Irwin emphasizes the contribution of deliberation accordingly. “Instead 
of trying to learn fully qualified generalizations,” he says, “it is better to try to learn to 
recognize and to compare the considerations that ought to guide us in assessing the 
different claims of different usual generalizations.” (2000, p. 120) 
 
The final difficulty faced by Irwin which merits discussion here is that Aristotle 
connects practical wisdom with perception in EN VI. Aristotle claims that practical 
wisdom is about the particular, which is the object of perception.175 He also claims 
that universals are derived from particulars, which are the object of a special kind of 
perception, i.e., nous.176 Irwin does not believe that such claims support particularism, 
but insists that the good deliberation of phronimos includes applying generalization 
with normative force. Perception is not used to summarize the material for moral rules, 
but rather to form the skill of applying general rules to particular situations.177 The 
perception of a particular situation depends on the acceptance of these generalizations, 
and “such dependence does not conflict with Aristotle's claim that universals are 
derived from particulars. Aristotle might simply mean that prudent people revise their 
general principles in the light of their situational appreciation.” (2000, p. 125)178 
Irwin argues against McDowell’s argument that perception recognizes the salient 
                                                        
175 1142a26-30, “…while practical wisdom is concerned with the ultimate particular, which is the object not of 
knowledge but of perception—not the perception of qualities peculiar to one sense but a perception akin to 
that by which we perceive that the particular figure before us is a triangle; for in that direction too there will be 
a limit. But this is rather perception than practical wisdom, though it is another kind of perception.” 
176 1143b2-b5, “…while in practical reasoning it grasps the last and contingent fact, i.e. the second proposition. 
For these are the starting-points of that for the sake of which, since the universals are reached from the 
particulars; of these therefore we must have perception, and this is comprehension.” 
177 Cf. EN 1126a31-b4. 
178 Cf. Wiggins in Rorty (1980), p. 233. 
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features in particular situations; he also draws a relationship among salience with 
relevance and decisiveness. Perception has no such special role in identifying either 
the relevant or the decisive features, however, but rather deliberation provides the 
awareness of decisiveness towards relevant elements. 
 
Irwin may be correct in his assertion that the universal rule has normative priority 
over the particular. I will not evaluate this claim here. He may also be right that the 
general rule is necessary and important for a particular action, and the particularist 
may likewise agree with this role of the general rule but disagree that the function of 
perception that he or she typically advocates must also be trained by universal rules 
and deliberation. I accept Irwin’s argument that universal rules are necessary for 
particular right actions, as they provide the general guidance to the moral agent. Said 
guidance must be adapted into particular situations by deliberation, however. Only the 
full deliberative process can inform the moral agent of how and why he must 
complete the particular right action; and this whole process is the OL. The 
particularist can draw a picture of what to do, but not why. The particular proposition 
alone is not adequate to comprehensively define the role of the OL. So the particular 
proposition is not the OL, but the right deliberation is, since the latter can provide the 
explanatory account. 
 
Another argument of Irwin’s that I accept is that the function of the moral perception 
is trained by universal rules and deliberation. I admit that a particular situationis not 
reached by deliberation, but rather by perception. This observation does not support 
the particularist view, as it is moral perception, not deliberation itself that relates 
directly to the effect of deliberation.179 
3.3 Moral Perception, Experience, and Deliberation 
If the particularists are correct that perception rather than deliberation plays the 
dominant role in reading any particular situation and providing the basis for moral 
                                                        
179 McDowell insists that the particular premise is reached by perception rather than deliberation or phronesis, 
while Moss argues that some are by deliberation and some by perception, i.e., perception assists deliberation 
when necessary. My argument marks a departure from both of these views, I agree the particular is reached by 
perception (like McDowell) but argue that this perception can read particular features due to the training of 
deliberation, not just instances of supply from deliberation as Moss argues. 
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judgement, then the OL could not be deliberation, since the perception would 
seemingly comprise the entire OL. Deliberation can be the OL only if perception is 
also (indirectly) under the control or influence of deliberation, in which case 
perception is a token of deliberation.  
 
Irwin only partially supports this point. The example of perceiving a baked loaf, 
which Irwin takes from EN III 3, seems to fall under an assumption that this 
perception is the same as in EN VI, where it is usually called “moral perception”. 
Irwin does not give us any further detailed explanation, however. The only support for 
his argument is that moral perception is trained, as opposed to sense-perception. What 
is the relationship between deliberation and these two kinds of perception, though? 
And how do they apply to universals and particulars?  
 
Aristotle discusses this perception in the following difficult passages in EN VI 8: 
 
(Passage 26) 
ὅτι δ’ ἡ φρόνησις οὐκ ἐπιστήμη, φανερόν· τοῦ γὰρ ἐσχάτου ἐστίν, ὥσπερ 
εἴρηται· τὸ γὰρ πρακτὸν τοιοῦτον. ἀντίκειται μὲν δὴ τῷ νῷ· ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς 
τῶν ὅρων, ὧν οὐκ ἔστι λόγος, ἣ δὲ τοῦ ἐσχάτου, οὗ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη ἀλλ’ 
αἴσθησις, οὐχ ἡ τῶν ἰδίων, ἀλλ’ οἵᾳ αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι τὸ [ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς] 
ἔσχατον τρίγωνον· στήσεται γὰρ κἀκεῖ. ἀλλ’ αὕτη μᾶλλον αἴσθησις ἢ 
φρόνησις, ἐκείνης δ’ ἄλλο εἶδος. 
 
That practical wisdom is not knowledge is evident; for it is, as has been said, 
concerned with the ultimate particular fact, since the thing to be done is of this 
nature. It is opposed, then, to comprehension; for comprehension is of the 
definitions, for which no reason can be given, while practical wisdom is 
concerned with the ultimate particular, which is the object not of knowledge 
but of perception—not the perception of qualities peculiar to one sense but a 
perception akin to that by which we perceive that the particular figure before 
us is a triangle; for in that direction too there will be a limit. But this is rather 
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perception than practical wisdom, though it is another kind of perception.180 
(1142a23-30) 
 
In this passage, Aristotle connects practical wisdom with perception, which is 
concerned with the particular, but he does not describe the character of this perception 
very clearly. What he does do is remind us that this perception is similar to the 
perceptual recognition of shapes, which I call “mathematical perception”; conversely, 
we may call the practical wisdom connected perception “practical perception” or 
“moral perception”. In the light of the analogy to mathematical perception, we can 
readily distinguish moral perception from the basic sense-perception: I see a white 
thing or I hear a sound.181 Any reasonable scholar would agree that moral perception 
is trained, but how exactly is the moral perception trained? What can the trained 
moral perception do? 
 
Let us first think about the character of mathematical perception which is used by 
Aristotle in Passage 24, where there is at least one aspect of this type of perception 
made quite clear—namely, that it is easy for a person without mathematical training 
to know that a particular figure is, say, triangular, but hard for him to know it as a 
mathematical triangle. To be able to do this would involve basic training in geometry. 
The universal generalization is involved both during and after this training. The 
medical domain yields another example: a doctor can handle various and complex 
illnesses after perceiving them by managing a larger quantity of universal medical 
knowledge about the structure of a healthy human body. 
 
                                                        
180 Here, I espouse Bywater’s translation ἀλλ’ αὕτη μᾶλλον αἴσθησις ἢ φρόνησις rather than μᾶλλον αἴσθησις ἡ 
φρόνησις, which exists in some manuscripts. According to the latter, perception is identified with phronesis. 
This reading is also favored by Reeve (2012, p. 68), but I don’t think it is a correct reading. There are three 
reasons. (i) φρόνησις is διανοητικοί άρεταί, and as such έξεις (1106a11). αΐσθησις, however, is a δύναμις 
(Αn.Post. 99b33). (ii) According to Aristotle, one cannot have knowledge by perception alone (DA 417b23), 
because knowledge proper is concerned with universals. φρόνησις and νους are also concerned with universals, 
and so count as knowledge, in the 'for the most part' sense in which those terms may be properly applied to 
practical inquiries. (iii) φρόνησις is closely associated with βούλευσις, deliberation. It is ό βουλευτικός who 
has practical wisdom (1140a31). However, among the things about which one cannot deliberate are particular 
facts; of those, one has αΐσθησις (1113a2). 
181 This type of perception is discussed by Aristotle in DA. See 418a7-25, 425a14-24. 
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If mathematical perception is trained by universal knowledge, then it is reasonable to 
believe that the universal rule or generalization is inextricably involved in training 
moral perception. We have to admit that the moral situation might not be explained 
with a similar analogy as the triangle. The universal which serves the particular in the 
practical domain applies differently to the theoretical domain. In Aristotle’s example 
of the general, practical domain, he tells us that we need trained perception to tell if a 
loaf is baked and that this trained perception also involves universal generalization.182 
I believe there is further evidence to reveal similar characteristics of moral perception.  
 
In EN VI 11, Aristotle says: 
(Passage 27) 
καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ’ ἀμφότερα· καὶ γὰρ τῶν πρώτων ὅρων καὶ τῶν 
ἐσχάτων νοῦς ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ λόγος, καὶ ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀποδείξεις τῶν ἀκινήτων 
ὅρων καὶ πρώτων, ὁ δ’ ἐνταῖς πρακτικαῖς τοῦ ἐσχάτου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου καὶ 
τῆς ἑτέρας προτάσεως· ἀρχαὶ γὰρ τοῦ οὗ ἕνεκα αὗται· ἐκτῶν καθ’ ἕκαστα γὰρ 
τὰ καθόλου· τούτων οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ αἴσθησιν, αὕτηδ’ ἐστὶ νοῦς. 
 
And comprehension is concerned with the ultimates in both directions; for 
both the primary definitions and the ultimates are objects of comprehension 
and not of argument, and in demonstrations comprehension grasps the 
unchangeable and primary definitions, while in practical reasoning it grasps 
the last and contingent fact, i.e. the second proposition. For these are the 
starting-points of that for the sake of which, since the universals are reached 
from the particulars; of these therefore we must have perception, and this is 
comprehension. (1143a35-b5) 
 
In Passage 27, Aristotle introduces nous into the practical domain. Like the theoretical 
nous, the practical nous is also concerned with ultimates (τῶν ἐσχάτων), but the 
                                                        
182 Irwin gives us a similar example: “We might, for instance, learn how to cook an omelette. We notice that it is 
better not to allow it to cook completely in the pan. We form the generalization 'Take it out when it's still a 
little runny.' This generalization, however, still cannot be applied by means of ordinary perception alone; we 
need experience and trained perception to estimate how runny is a little runny” (2000), pp. 127-8. 
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meaning of the ultimate under the theoretical nous must differ from that under the 
practical nous. The theoretical nous is concerned with the highest axioms of 
science,183 while the practical nous is concerned with precise facts. The minor 
premise of a practical syllogism states that a particular fact is the ultimate (e.g., 
chicken is light meat,) while the major premise relates to the universal (e.g., eating 
light meat is healthy.) Aristotle identifies this practical nous with perception here. 
Aristotle does not simply identify nous de facto with sense-perception. This 
perception must have been trained. One can immediately perceive chicken as a light 
meat only if they have learned the basic characteristics of the light meat; this 
perception of a particular meat confirms the original knowledge of light meat, i.e., 
perception is formed under the guidance of the corresponding knowledge.  
 
How exactly are “universals… (reached) from [the] particular” in the practical 
domain? It is widely accepted that universal rules are established by induction in the 
theoretical domain;184 we also must admit then that the universals in the practical 
domain come from induction, sense perception, or habituation which must be gained 
through experience.185 The universals reached from the particular in this context refer 
not to generalization via induction, because perception in question is not sense 
perception but rather is in the sense of nous. 
 
In the practical domain the universal is, as opposed to its role in the theoretical 
domain, the formulation of the end which the moral agent is tasked with fulfilling. For 
                                                        
183 Ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἕξεων αἷς ἀληθεύομεν αἱ μὲν ἀεὶ ἀληθεῖς εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ ἐπιδέχονται τὸ ψεῦδος, 
οἷον δόξα καὶ λογισμός, ἀληθῆ δ’ ἀεὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπιστήμης ἀκριβέστερον ἄλλο γένος ἢ 
νοῦς, αἱ δ’ ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδείξεων γνωριμώτεραι, ἐπιστήμη δ’ ἅπασα μετὰ λόγου ἐστί, τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐπιστήμη μὲν 
οὐκ ἂν εἴη, ἐπεὶ δ’ οὐδὲν ἀληθέστερον ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ἐπιστήμης ἢ νοῦν, νοῦς ἂν εἴη τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἔκ τε τούτων 
σκοποῦσι καὶ ὅτι ἀποδείξεως ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἀπόδειξις, ὥστ’ οὐδ’ ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμη. εἰ οὖν μηδὲν ἄλλο παρ’ 
ἐπιστήμην γένος ἔχομεν ἀληθές, νοῦς ἂν εἴη ἐπιστήμης ἀρχή. καὶ ἡμὲν ἀρχὴ τῆς ἀρχῆς εἴη ἄν, ἡ δὲ πᾶσα ὁμοί 
ως ἔχει πρὸς τὸ πᾶν πρᾶγμα. An. Post. 100b 5-16. 
184 An. Post. 90a 28-30, ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ αἰσθέσθαι καὶ τὸ καθόλου ἐγένετο ἂν ἡμῖν εἰδέναι. ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις ὅτι νῦν 
ἀντιφράττει (καὶ γὰρ δῆλον ὅτι νῦν ἐκλείπει)· ἐκ δὲ τούτου τὸ καθόλου ἂν ἐγένετο. See also; 81b 3-9; 87b 
39-88a 6; 88a 12-16; 90b 26-30; 99b 22-35; 100b 3-4. 
185 EN I 7, 1098b3-8, τῶν ἀρχῶν δ’ αἳ μὲν ἐπαγωγῇ θεωροῦνται, αἳ δ’ αἰσθήσει, αἳ δ’ ἐθισμῷ τινί, καὶ ἄλλαι δ’ 
ἄλλως. μετιέναι δὲ πειρατέον ἑκάστας ᾗ πεφύκασιν, καὶ σπουδαστέον ὅπως διορισθῶσι καλῶς· μεγάλην γὰρ 
ἔχουσι ῥοπὴν πρὸς τὰ ἑπόμενα. δοκεῖ γὰρ πλεῖον ἢ ἥμισυ τοῦ παντὸς εἶναι ἡ ἀρχή, καὶ πολλὰ συμφανῆ 
γίνεσθαι δι’ αὐτῆς τῶν ζητουμένων. 
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example, “eating light meat is healthy” presupposes the desire of the moral agent to 
be healthy. In order to fulfill this end, he must find the means by deliberation; the 
particular (type) of possible means is the last step of deliberation. The performance of 
a concrete action, however, requires the facility of perception to provide the available 
means at that exact moment. This type of perception can cooperate with deliberation 
to make action happen, because this perception has acquired moral sensibility by 
moral training (which involves also deliberation or rational reflection) over the long 
term.186 This is the essence of “the universals reached from the particulars” in the 
practical domain.187 
 
Aristotle does emphasize the importance of experience in the ethical domain, however. 
The trained moral perception cannot be deprived of experience. The following 
passage in EN VI 11 confirms that Aristotle credits experience in ethical matters. 
 
(Passage 28) 
ὥστε δεῖ προσέχειν τῶν ἐμπείρων καὶ πρεσβυτέρων ἢ φρονίμων ταῖς 
ἀναποδείκτοις φάσεσι καὶ δόξαις οὐχ ἧττον τῶν ἀποδείξεων· διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἔχειν 
ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὄμμα ὁρῶσιν ὀρθῶς. 
 
Therefore, we ought to attend to the undemonstrated sayings and opinions of 
experienced and older people or of people of practical wisdom not less than to 
demonstrations; for because experience has given them an eye they see aright. 
(1143b11-14) 
 
This passage tells us that experience is important for ethical matters, as experience 
allows the moral agent an eye to see what is right. The emphasis on experience seems 
to create another distinction between theoretical and practical matters. In the 
theoretical domain, knowledge is a system of demonstration searching for “the 
because” (aitia). Experience sits on a lower level than knowledge because it cannot 
provide the moral agent an account of “the because”. In the practical domain, as the 
                                                        
186 Although I have a different understanding of this passage compared to Reeve, I draw, occasionally, the same 
conclusion on this point.  
187 This interpretation is similar to Broadie’s (2002), pp. 378-9. 
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above passage tells us, experience seems sufficient to dictate particular actions. It is 
not necessary to have or resort to either rule or principle or demonstration to identify 
the cause of said actions. 
 
As I have already argued, Aristotle’s ethics do not target moral theory but rather right 
actions in for all situations. To this effect, rules and principles are not the ends which 
Aristotle wants to establish. There is also no doubt that any particular action is taken 
with the aid of experience, but that does not mean that there is no need to find “the 
because” to form certain types of practical knowledge (like knowledge in the 
theoretical domain.) As discussed in Section 2, achieving eudaimonia is the final end 
for which virtuous people perform virtuous actions. In addition, Aristotle does not 
claim that the moral agent should rely solely upon experience to identify virtuous 
actions; experience alone cannot supply a sufficient explanatory account of why a 
given action is correct. Based on experience, phronimos should go one step further to 
integrate the practical universal knowledge into a final explanation for the action. 
 
Deliberation or practical syllogism differs substantially in meaning from the 
theoretical syllogism. The universal proposition does not play the same role in 
practical and theoretical syllogism, either. The similarity between them can, however, 
adequately illuminate the explanatory function of the good deliberation or correct 
practical syllogism. 
3.4 Deliberation as Prescription and Explanation 
An argument for the requirement of “the because” in the practical domain as in the 
theoretical domain has been systematically and persuasively made by Jessica Moss 
(2014). To flesh out my own argument, I think it behoves me to further discuss the 
basics of her argument here. 
 
In the theoretical domain, Aristotle states several times that universal knowledge is 
attained based on experience. Experience is only a collection of phenomena, while 
craft and knowledge grasp “the because”. The most famous evidence of this is as 
follows: 
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We think that knowledge and understanding belong to art rather than to 
experience, and we suppose artists to be wiser than men of experience (which 
implies that wisdom depends in all cases rather on knowledge); and this because 
the former know the cause, but the latter do not. For men of experience know 
that the thing is so, but do not know why, while the others know the ‘why’ and 
the cause. (981a24-30)188 
 
Moreover, knowing the why or “the because” is (or is similar to) possessing logos: 
“…we view them as being wiser not in virtue of being able to act, but of having the 
theory for themselves and knowing the causes (κατὰ τὸ λόγον ἔχειν αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰς 
αἰτίας γνωρίζειν)” (981b6).189 Moss understands this logos as “an entire explanatory 
argument: a syllogism that includes the statement of the cause account as a first 
premise, and goes on to show what it explains” (Moss, p. 207). 
 
To identify the logos with (a wider genus of) syllogism is a reasonable move, since 
both of them are loaded the explanatory function, though we do not have many direct 
textual evidences to support this claim. We do know that syllogism etymologically 
means a combination of different logoi, thus, syllogism is also a kind of logos. 
Theoretical science demands a demonstrative syllogism, i.e., an explanatory account: 
“…a demonstration is a syllogism that reveals the cause and the why” (An. Post. 
85b23-4).190The relevant logos at work here is a demonstrative syllogism consisting 
of “the that” (explanandum) and “the why” (explanans).  
 
In the ethical context, the right logos is also an explanatory syllogism of relevant 
phenomena. Its basic structure is identical to that of the demonstrative syllogism. As 
discussed above, Aristotle identifies deliberation with the practical syllogism, 191 for 
example, by saying “there is no deliberation of ends” (EN 1112b11-12), or that“there 
is no syllogism or logos of the end” (EE 1227b23). Without an end there is also no 
                                                        
188 See also An. Post. 71b9-12; 90a5-7. 
189 See also An. Post. 74b27-8; cf. Gorgias 465a; Laws 720a-d. 
190 See also An. Post. 78b3-4. 
191 Again 1139a11-13; 1141b11-4; 1142b1-2; De Memoria 453a13. 
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deliberation or logos; deliberation or logos begins to work only after the end has been 
set (EE 1226b25-30).  
 
The end is considered as the fundamental assumption or the “starting-point” (archē) 
of the reasoning process. “For inferences (syllogisms) which deal with acts to be done 
are things which involve a starting-point, viz. ‘since the end, i.e. what is best, is of 
such and such a nature’, whatever it may be”(EN VI.12, 1144a31-3). The 
starting-point of a deliberation process, just like a demonstration process, is the 
explanations or causes (aitiai) of the conclusions.192 The conclusion is the action 
which deliberation tells us ought to be done, and the “why” is traced back to the 
stating-point of deliberation, which is the final cause.  
 
Moss continues to enhance her argument by saying this: the final cause possessing the 
fully explanatory account presupposes that deliberators have been individually 
equipped with universal knowledge and an appreciation of various details in each 
particular situation. The fully trained doctor (grasped the logos) and the doctor honing 
his skills only according to his experience have the same final cause—recovering their 
patients’ health—and also may take the same action to do so, but the former possesses 
a fully explanatory account of the action due to his systematic medical knowledge, 
while the latter does not.  
 
In the ethical domain, fully virtuous people have fully explanatory accounts for each 
virtuous action. Deliberation or practical syllogism expressly provides this 
explanatory account. The logos is identified with (a wider genus of) deliberation and 
practical syllogism,193 thus, the OL qua good deliberation is the right prescriptive 
                                                        
192 There are also a few differences between theoretical demonstration and practical deliberation listed by Moss 
(2014) “In demonstration one begins with a grasp of the explanandum and searches for the explanans; in 
deliberation one instead begins with a grasp of the explanans—one lays down a goal—and searches for the 
explanandum (preccription).” 2) “In deliberative syllogisms, unlike theoretical ones, the explanandum is a 
prescription: what gets explained is why something should be done.” 3) “In deliberative syllogisms the 
explanans is always a final cause… in demonstrative syllogisms…the explanans can be any of the four causes 
but is always ‘logically’ a formal cause”, pp. 215-6. 
193 Another important and explicitly supportive passage is from EN VII 3, 1147a31-b3, where, as I discussed in 
Chapter 1, Aristotle describes the akratic deliberation well but in opposition to the right deliberation, as the 
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(telling what to do) cum explanatory (explaining why) account (Moss (2014), p. 219). 
 
This interpretation fits very well within the ethical context. As discussed above, the 
moral function of the OL is to prescribe the right action and to regulate feelings to an 
appropriate degree. How the OL qua deliberation or reasoning regulate feelings and 
virtue-building action is discussed in detail in Chapter 3. My position at this stage 
differs from Moss’s, though she does not open any analysis of the virtue-acquiring 
stage in her work.194 My argument for the function of reason in moral development, I 
think, is fairly persuasive. In the virtue-acquired stage, the moral agent is equipped 
with both full ethical virtue and phronesis. The OL qua right deliberation to identify 
the means to the end also suits my argument related to the definitions of ethical virtue 
and phronesis. Aristotle also emphasizes that in the virtuous stage, the learner has not 
only kata OL, but also meta OL. The OL qua deliberation functions better than any 
other candidates, e.g., rules or particular propositions. In the context of enkrates and 
akrates, the OL is identified implicitly with deliberation by Aristotle. Further, 
deliberation or practical syllogism is defined as a reasoning process which not only 
prescribes what to do but also tells us why to do it in given situation.  
 
Regarding the relationship Aristotle identifies between phronesis and the OL in 
1144b27-8, according to mine and Moss’s present interpretation, the identification is 
most likely a loose expression or overstatement deployed in order to emphasize the 
connection between them. But Moss is also happy to leave open the possibility that 
Aristotle may de facto introduce a new meaning: the meaning of the “virtuous state”. 
It is hard to judge whether or not Aristotle really has changed his mind from defining 
the OL as the rational activity of phronesis to defining it as phronesis itself 
somewhere in the middle of the text. The passage from MM II 10 which I discussed in 
Chapter 1 shows that the logos prima facie possesses different meanings in different 
places in MM, but even if the 1144b27 passage really delivers a new definition of 
virtue, it is one that is derived from the definition of the explanatory account; namely, 
                                                                                                                                                              
appetite is opposed to the OL. (There is a printing mistake in Moss’s quotation: it should be EN VII 3 rather 
than VI 3, see p. 212.) 
194 In another article, “Virtue makes the Goal Right”, Moss argues very firmly that the rational activity cannot 
effect the goal which is set separately by desire; this effectively renders the intellectual view void. See Moss 
(2011). 
Chapter 4: The Orthos Logos in the Virtue-Acquired Stage 
 155 
the OL as a virtue also has to be built upon the ability to seek means and to determine 
why certain means fit certain situations. Accordingly, the prescriptive and explanatory 
account is the fundamental meaning of the logos. 
 
Moss establishes her argument based on the identification between logos, practical 
syllogism, and deliberation. As I mentioned above, this identification is not without 
any qualification. Further, Moss does not respond to potential challenges to her 
position very extensively. In my argument, I have not only made the necessary 
modifications, but also provide a detailed explanation as to why the universal or 
particular proposition alone cannot be the OL. To this effect, though our standpoints 
are similar, my argument is more detailed than Moss’s.  
4. Advantages of Deliberation qua the Orthos Logos 
Generally speaking, the advantages of my interpretation of the OL lie in two features: 
it fits well the context of the Ethics, and it more comprehensive explanatory power 
than the proposition view (both universal and particular.) From the point of view of 
the context of the Ethics, this interpretation first of all brings us a most coherent 
reading of the sixth Book with the entirety of the EN, and then makes the whole of 
Aristotle’s ethics as a more compact and systematic work of literature. (I will make 
this advantage clearer in my final chapter which serves as a summary of my entire 
argument.) Here, I would like to attempt to elucidate the challenging textual 
understanding of the sixth Book in terms of the relationship between the OL and 
phronesis, universal knowledge, and experience via my interpretation of deliberation 
qua the OL.  
 
According to my interpretation, the OL is the right deliberation generated by 
phronesis. I make this point in effort to explain why Aristotle identifies the OL with 
phronesis. The ethical virtue is not only κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, but also μετὰ τοῦ 
ὀρθοῦ λόγου. I’ll quote this passage again for the sake of convenience:  
 
(Passage 29) 
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σημεῖον δέ· καὶ γὰρ νῦν πάντες, ὅταν ὁρίζωνται τὴν ἀρετήν, προστιθέασι, τὴν 
ἕξιν εἰπόντες καὶ πρὸς ἅἐστι, τὴν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον· ὀρθὸς δ’ ὁ κατὰ τὴν 
φρόνησιν. ἐοίκασι δὴ μαντεύεσθαί πως ἅπαντες ὅτι ἡ τοιαύτη ἕξις ἀρετή ἐστιν, 
ἡ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. δεῖ δὲ μικρὸν μεταβῆναι. ἔστι γὰρ οὐ μόνον ἡ κατὰ τὸν 
ὀρθὸν λόγον, ἀλλ’ ἡ μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου ἕξις ἀρετή ἐστιν· ὀρθὸς δὲ λόγος 
περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡ φρόνησίς ἐστιν.  
 
This is confirmed by the fact that even now all men, when they define 
excellence, after naming the state and its objects add ‘that (state) which is in 
accordance with the right reason’; now the right reason is that which is in 
accordance with practical wisdom. All men, then, seem somehow to divine 
that this kind of state is excellence, viz. that which is in accordance with 
practical wisdom. But we must go a little further. For it is not merely the state 
in accordance with right reason, but the state that implies the presence of right 
reason, that is virtue; and practical wisdom is right reason about such matters. 
(1144b26-28). 
 
Ethical virtue is acquired from the process of following the right deliberation of 
phronimos. After virtue is acquired, ethical virtue is always present with right 
deliberation owing to the fact that virtue is a prohairetic state and virtue is always 
connected to phronesis, which generates the right deliberation to find the right action 
in a particular situation. The identification between phronesis and the OL is thus 
loosely overstated to emphasize the causality between the phronesis and the OL. 
 
A right or virtuous action is not only “the that” which should be done, but also entails 
“the why” grasped by virtuous people during right deliberation. This is an explanatory 
structure beginning with reading or perceiving the given situation, then seeking the 
right action, which needs first of all experience—a fully virtuous person extracts the 
universal rule from his or her experience to fully establish the reason that the action to 
be done is correct. Acting by experience and saving experience is the prime 
characteristic of the moral learner. Fully virtuous people act not only according to 
experience, but rather by reasoning. The right reasoning or deliberation is 
characteristic of phronesis. Aristotle emphasizes experience simply to make the 
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reader keenly aware of its function in terms of the particular action, not to exclude the 
necessity of searching “the why”.  
 
The advantages of this textual understanding also introduce a stronger explanatory 
power than the proposition view. Clearly, based on the above discussion, rules or 
principles are involved in the right deliberation for particular situations although they 
are usual and inexact. These usual rules or principles cannot be the OL, however, as a 
rule is too general as-is to apply to all possible particular actions. In order to apply to 
a particular situation, the rule must be adjusted per the situation via the right 
deliberation generated by phronesis (ὀρθὸς δ’ ὁ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν). The OL must 
function according to a particular situation to which the rule is appropriately adapted. 
The OL cannot be a particular proposition either, as a particular proposition alone 
cannot include “the why”, i.e., a full explanation of the particular action. 
 
Right, particular propositions that are morally useful for an action can only be made 
by deliberation and universal rules together. First, if we take the OL as only a 
proposition (whether universal or particular,) it would obscure the importance of 
phronesis, which is inextricably connected to virtue, generates good deliberation, and 
trains moral perception. Aristotle emphasizes this throughout the entire sixth Book of 
EN. This obscuration brings us face-to-face again with the problem that Book Six or 
even the entire Ethics is inconsistent, as Aristotle does not define the OL in regards to 
any form of proposition.  
 
Even if we admit that the proposition view does account for the importance of 
deliberation, a particular proposition is not suitable for the condition of μετὰ τοῦ 
ὀρθοῦ λόγου. According to Aristotle, the ethical virtue is not only in accordance with 
the OL but also is present with the OL. As I argued above, any particular proposition 
seems to be made right at the moment at which a particular situation is faced, and 
different situations have different propositions. Some particular propositions might be 
used once and then never again. Therefore, it is impossible for the always-changing 
proposition to be present with the ethical virtue.  
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In fact, in some situations, it is not reasonable or economical at all to make particular 
propositions. By “economical”, I mean that deliberation or a virtuous state can render 
the proposition-making process unnecessary. In some cases, the right action results 
directly and immediately from the virtuous state rather than first requiring a 
proposition for the particular situation, followed by an action. The example of the 
brave person in EN III 8, 1117a 17-22, for instance, tells us that the man standing firm 
and fearless in the face of sudden danger is braver than those who are only fearless in 
meeting danger already foreseen—in short, braveness in the given situation results 
directly from a brave state of character. In this kind of particular situation, e.g., 
sudden danger, Aristotle tells us explicitly that there would be little time and space for 
deliberation to identify the right action let alone to form a proposition through 
deliberation. It is simpler (and safer) to perceive the sudden danger and instantly react. 
The reaction to danger is, in this case, formed completely the immediate state of the 
person in the situation and by that state along. The OL cannot be a particular 
proposition, but rather the right deliberation to find the intermediate of the particular 
situation, i.e., a right action for a given situation. If it can always do rightly, that is to 
say, it becomes a state which grasps the practical truth; and Aristotle calls it phronesis. 
This phronesis can thus be deemed as state of grasping the OL. 
 
One may still ask whether the OL could be a particular proposition which does not 
result from general rules and deliberation, but rather is directly issued by something 
else. In this case, without any aid of universal rules or deliberation process, how could 
phronimos grasp a particular proposition suddenly in the face of a particular situation? 
The particularist would say from perception. And yes, sense perception can give us a 
particular proposition without the aid of universal rules (e.g., this is red, or this is 
sweet,) but such propositions separate from universal rules are useless for producing 
moral actions. Without the knowledge that eating too many sweets is unhealthy, one 
may eat too many because they bring him pleasure. He must know first the universal 
rule that eating too many sweets is unhealthy, and then he can find the intermediate to 
eating sweets. 
 
As argued above, only after the moral agent has been trained, collected experience, 
and obtained basic practical knowledge can he use his trained perception to adapt 
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universal rules to particular situations, then to find intermediates for his actions. 
Before the training is complete, a particular proposition formed only by sense 
perception is still useless for moral action because the moral agent has no knowledge 
of the intermediate of his situation. Only after he is trained can he form a proposition 
to describe or summarize the basic features of what has been perceived with the 
senses; then this description can be used again later in a similar, but particular 
situation. This is exactly the process from perception to experience, then to a kind of 
knowledge, and finally back to a particular situation. The OL is not, then, a particular 
proposition formed by sense perception. The particular proposition that is useful for 
making a moral decision is built via moral perception, which is formed under training 
(deliberation) and guidance (universal rules). 
 
If we are to understand that the OL, for a fully virtuous person, is the right 
deliberation generated by phronesis in ethical matters, our understanding conforms to 
all the passages in which Aristotle discusses the OL. First of all, we need universal 
rules or principles although they may be inexact and usual. We then need good 
deliberation and moral perception to apply the corresponding rules to a particular 
situation and to find the intermediate deemed as a moral action. Because the situation 
is always particular, phronesis as an intellectual virtuous state is always present with 
virtuous people as they deliberate upon what is best to be done then and there; 
otherwise, we have no proposition to guide actions into particular situations, nor can 
the intermediate be identified appropriately. In this process, the reasoning activity of 
phronesis plays exactly the role of the OL and they can be identified as equal terms. 
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Conclusion 
After a comprehensive and careful examination of topics related to and interpretations 
of the definition of the OL, I have shown that the decisive function of the OL is to 
build a virtuous state and generate virtuous action. In view of this moral function of 
the OL, I have also explored the advantages and disadvantages of all major existing 
interpretations as well as my own. My interpretation, which I developed based on 
preceding interpretations is based on the existence of two different moral stages: the 
virtue-acquiring stage and the virtue-acquired stage. My inquiry has not only exposed 
the moral function of the OL in significant detail and across different stages of the 
moral learner’s life, but also has allowed me to pinpoint the value and advantages of 
my definition of the OL compared to other interpretations.  
 
According to my interpretation, the OL is ultimately the right practical reasoning or 
right deliberation which is generated by intellectual virtue, i.e., phronesis. In the 
virtue-acquiring stage, the OL is something different for moral learners: an incomplete 
piece of the deliberative form or a proposition separate from the reasoning sequence. 
Especially at the very beginning of the moral learning process, the OL for moral 
learners arguably is 1) a type of formulation or articulated declaration, e.g., the 
guidance as a request or command of the moral guider; this guidance could be (1a) a 
proposition either regarding a universal rule (the major premise of the practical 
reasoning of phronimos) or (1b) regarding a particular situation (the conclusion of the 
practical reasoning of phronimos.) Because moral learners have not acquired the “that” 
in this very initial stage of moral learning, they cannot use their reason actively to 
make any moral judgment. What they can do is simply imitate and follow the 
guidance of the moral guider, namely the formulation of phronimos. This process is 
more mechanical than rationally reflective, although the rational activity is already 
somewhat involved. 
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In the later stages of the moral leaning process, moral learners actively utilize their 
deliberative capacity to identify the right action to be done per situation and regulate 
their feelings appropriately. They will also attempt to develop proper explanations for 
particular actions. They use rational deliberation to help them make the right choices 
in these later stages, but they cannot make right choices all the time as they are still 
learning the features of particular situations through experience or cannot ensure the 
right end (or right desire) in all particular situations. They have decided to lead a 
virtuous life, and have accepted eudaemonia as the ultimate end; but the capacity to 
make the right choice in every situation is still being built and the rational faculty is 
yet tasked with making decisions in accordance with emotions. It is crucial to 
recognize the contribution of calculation and deliberation in this virtue-acquiring 
stage. This is a function of the OL in a loose sense, but once it applies to all particular 
situations, it is the OL in a strict sense. The application of plans and rules in particular 
situations depends on deliberation, and the firm state also depends somewhat on 
deliberation and decision-making in the virtue-acquired stage, so I believe 
deliberation to be more fundamental than proposition in the later stages of moral 
learning. 
 
Once the capacity for deliberation has matured (i.e. the ability of good deliberation 
generated by phronesis has reached its peak,) the moral agent (i.e., fully virtuous 
person) can consistently identify the right action for any given situation; further, he or 
she can also provide a full explanation for why this or that action should be done then 
and there. This process of searching for the right reason is indeed the deliberation 
process, which involves knowing the universal and the particular of the given 
situation; deliberation can rightly determine the right action for the situation at hand. 
This interpretation is advantageous in that it makes the ethical text more coherent, 
comprehensive, and inclusive than the proposition view. Further, the rule view cannot 
cover all the particular factors that are actually under consideration, and the 
particularist view does not fully explain why a particular action is called for in a 
particular situation. 
 
I’ll gladly admit that there may be questions or concerns remaining in regards to my 
interpretation both from the textual and interpretive aspects. Why, for example, would 
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Aristotle place the OL concept in such an important position but fail to define it 
explicitly? How am I to prove that my interpretation accurately reflects Aristotle’s 
interpretation of the OL?  
 
First, in this thesis I do not aim to prove that my interpretation aligns precisely with 
Aristotle’s personal interpretation but rather to introduce a coherent, architecturally 
merit-worthy reading of his entire work on ethics. The main topic of the Nicomachean 
Ethics is the question of how humans are to achieve supreme goodness, i.e., 
eudaemonia and its constituents such as virtue (both ethical and intellectual.) Under 
my interpretation, Aristotle does not give us an answer to what the OL is directly, not 
because there is no such an answer but because the answer cannot be expressed 
straightforwardly. 
 
The OL appears differently from what the OL is per se in the virtue-acquiring stage. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, there are several kinds of moral guidance in this stage: 
universal rule, a proposition about a particular situation, or, occasionally, the rational 
activity of the moral learners which can contingently play the role of the OL, and 
which of these different kinds of moral guidance is used is dependent on the moral 
situation. One rule is the best kind of moral guidance in this situation, but in another 
situation the best may be a particular proposition being an order issued by the moral 
guider. It is, accordingly, very challenging to give one clear-cut description of the OL 
in the virtue-acquiring stage. I argue that among these types of moral guidance, 
Aristotle treasures the growing rational activity most of all despite the fact that in the 
virtue-acquiring stage, the rational activity of the moral learner does not always lead 
her to the right decision.  
 
Again, in his discussion on the virtue-acquiring stage, Aristotle emphasizes the 
process of building a virtuous state. This process is defined by Aristotle as habituation, 
but under the umbrella of the “habituation” concept is actually a complex process 
including mechanical training and rational reflection; their contribution to achieving 
virtue differ and change among different phases of the virtue-acquiring stage. Rational 
reflection then goes on to play a more and more important role as virtue is continually 
developed and cemented in the moral learner. Once the moral learner matures, i.e., 
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reaches the virtue-acquired stage, rational reflection in the form of practical 
deliberation plays the decisive role for virtuous action. This deliberation is discussed 
repeatedly and at length by Aristotle in his ethical work, especially in Book Six, 
where it is defined as the activity generated by phronesis inextricably linked to ethical 
virtue (and finally is identified with the OL in some sense.) We can, accordingly, 
consider right deliberation to be the OL, but neither we nor Aristotle himself can 
maintain this definition through such a dynamic process. 
 
My inquiry not only proves that Aristotle actually does provide us his best answer to 
the question of what the OL is, but also leads us toward a reading of the Nicomachean 
Ethics as a consistent and coherent work. Its structure and argument are well designed 
by Aristotle at the onset, (though neither are accomplished perfectly in the end of the 
work.) 
 
With respect to the interpretive concern, there are several weak points in my 
interpretation which I have addressed above and will summarize below.  
 
First, from my interpretation, the achievement of ethical virtue is nearly entirely 
dependent on rational reflection. This seems to imply that there are a set of basic rules 
or principles that the learner seeks to gain an explanation for virtue; if these 
particulars can be connected to a given situation, the right action should become clear. 
Seemingly, then, ethical virtue is taught deductively; but Aristotle places ethical 
virtue achieved from habituation in contrast against intellectual virtue that is 
taught/learned.  
Second, the example of the brave person in EN III 8, 1117a 17-22 tells us that the man 
standing firm and fearless in the face of sudden danger is braver than those who are 
only fearless when facing dangers already foreseen. This argument seems to suggest 
that a brave action done after deliberation is not as brave as the action done 
immediately without any deliberation involved.  
 
Third, under the grand conception of eudaemonia and complicated situations inherent 
to human life, though deliberators can appreciate all the particular elements, different 
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deliberators might select different means to fulfill the same end. By the same token, 
one deliberator may find it difficult to make right decisions among several doable or 
even good options. 
 
I will comfortably admit that in my model, the ethical virtue is somewhat teachable. 
In the earlier phases of the virtue-acquiring stage, mechanical habituation mainly 
leads the way to acquiring virtue while in the later phases, the rational reflection of 
the moral learner slowly takes over that task (though habituation continues to play an 
auxiliary role.) Certain basic rules and principles are well-understood by the learner 
and he can adapt them to particular situations, though these rules and principles are 
not without exception. “Taught” and “habituated” can be compatible and even 
co-involved. Ethical virtue is generally acquired through habituation, but teaching 
rules remains helpful. The acquisition of intellectual virtue also necessitates 
habituation to make the intellectual state firm and stable. Aristotle makes the 
distinction between habituation and teaching not to exclude one or the other, but to 
emphasize that they characterize different types of virtue differently. 
 
The example of braveness really seems a contradiction to Aristotle’s own definition of 
virtue as a prohairetic state. To emphasize the role of deliberation so highly is to 
reflect the complexity of any particular situation with which the moral agent is faced. 
It is deliberation that helps moral agents make right decisions in particular situations, 
and deliberation generally needs time—excellent deliberation is completed very 
quickly, however (1142b26-27), assuming that the moral agent has faced similar 
situations many times during training and that said deliberation is supported by 
habituation. In highly familiar situations, the moral agent may act even without 
deliberation. There are other possible interpretations of this point,195 which I will 
leave up to another scholar to discuss.  
 
The last one is quite tricky. According to my interpretation, good deliberation is 
generated by phronesis, which is always connected ethical virtue. This ensures that 
                                                        
195  One important modern theory interprets this virtuous action without deliberation as “apparently” 
non-deliberative, automatic behavior. There is actually a reasoning process hidden beneath normal 
consciousness, however. See J. Fodor (1968). 
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actions are always right and pointing the moral agent toward the ultimate end, i.e., a 
happy life. Good deliberation also involves both knowledge of a series of relevant 
universal rules and particular situations that guarantees the deliberation is soundly and 
reasonably conducted. We cannot absolutely eliminate the risk of “impossible” 
decisions, however, i.e., those in which ultimate right and ultimate wrong are patently 
unclear or very obscure. Virtuous people can easily tell right from wrong, but may 
find it difficult to choose between two good options. In this situation, the moral agent 
may be more or less reliant on ethical “luck”: another interesting topic that Aristotle 
has left us to discuss.  
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